scholarly journals Board Independence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Italy

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Stella Lippolis ◽  
Francesco Grimaldi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
High Concentration ◽  
Management Activity ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Italian Context

This research aims to analyze the relationship between the characteristics of the Board of Directors (BoD) and the effectiveness of the monitoring of earnings manipulation activities in family – controlled companies in Italy. In particular, specific hypotheses relating to the link between those aspects of the Board, that substantiate its independence, and earnings quality have been formulated to verify whether the mechanisms for monitoring management activity are less effective in these companies. This study applies a univariate and multivariate methods on a sample of Italian listed company over the period 2014-2016.  Earnings management is defined by the proxy of abnormal working capital accrual (AWCA) estimed model according to DeFond and Park (2001). Proxies for corporate governance mechanism are the board size, the level of board independence, the CEO non-duality and the interaction between the last two variables. The research shows that independent directors are not, as in other contexts, a factor that contributes to earnings quality, in the same way that the separation of the offices of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief executive Officer (CEO) does not appear to be relevant to this end. The study aims to provide a double contribution. First, the research represents one of the few studies concerning the Italian context with its peculiarities, taking into consideration the earnings management issue in companies with a high concentration of family ownership. Secondly, this study aims to further stimulate the debate on the most effective features of structure and composition of the BoD in family-controlled companies: specifically, the conclusions could lead to a reconsideration of the validity of certain characters of the boards that defines independence.

scholarly journals The effects of board characteristics on earnings management

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 96-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lanfeng Kao ◽  
Anlin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Group Affiliation ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between board characteristics and earnings management. Management of a firm may engage in earnings management for his own benefit. However, under proper corporate governance mechanism, the board of directors might be able to monitor the firm and prevent the management from engaging in earnings management. We find that when the board size is large, the higher the extent of earnings management. However, when there are more outside directors in the board, the extent of earnings management is lower. The effects of board characteristics on earnings management are significant only for group affiliation firms or non-electronic firms.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and earnings management in New Zealand

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-55
Author(s):  
Dyna Seng ◽  
Justin Findlay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors

This paper examines the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management. Using data collected from New Zealand listed companies for the financial year ending in 2005, the results show that the size of the board of directors is significantly positively associated with earnings management. This suggests that larger boards seem to be ineffective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards. On the other hand, the independence of the board of directors, the independent role of the board chair and chief executive officer, and the independence of audit committees are not significantly associated with earnings management. Thus, these three corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective at monitoring the discretionary choices of management. The lack of effective corporate governance in New Zealand, particularly with regard to boards of directors, is mainly due to the lack of “experience and skills required to oversee the scale, complexity, and characteristics of finance operations” (Ministry of Economic Development, 2009, p.8)

scholarly journals Board of directors and board of statutory auditors’ diversity and earnings management: Evidence from Italy

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 42-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pier Luigi Marchini ◽  
Alice Medioli ◽  
Veronica Tibiletti ◽  
Silvia Triani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
International Regulation ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Management Behaviour ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Impact

The importance of diversity within corporate boards has been demonstrated both from the literature and also from the national and international regulation. The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of diversity on the Board of Directors and in the Board of Statutory Auditor on Earnings Management behaviour. Starting with a random sample of 121 non-financial Italian listed companies, we hand-collected corporate governance data from the corporate governance report to investigate how firms deal with the opportunistic behaviour of EM, through the appointment of members with specific features. Our findings show that, even though diversity within the Board of Directors is not associated with Earnings Management, the presence of female and member expertise on Board of Statutory Auditor instead curb Earnings Management. Based on these findings we argue that pursuing a good degree of diversity in the corporate boards could help to improve the earnings quality and, in particular, to reduce Earnings Management behaviour.

scholarly journals The controlling power of royal family members on the board of directors and audit committee effectiveness

Accounting ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 987-992
Author(s):  
Khaled Salmen Aljaaidi ◽  
Abdulaziz Alothman ◽  
Raj Bahadur Sharma ◽  
Omar Ali Bagais
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Royal Family ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Relationship Of

