What Are Self-Cultivation Philosophies?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans

The chapter defines the concept of a self-cultivation philosophy. This proposes that human beings can and should move from a troubled state of existence to some ideal state of being via spiritual exercises guided by some philosophical analysis. Philosophy is defined as a reflective practice that seeks understanding of fundamental assumptions in our life. Philosophy may be a practical discipline or a theoretical one, and it may be based on whatever cognitive capacities human beings possess, including reason and awareness. This claim is defended by reference to virtue epistemology. Self-cultivation philosophy has a four-part structure: an account of human nature, an existential starting point, an ideal state of being, and a transformation program. The transformation program consists of exercises which have four functions: Cognition, Purification, Doctrine, and Habituation. Self-cultivation philosophies are often expressed in transformational texts intended to guide people in how to live their lives according to the philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-140
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans

The chapter argues that ancient Epicureanism (mainly Epicurus, Lucretius, and Philodemus) is plausibly interpreted as a self-cultivation philosophy. The existential starting point is a life of irrational fears and frustrated desires. The ideal state of well-being is a life of pleasure, understood primarily as the absence of physical pain and mental distress (more tranquilism than hedonism). This ideal life is free of fear of death and the gods, and it is devoted to friendship, moral virtue, and the pursuit of desires only if they are natural and necessary. The philosophical foundation is a materialist, atomistic theory of nature and human nature that entails that death is nothing to fear, the gods are unconcerned with us, and only natural and necessary desires are important. We achieve this ideal through spiritual exercises that involve learning Epicurean philosophy, modifying desires, and cultivating virtue in a community of like-minded people.


Author(s):  
Daniel Jacobi

“Human nature” is not a notion that has originated from theories of world politics. On the contrary, it represents one of the oldest points of reference in various cultural traditions of thought. An aspect, however, that makes the current status of the human in international relations (IR) interesting is the fact that since the 1980s, the discipline has undergone a rigorous and critical examination of its core terminologies. Above all, this effort has led scholars to become aware of the concurrent appropriations of their terms: once as scientific concepts and once as ontological facts. However, while various aspects of the human have always found their way into the theorization of world politics, so far the actual impact of the equally diverse “models of man” on the latter has hardly been subjected to systematic consideration. Observing “human nature” not only as a “naturally given fact” but also as an observational concept connects IR with the broader literatures on how the (political) world may be interpreted and analyzed. The proposition to begin a reappraisal of “human nature’s” framing effects on the basis of the distinction of anthropological and post-anthropological approaches (Human Beings in International Relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015) calls upon IR scholars to appreciate what happens when they study world politics through a lens that either places the human at the center of its observations or one that opts to decenter it to different extents. A reflection on the distinction of an international political anthropology and an international political post-anthropology as a starting point for theory building then not only draws attention to what is included and excluded in regard to the human when studying world politics. It moreover exposes how different views on the (post)human come to shape different theoretical architectures. What is more, it also reveals that such foundations do not run parallel to the classical IR heuristic of distinct paradigms. A closer look at their post-human foundations then shows how much these schools of thought, once conceived as highly coherent, have now been differentiated internally. The said absence of a systematic debate on the status of the human in the IR theories also poses a challenge to this article. Not only is the human still rarely reflected upon as a theoretical core concept; at the same time, parallel debates exist that are guided less by theoretical frameworks but rather by the problems that arise from specific ideas about the post-human. In this sense, this article also pursues a dual strategy: on the one hand, the listing either of obvious or subtle uses of post-human views by various theoretical traditions, and on the other hand, the identification of specific core problems that have formed in the wake of specific angles on the post-human. Since inquiries into the post-human also include an intersection of IR theories with other scientific literatures, the article also features text references that will help readers find their way into the state of the art of those important adjacent debates.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kleio Akrivou ◽  
Manuel Joaquín Fernández González

There is a need of deeper understanding of what human beings are for facing adequately global challenges. The aim of this article is to point to the possible contributions that transcendental anthropology would represent for complementing and expanding the valuable, but still incomplete solutions put forward by personalist virtue ethics to face these challenges. In particular, the question of the moral motivation and the complex relations between virtue and freedom are addressed, taking as a starting point the understanding of the uniqueness of the personal act-of-being and the transcendentality of human freedom, which is in dialogue with human nature and society, but ultimately not subdued to none of them. Some implications of the transcendental anthropology in the field of interpersonal communication ethics are put forward.


2021 ◽  
pp. 167-194
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans

The chapter argues that Pyrrho and ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism (specifically, Sextus Empiricus) are plausibly interpreted as accepting a self-cultivation philosophy, though in somewhat different senses and with some qualification. For both, the existential starting point is an emotionally troubled life rooted in beliefs about the world, and the ideal state of being is a life of tranquility without these beliefs and guided by appearances. It is difficult to say what spiritual exercises Pyrrho thought were needed to achieve the ideal state: perhaps learning his philosophy and habituating ourselves to follow it. However, for Sextus, employment of skeptical arguments was the primary exercise. Since neither Pyrrho nor Sextus supposed we could make assertions about the specific nature of things, neither had a philosophy of human nature in a straightforward sense. Nonetheless, presentations of their outlooks betray some perspective on this (e.g., about the relationship between absence of belief and tranquility).


2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (12) ◽  
pp. 1-2
Author(s):  
Andrew St. Stephanos ◽  

The human person is both biological and transcendent, and it is necessary to see this reality to respect and protect all human beings. The inviolable dignity of every human being from fertilization until death is key to building a bridge between disparate philosophies of human nature. In this article, Andrew St. Stephanos proposes a starting point for building an understanding between rival philosophical factions by first understanding the nature of Man.


