scholarly journals Board of directors and board of statutory auditors’ diversity and earnings management: Evidence from Italy

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 42-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pier Luigi Marchini ◽  
Alice Medioli ◽  
Veronica Tibiletti ◽  
Silvia Triani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
International Regulation ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Management Behaviour ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Impact

The importance of diversity within corporate boards has been demonstrated both from the literature and also from the national and international regulation. The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of diversity on the Board of Directors and in the Board of Statutory Auditor on Earnings Management behaviour. Starting with a random sample of 121 non-financial Italian listed companies, we hand-collected corporate governance data from the corporate governance report to investigate how firms deal with the opportunistic behaviour of EM, through the appointment of members with specific features. Our findings show that, even though diversity within the Board of Directors is not associated with Earnings Management, the presence of female and member expertise on Board of Statutory Auditor instead curb Earnings Management. Based on these findings we argue that pursuing a good degree of diversity in the corporate boards could help to improve the earnings quality and, in particular, to reduce Earnings Management behaviour.

scholarly journals Does the competency attributes of board members’ enhance the monitoring of earning management? Evidence from a developing country

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anas Najeeb Mosa Ghazalat ◽  
Md.Aminul Islam ◽  
Idris Bin Mohd Noor ◽  
Ayman Ahmad Abu Haija
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Industrial Firms ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

The monitoring role of the board of directors has been extensively slammed as being ineffective since it depends on several factors. This study sheds light on some of the directors’ attributes and the impact on mitigating the opportunistic behaviour. By adopting different perspectives, we argued whether the directors with more expertise, tenure, outside directorships become more effective in mitigating the opportunistic behaviour. These attributes could have a curvilinear effect since such optimal attributes could improve the competency level of the directors. Hence, the board becomes more effective. Meanwhile, its effect could turn inversely to make the directors ineffective. This study adopted discretionary accruals as an indicator for earnings management. A sample of 114 service and industrial firms listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2009-2015 were chosen for this study. Pooled OLS regression model is enlisted to avoid the inconsistently of the slope across individual units and time period. Results show that the directors with financial expertise are more effective to minimise the level of earnings management practices. Conversely, the independent directors with high tenure besides the higher directors with outside directorships are engaged with a high level of earnings management practices. This implies the existence of each of the friendliness hypothesis and the busyness hypothesis in the Jordanian market. Similarly, this also explains the weakness of the board of directors in complying to their monitoring role in the emerging markets in general.

scholarly journals The Impact of Corporate Governance Characteristics on the of Financial Distress

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
Mahdi Filsaraei ◽  
Reza Jarrahi Moghaddam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Multivariate Regression Analysis ◽  
Company Stock ◽  
Governance Indicators ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Qualified Audit Opinion ◽  
The Impact

Given the importance of corporate governance for increasing the monitoring of company operations, i.e., reducing information asymmetry and increasing control over operations, in this study, we investigate some indicators of corporate governance and financial distress as one of the most important criteria in the decisions of the users of financial statements. Corporate governance Indicators that have been mentioned in this study, including the independence of the board of directors (the ratio of non-executive members), institutional investors and duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. This study is applied research and the required information is gathered from financial statements of listed companies on the TSE. Using a sample of 82 company stock during the period 2010-2014 and multivariate regression analysis, the results of the analysis of information gathered indicates that institutional ownership reduces the financial distress. However, there was no significant relationship between board independence (proportion of outside board members) and the duality of CEO and Chairman of the Board with the financial distress. The results also indicate that financial leverage and a qualified audit opinion increases financial distress and firm size and management performance reduces it.

scholarly journals Implementing the board of directors’ mechanism – An empirical study of the listed firms in Libya

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Atkins ◽  
Mohamed Zakari ◽  
Ismail Elshahoubi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Stakeholder Groups ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Executive Managers

This paper aims to investigate the extent to which board of directors’ mechanism is implemented in Libyan listed companies. This includes a consideration of composition, duties and responsibilities of the board directors. This study employed a questionnaire survey to collect required data from four key stakeholder groups: Boards of Directors (BD), Executive Managers (EM), Regulators and External Auditors (RE) and Other Stakeholders (OS). The results of this study provided evidence that Libyan listed companies generally comply with the Libyan Corporate Governance Code (LCGC) requirements regarding the board composition: the findings assert that most boards have between three and eleven members, the majority of whom are non-executives and at least two or one-third of whom (whichever is greater) are independent. Moreover, the results indicate that general assemblies in Libyan listed companies are practically committed to the LCGC’s requirements regarding the appointment of board members and their length of tenure. The findings provide evidence that boards in Libyan listed companies are carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with internal regulations and laws, as well as the stipulations of the LCGC (2007). Furthermore, the stakeholder groups were broadly satisfied that board members are devoting sufficient time and effort to discharge these duties and responsibilities properly. This study helps to enrich our understanding and knowledge of the current practice of corporate boards as a significant mechanism of corporate governance (CG) by being the first to address the board of directors’ mechanism in Libyan listed companies.

