scholarly journals Corporate governance and earnings management in New Zealand

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-55
Author(s):  
Dyna Seng ◽  
Justin Findlay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors

This paper examines the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management. Using data collected from New Zealand listed companies for the financial year ending in 2005, the results show that the size of the board of directors is significantly positively associated with earnings management. This suggests that larger boards seem to be ineffective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards. On the other hand, the independence of the board of directors, the independent role of the board chair and chief executive officer, and the independence of audit committees are not significantly associated with earnings management. Thus, these three corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective at monitoring the discretionary choices of management. The lack of effective corporate governance in New Zealand, particularly with regard to boards of directors, is mainly due to the lack of “experience and skills required to oversee the scale, complexity, and characteristics of finance operations” (Ministry of Economic Development, 2009, p.8)

scholarly journals Impact of internal ownership on the monitoring and mitigating mechanisms of earnings management practices

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anas Najeeb Mosa Ghazalat ◽  
Md.Aminul Islam ◽  
Idris Bin Mohd Noor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Relationship

This paper attempts to review on how the effectiveness of board of directors and the executive compensations are moderated by internal ownership such as managerial and family ownership to mitigate earnings management. Most of prior studies focused on the traditional interaction among corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management, thus neglected that the variance of these practices that can be attributed to the business environment and the nature of ownership structure. This paper revisits the literature on the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors in the individual level such as board independence, size, meeting frequency, CEO duality, audit and nominations-compensations committees, directors financial expertise, tenures and multiple directorship etc. and as a bundle through creating a score of effectiveness on the earnings management practices. It also reviews on whether the managerial and family ownership can moderate the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors (as a score) and the total executive compensation with the earnings management practices. Panel data analysis method will applied over the data collected for ASE for the Jordanian listed firms for the period after the issuing of the Jordanian corporate codes in 2009. This paper’s contributes to the existing literature by providing an in-depth review of corporate governance mechanisms and earning management.

scholarly journals The adjustments of corporate governance mechanisms in Canadian banks following regulatory changes

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-455
Author(s):  
Michael Maingot ◽  
Daniel Zéghal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Domestic Banks

The recent scandals on corporate governance have forced the regulatory bodies to issue new corporate governance mechanisms. These new governance mechanisms include banks. The purpose of this study was to observe changes to the boards of directors, to the committees reporting to the board, to the board of directors‟ independence and adoption to certain charters and checklists in Canadian banks for the periods covering the years 2002-2004. Our sample covers the eight largest domestic banks in Canada. Results indicate a reduction in board members and in the number of committees reporting to the board. However, it increased supervision by increasing the number of board committee meetings. Most of the banks in our sample have separated the role of Chairman and CEO, thereby increasing the independence of the board. There was also an improvement in the adoption of a new charter for the board of directors.

scholarly journals Detecting tax evasion when tax and accounting earnings match

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-295
Author(s):  
Stavroula Kourdoumpalou
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Relationship

This paper attempts to review on how the effectiveness of board of directors and the executive compensations are moderated by internal ownership such as managerial and family ownership to mitigate earnings management. Most of prior studies focused on the traditional interaction among corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management, thus neglected that the variance of these practices that can be attributed to the business environment and the nature of ownership structure. This paper revisits the literature on the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors in the individual level such as board independence, size, meeting frequency, CEO duality, audit and nominations-compensations committees, directors financial expertise, tenures and multiple directorship etc. and as a bundle through creating a score of effectiveness on the earnings management practices. It also reviews on whether the managerial and family ownership can moderate the relationship between the factors of effectiveness of the board of directors (as a score) and the total executive compensation with the earnings management practices. Panel data analysis method will applied over the data collected for ASE for the Jordanian listed firms for the period after the issuing of the Jordanian corporate codes in 2009. This paper’s contributes to the existing literature by providing an in-depth review of corporate governance mechanisms and earning management.

scholarly journals Manajemen Laba, Pengungkapan Lingkungan Perusahaan dan Mekanisme Tata Kelola Perusahaan

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaky Machmuddah ◽  
Muchamad Syafruddin ◽  
Dul Muid ◽  
St. Dwiarso Utomo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Practical Implication ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Environmental Disclosure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Government

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of earnings management on corporate environmental disclosure with corporate governance mechanisms as a moderating variable. Population of this study is all companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2011. The samples size is 61 companies or 144 annual reports selected by using purposive sampling method. The data was analysed by employing multiple regression method. The result of this study demonstrated that earnings management significantly affected corporate environmental disclosure. Corporate governance mechanisms represented by proportion of independent board of directors and the number of audit committees moderated the effect of earnings management on corporate environmental disclosure. Meanwhile, the number of board of directors meetings and the number of audit committees meetings did not moderate the effect of earnings management on corporate environmental disclosure. The practical implication of this study is that the government needs to propuse a policy to reduce opportunistic action of managers in order to optimize shareholders and stakeholders  decision making process

Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks

2021 ◽  
pp. 322-337
Author(s):  
Sami Ben Mim ◽  
Yosra Mbarki
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Transmission Channels ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This study investigates the efficiency of the Shariah supervisory board as a corporate governance mechanism in Islamic banks. The authors mainly seek to examine the effect of the Shariah board's composition (size and academic background of its members) on the performance of Islamic banks. They also try to highlight the transmission channels explaining this effect, and compare the efficiency of the Shariah board with that of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of directors. The empirical investigation is based on a sample of 72 Islamic banks from 19 countries. Estimation results suggest that the Shariah board positively affects the Islamic banks performance through the number of Islamic Shariah scholars. This effect is mainly due to the size and cost transmission channels. These results are robust to different performance measures. On the other hand, results show that the board of directors' size produces a positive effect on a bank's performance, offering evidence for complementarity between traditional and Islamic governance mechanisms.

scholarly journals Analisis Struktur Kepemilikan dan Good Corporate Governance terhadap Manajemen Laba pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Idonesia

2021 ◽  
pp. 220-225
Author(s):  
Jova Yolanda ◽  
Dian Efriyenti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors

Earnings management practice is the decision to choose a particular accounting method that can achieve the goal of increasing reported profits or reducing investment losses. Misappropriation of financial statements by management can affect the amount of reported income. This study aims to determine whether ownership structure and good corporate governance have a significant influence on earnings management. The study was conducted on pharmaceutical sub-sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in a row for the 2016-2020 period. The sample technique used is purposive sampling, so as many as 7 samples of companies are used. The data testing method uses multiple linear analysis. The results of the data test show that partially institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on earnings management, independent commissioners, the audit committee, and the board of directors has a negative but not significant effect on earnings management. Simultaneously the results state that institutional ownership, independent commissioners, audit committees, and the board of directors have an effect but not significantly on earnings management.

scholarly journals Corporate governance mechanisms, sensitive factors and earnings management in Nigerian oil and gas industry

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuraddeen Usman Miko ◽  
Hasnah Kamardin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Oil And Gas Industry ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Gas Industry ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Oil And Gas Firms

Oil and gas industry is considered as the sector that contributes a big share to the Nigeria economy. This study investigated the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, sensitive factors on earnings management of quoted oil and gas firms in Nigeria using the sample of nine (9) listed oil and gas firms for the period of ten years (2004-2013). Discretionary current accruals was used as the proxy for earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms (boards size, chief executive officer (CEO) duality, directors’ ownership, audit committee size, audit committee independence), sensitive factors (corporate tax, corporate profit, corporate social responsibility) served as independent variables. The study concludes that corporate governance mechanisms curves earnings management while sensitive factors increase earnings management. The study recommends that corporate governance regulations should be strengthened to reflect present challenges.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and innovation: a theoretical review

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Asensio-López ◽  
Laura Cabeza-García ◽  
Nuria González-Álvarez
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present a review of the literature on two lines of research, corporate governance and innovation, explaining how different internal corporate governance mechanisms may be determinants of business innovation. Design/methodology/approach It explores the theoretical background and the empirical evidence regarding the influence of both ownership structure and the board of directors on company innovation. Then, conclusions are drawn and possible future research lines are presented. Findings No consensus was observed regarding the relation between corporate governance and innovation, with both positive and negative arguments being found, and with empirical evidence not always pointing in the same direction. Thus, new studies trying to clarify this relationship are needed. Originality/value Over recent years, interest has grown in the influence of governance mechanisms on innovation decisions taken by the management. Innovation efforts and results depend on factors that are influenced by corporate governance, such as ownership structure or the functioning of the board of directors. Thus, the paper shows an updated state of the art in this field proposing future lines for empirical research.

scholarly journals Diversity in the board of directors and good governance practices

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Álvaro Melón-Izco ◽  
Francisco J. Ruiz-Cabestre ◽  
M. Carmen Ruiz-Olalla
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Board Of Directors

Motivated by the debate on the adequacy of the composition of boards of directors, we examine the effect that board diversity has on corporate governance performance in Spain, analysing gender diversity, diversity of director types and tenure diversity. The findings reveal that diverse boards of directors have a positive influence on good governance practices,improving the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. These results could be interesting for practitioners and regulators.

scholarly journals Equity incentives, earnings management and corporate governance: Empirical evidence using UK panel data

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 104-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed A. Shabeeb Ali ◽  
Hazem Ramadan Ismael ◽  
Ahmed H. Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Relationship

Using a UK panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations, we examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. We use multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. We find that CEO equity incentives are related to higher absolute and income increasing earnings management. These results support the managerial power theory argument that CEOs exploit equity-linked compensation to obtain more personal benefits without causing public anger. Contrary to CEO equity incentives, we could not find any significant relationship between CFO equity incentives and any of the earnings management proxies. In addition, we find that corporate governance quality (measured by individual mechanisms and overall index) has no effect on the relationship between executives’ equity incentives and earnings management. This result indicates that whereas some corporate governance mechanisms can reduce earnings management in general, they do not affect wealth driven incentives to manipulate accruals. In total, results question the effectiveness of the corporate governance system in mitigating opportunistic behavior motivated by executives’ compensation structures

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