This paper examines the association of the presence of royal family members on the board of directors with audit committee effectiveness. The sample of this study consists of 444 listed manufactured firms in Saudi Arabia for the period 2012-2019. Using the Pooled OLS regression, the result of the study shows that royal family ownership is associated with audit committee effectiveness, giving support to the substitution hypothesis. The result indicates that members from the royal families are good monitors imposed into the companies' managements as both taking the role of decision makers and owners who may substitute the effectiveness of the audit committee. The presence of royal family members on the board has an alternative for the effectiveness of the audit committee. The marginal effect of audit committee effectiveness as an internal corporate governance mechanism is substituted by the presence of royal family members on the board. This study provides insightful evidence to regulators and policy makers at the company and country levels on the relationship of royal family ownership and audit committee effectiveness.

scholarly journals PENGARUH MEKANISME GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP KINERJA KEUANGAN PADAPERBANKAN YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA (BEI)

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Mira Diyanty ◽  
Meina Wulansari Yusniar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Linear Regression ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors

<em><span lang="EN-US">The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of the Good Corporate Governance mechanism on the board of commissioners, the board of directors, the proportion of independent commissioners, the audit committee, CAR on ROA. This study also uses a purposive sampling method for sampling. The analysis test used is multiple linear regression analysis. The population used by companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2011 - 2013 and which meet the sample selection criteria. The sample used was 25 companies. Data is collected through secondary data collection in the form of the company's annual report for the period 2011 - 2013 which is published on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research hypothesis was tested by multiple linear regression which had met the testing of classical assumptions. The results of the analysis show that the board of commissioners, the proportion of independent commissioners, audit committees, CAR does not significantly influence ROA while the board of directors has a positive and significant effect on ROA.</span></em>

Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks

2021 ◽  
pp. 322-337
Author(s):  
Sami Ben Mim ◽  
Yosra Mbarki
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Transmission Channels ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This study investigates the efficiency of the Shariah supervisory board as a corporate governance mechanism in Islamic banks. The authors mainly seek to examine the effect of the Shariah board's composition (size and academic background of its members) on the performance of Islamic banks. They also try to highlight the transmission channels explaining this effect, and compare the efficiency of the Shariah board with that of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of directors. The empirical investigation is based on a sample of 72 Islamic banks from 19 countries. Estimation results suggest that the Shariah board positively affects the Islamic banks performance through the number of Islamic Shariah scholars. This effect is mainly due to the size and cost transmission channels. These results are robust to different performance measures. On the other hand, results show that the board of directors' size produces a positive effect on a bank's performance, offering evidence for complementarity between traditional and Islamic governance mechanisms.

4 SIAC Corporate Structure

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Choong John
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
International Arbitration ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
The Board Of Directors

This chapter discusses the corporate structure of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC). The SIAC administers arbitrations for which it is responsible by appointing arbitrators, managing the financial and practical aspects of cases, carrying out supervisory functions entrusted by the SIAC Rules, and scrutinizing and issuing awards. It performs these roles through the following organs: (a) the board of directors, which is under the supervision of a chairman; (b) the SIAC Court, which is led by a president; (c) the chief executive officer; and (d) the secretariat, which includes the registrar. In addition, the SIAC has three overseas liaison offices which do not administer cases but promote the SIAC as an arbitral institution.

scholarly journals Determinants of board composition: Evidence from Tunisian companies

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-173
Author(s):  
Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou ◽  
Soumaya Ayedi ◽  
Yosra Makni Fourati
Keyword(s):  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Debt Ratio ◽  
Organizational Complexity ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Board Representation

This study focuses on the composition of boards of directors in the Tunisian context. We model the composition of the board of directors as a function of alternative governance mechanisms, some board characteristics and other control variables. On a sample of 97 Tunisian firms, we find evidence that the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors is positively associated with large block, institutional and overseas ownerships, and board size. We document that the CEO duality is associated with a decrease in the board independence. We fail to find evidence that increased debt ratio to total assets is inversely associated with the outside board representation. While we predict a positive relationship between the board independence and the firm size, the organizational complexity and the quotation status; our results generally do not support this conjecture

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