scholarly journals An Approach to Developmental Cognition in Organizations

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Emre Caglar

<p>As an enthusing concept to re-define the organizational cosmos in a novel form, this study approve the cognition of individuals as a starting point. Despite the abundant study of organizational cognition concept, there remains an uncharted area which depicts; how perceptions of different cognitive capacities might hierarchise the organizational cosmos. Upon this, we used ‘Kohlberg’s Moral Development Theory’ as a metaphor and found 3 hierarchic cognitive level which characterize on different justification modes. Also an additional theoric level identified for possible phenomenons. We show that the consideration styles of organization members evolve while their cognitive capacities and related environmental perceptions broaden and that these shifts are consistently patterned. An objective scale was developed using an ontological approach to confirm the oral interviews. Eventually, we obtained two different scales for industrial use.</p>

2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246
Author(s):  
Stephanie Anderson ◽  
Brian Bourke

The authors make the argument that trauma journalism should be taught as part of the postsecondary curriculum in journalism schools. As part of that education, students will learn that coping with the psychological effects of repeated exposure to such events can have long-term impacts on their mental health. As Kohlberg and Rest found, students in college are at a pivotal point in their moral development. Education takes place as adolescents are developing key psychological skills, including moral and ethical decision-making. Collegiate journalists should be gaining these valuable reasoning skills as it relates to covering traumatic events.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Najia Zulfiqar

Previous studies supported that adolescents’ moral judgment decreases as their peer problems increase in severity. The objective of the present research was to examine peer problems as a predictor of adolescents’ moral judgment development based upon Jessor’s problem behavior theory and Gibbs moral development theory. It was hypothesized that moral judgment increases with growing age and thus, older adolescents are expected to be at higher stages of moral judgment development than younger adolescents. It was also assumed that adolescents with severe peer problems will be at lower level of moral judgment development than their counterparts. The younger adolescents (n = 140; M = 13.1 year) and older adolescents (n = 147; M = 19 year) were compared on measures of Index of Peer Relations and Padua Moral Judgment Scale. The findings showed that adolescents’ moral judgment development declined with an increase in peer problems, particularly during late adolescence. Adolescents who reported having moderate and severe peer problems had lower level of moral judgment development than those with no and mild peer problems. Findings provided guideline for future researchers and practitioners.


Author(s):  
Unoma B. Comer ◽  
Suki Stone

Teacher burnout as the result of poor career choice and decision making plagues new teachers in the field of education, as well as special education. This chapter introduces theories of moral development and self-efficacy that explain the thought processes of teachers whose expectations in the field do not match the reality of teacher practice. Therefore, their decision making to enter the field contributes to early teacher burnout. Three case studies are described as examples to understand how the psychology of choice determines the factors that result in burnout. The chapter describes how the teachers' decisions relate to the psychology of moral development theory and self-efficacy theory for their career choice. Their behavior and attitude as a teacher relates to their catastrophic choices. The chapter presents suggestions that teachers can implement to make better decisions for their career choice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans

The chapter defines the concept of a self-cultivation philosophy. This proposes that human beings can and should move from a troubled state of existence to some ideal state of being via spiritual exercises guided by some philosophical analysis. Philosophy is defined as a reflective practice that seeks understanding of fundamental assumptions in our life. Philosophy may be a practical discipline or a theoretical one, and it may be based on whatever cognitive capacities human beings possess, including reason and awareness. This claim is defended by reference to virtue epistemology. Self-cultivation philosophy has a four-part structure: an account of human nature, an existential starting point, an ideal state of being, and a transformation program. The transformation program consists of exercises which have four functions: Cognition, Purification, Doctrine, and Habituation. Self-cultivation philosophies are often expressed in transformational texts intended to guide people in how to live their lives according to the philosophy


Author(s):  
Oliver Li

AbstractOn virtue ethical grounds, Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson recently recommended that near-future AIs should be developed as ‘Friendly AI’. AI in social interaction with humans should be programmed such that they mimic aspects of human friendship. While it is a reasonable goal to implement AI systems interacting with humans as Friendly AI, I identify four issues that need to be addressed concerning Friendly AI with Fröding’s and Peterson’s understanding of Friendly AI as a starting point. In a first step, I briefly recapitulate Fröding’s and Peterson’s arguments for Friendly AI. I then highlight some issues with Fröding’s and Peterson’s approach and line of reasoning and identify four problems related to the notion of Friendly AI, which all pertain to the role and need for humans’ moral development. These are that (1) one should consider the moral tendencies and preferences of the humans interacting with a friendly AI, (2) it needs to be considered whether the humans interacting with a Friendly AI are still developing their virtues and character traits, (3) the indirect effects of replacing humans with Friendly AI should be considered with respect to the possibilities for humans to develop their moral virtues and that (4) the question whether the AI is perceived as some form of Artificial General Intelligence cannot be neglected. In conclusion, I argue that all of these four problems are related to humans moral development and that this observation strongly emphasizes the role and need for humans moral development in correlation to the accelerating development of AI-systems.


2019 ◽  
Vol 98 (98) ◽  
pp. 85-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Beatrice Fazi

It is often argued (and feared) that the human capacity to pay attention is being transformed by computational technologies. Are computing machines distraction machines? This article takes this question as its starting point in order to address concerns about attention deficits visà-vis questions and issues about the mechanisation of cognitive procedures. I will claim that, when approaching the attention ecology of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to differentiate between augmentation and automation. While augmentation implies the extension of predefined forms or modes of behaviour, contemporary developments in computational automation ask us instead to consider the possibility of moving beyond phenomenological analogies. The article will thus discuss how transformations in the capacity to pay attention in a computational age need to be analysed in relation to the emergence of quasi-autonomous artificial cognitive agents driven by AI technologies, such as those known as machine learning. I will argue that these artificial cognitive agents can no longer be described in terms of technological add-ons to pre-existing human cognitive capacities. Today, we think alongside machines that are, is a sense, already thinking. Similarly, we pay attention alongside machines that are, in a sense, already paying attention. The challenge for philosophy and cultural theory is that of moving beyond 'projectionist' conceptions of such technological agency. This challenge, however, also involves overcoming the anthropomorphism that is implicit in expression such as 'thinking machines'. In a century where robot-to-robot communications have outpaced and outnumbered human-machine interactions, these artificial cognitive agents are not just reframing the human capacity to pay attention: they are also re-structuring the conditions for such capacity. Addressing the conditions for attention beyond augmentation and vis-à-vis computational automation involves considering the role and scope of both human and algorithmic decisionmaking, and engaging with the ways in which the humanities can intervene upon contemporary complex cognitive scenarios.


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