2021 ◽  
pp. 82-110
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans

The chapter argues that the teaching of the Buddha, Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, and Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra are each plausibly interpreted as self-cultivation philosophies. For each, the existential starting point is that we are caught in a cycle of rebirth permeated by suffering caused by craving, something rooted in the delusion that we are selves or have an intrinsic nature. The ideal state of being is centrally the awareness that we are not selves or are empty of an intrinsic nature. This awareness—nirvana—is a state of peace and compassion that ends the cycle of rebirth. The transformation from suffering to nirvana is achieved through intellectual, ethical, and meditative disciplines, the spiritual exercises, namely the Eightfold Path or the Six Perfections. Though Buddhism denies that there is a self, this denial is connected to an understanding of human nature as consisting of five kinds of “aggregates” and having the capacity for enlightenment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (34) ◽  
pp. 7-25
Author(s):  
Tamás Demeter

I suggest that it is fruitful to read Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding as a concise exposition of an epistemic ideal whose complex philosophical background is laid down in A Treatise of Human Nature. Accordingly, the Treatise offers a theory of cognitive and affective capacities, which serves in the Enquiry as the foundation for a critique of chimerical epistemic ideals, and the development of an alternative ideal. Taking the "mental geography" of the Treatise as his starting point, this is the project Hume pursues in the Enquiry. The epistemic ideal Hume spells out in the Enquiry is an alternative to competing ideals: the Aristotelian, the Cartesian, and the Newtonian, and can be read as an exposition of the epistemic ideal of modern science. Although the spell of the Aristotelian and the Cartesian ideals had been in decline for several decades by the 1740s, they had not fully lost their grip on the philosophical imagination. Yet, it was the Newtonian epistemic ideal that became dominant in Scotland and Britain by then, guiding inquiry in moral and natural philosophy, as well as in medical theory. Hume offers a critique of these ideals. He shows that Aristotelian and Cartesian epistemic aspirations rest on mistaken views on human cognitive capacities. And albeit the Newtonian ideal is not prone to this mistake by Hume's standards, its epistemic expectations extend far beyond the limits of those capacities. Hume's epistemic ideal can be read as a correction, limitation and refinement of the Newtonian ideal: it sets epistemic aims and propagates methods for the production of fallible, limited and potentially useful knowledge that falls short of the great epistemic expectations of Newton and many Newtonians - but it conforms to what we expect from modern science.


Author(s):  
Volker Scheid

This chapter explores the articulations that have emerged over the last half century between various types of holism, Chinese medicine and systems biology. Given the discipline’s historical attachments to a definition of ‘medicine’ that rather narrowly refers to biomedicine as developed in Europe and the US from the eighteenth century onwards, the medical humanities are not the most obvious starting point for such an inquiry. At the same time, they do offer one advantage over neighbouring disciplines like medical history, anthropology or science and technology studies for someone like myself, a clinician as well as a historian and anthropologist: their strong commitment to the objective of facilitating better medical practice. This promise furthermore links to the wider project of critique, which, in Max Horkheimer’s definition of the term, aims at change and emancipation in order ‘to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them’. If we take the critical medical humanities as explicitly affirming this shared objective and responsibility, extending the discipline’s traditional gaze is not a burden but becomes, in fact, an obligation.


Author(s):  
Alan L. Mittleman

This chapter moves into the political and economic aspects of human nature. Given scarcity and interdependence, what sense has Judaism made of the material well-being necessary for human flourishing? What are Jewish attitudes toward prosperity, market relations, labor, and leisure? What has Judaism had to say about the political dimensions of human nature? If all humans are made in the image of God, what does that original equality imply for political order, authority, and justice? In what kinds of systems can human beings best flourish? It argues that Jewish tradition shows that we act in conformity with our nature when we elevate, improve, and sanctify it. As co-creators of the world with God, we are not just the sport of our biochemistry. We are persons who can select and choose among the traits that comprise our very own natures, cultivating some and weeding out others.


1970 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muskinul Fuad

The education system in Indonesia emphasize on academic intelligence, whichincludes only two or three aspects, more than on the other aspects of intelligence. For thatreason, many children who are not good at academic intelligence, but have good potentials inother aspects of intelligence, do not develop optimally. They are often considered and labeledas "stupid children" by the existing system. This phenomenon is on the contrary to the theoryof multiple intelligences proposed by Howard Gardner, who argues that intelligence is theability to solve various problems in life and produce products or services that are useful invarious aspects of life.Human intelligence is a combination of various general and specific abilities. Thistheory is different from the concept of IQ (intelligence quotient) that involves only languageskills, mathematical, and spatial logics. According to Gardner, there are nine aspects ofintelligence and its potential indicators to be developed by each child born without a braindefect. What Gardner suggested can be considered as a starting point to a perspective thatevery child has a unique individual intelligence. Parents have to treat and educate theirchildren proportionally and equitably. This treatment will lead to a pattern of education that isfriendly to the brain and to the plurality of children’s potential.More than the above points, the notion that multiple intelligences do not just comefrom the brain needs to be followed. Humans actually have different immaterial (spiritual)aspects that do not refer to brain functions. The belief in spiritual aspects and its potentialsmeans that human beings have various capacities and they differ from physical capacities.This is what needs to be addressed from the perspective of education today. The philosophyand perspective on education of the educators, education stakeholders, and especially parents,are the first major issue to be addressed. With this step, every educational activity andcommunication within the family is expected to develop every aspect of children'sintelligence, especially the spiritual intelligence.


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