Financial soundness of Islamic banks: does the structure of the board of directors matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Afef Khalil ◽  
Imen Ben Slimene
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Z Score ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Additional Hypothesis ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Financial Soundness ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the Board of Directors’ characteristics and their impact on the financial soundness of Islamic banks. Design/methodology/approach Regression analysis is applied to test the impact of the Board of Directors’ characteristics on the financial soundness of Islamic banks, using a panel data set of 67 Islamic banks covering 20 countries from 2005 to 2018. The Z-score indicator is used to evaluate the Islamic banks’ soundness. To check the robustness of the results, this paper uses other dependent variables (CAMEL) than the Z-score. Findings The main results show that the presence of an independent non-executive director negatively impacts the financial soundness of Islamic banks, while the chief executive officer duality practice has a positive effect on it. Other characteristics of the Board of Directors do not significantly impact the financial soundness of Islamic banks (foreign director, institutional director, chairman with a Shari’ah degree, interlocked chairman and the Board of Directors’ size). Practical implications This study aims to fill the gaps in the literature that discuss the Board of Directors’ role in corporate governance and its impact on the financial soundness of Islamic banks. In other words, it shows the role played by the Board of Directors and improves the knowledge of the corporate governance-financial soundness relationship. Plus, managers, investors and regulators may gain evocative insights, particularly those looking to improve their Islamic banks’ soundness by restructuring their boards’ composition. Originality/value This study sheds new light on the literature on Islamic banking by clarifying the relationship between the Board of Directors and the financial soundness of Islamic banks. Contrary to previous research, this paper uses an additional hypothesis stating that a chairman with a Shari’ah degree (Fiqh Muamalt) has a positive impact on the financial soundness of Islamic banks.

scholarly journals Board Independence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Italy

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Stella Lippolis ◽  
Francesco Grimaldi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
High Concentration ◽  
Management Activity ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Italian Context

This research aims to analyze the relationship between the characteristics of the Board of Directors (BoD) and the effectiveness of the monitoring of earnings manipulation activities in family – controlled companies in Italy. In particular, specific hypotheses relating to the link between those aspects of the Board, that substantiate its independence, and earnings quality have been formulated to verify whether the mechanisms for monitoring management activity are less effective in these companies. This study applies a univariate and multivariate methods on a sample of Italian listed company over the period 2014-2016.  Earnings management is defined by the proxy of abnormal working capital accrual (AWCA) estimed model according to DeFond and Park (2001). Proxies for corporate governance mechanism are the board size, the level of board independence, the CEO non-duality and the interaction between the last two variables. The research shows that independent directors are not, as in other contexts, a factor that contributes to earnings quality, in the same way that the separation of the offices of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief executive Officer (CEO) does not appear to be relevant to this end. The study aims to provide a double contribution. First, the research represents one of the few studies concerning the Italian context with its peculiarities, taking into consideration the earnings management issue in companies with a high concentration of family ownership. Secondly, this study aims to further stimulate the debate on the most effective features of structure and composition of the BoD in family-controlled companies: specifically, the conclusions could lead to a reconsideration of the validity of certain characters of the boards that defines independence.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Economic Performance: The Limit of Short Termism

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-61
Author(s):  
F. D. Tommaso ◽  
A. Gulinelli
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Performance Indicators ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Key Performance Indicators ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
The Impact

This article includes exploring arguments and counterarguments in the context of conducting a scientific discussion on the impact of corporate governance on a company’s financial and economic performance. The main purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of the impact of corporate governance policy on the activities of economic entities. The systematization of literary sources and approaches to problem solving has shown that there are two opposing points of view: firm value, efficiency), on the other hand, a number of scientists are convinced that there is a positive influence of the functioning of the corporate governance system on the valuation of listed companies. The work emphasizes the decisive role of the board of directors of the company in the development and adoption of the strategic direction of development of the organization. The author points out in the study the need for coordinated interaction of the board of directors with the financial management of the company and the business owners in order to increase the efficiency and profitability of the business entity. It is stated that the key economic tools for achieving and implementing the strategic plans of the company can be the key performance indicators and accordingly developed measures to achieve such success. As a result, it is justified that corporate governance should not be a set of rules and mechanisms aimed at managing and controlling companies, but rather as a process by which companies become sensitive to stakeholder rights. The spread of corporate culture, according to the author of a work aimed at protecting the common interest, is facilitated by the existence of good rules and effective authorities that control their observance. Keywords: corporate governance, financial and economic activity, board of directors, key performance indicators.

scholarly journals Editorial: Fundamental pillars of corporate governance research

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 222-224
Author(s):  
Paolo Tenuta ◽  
Alexander Kostyuk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
And Control

Corporate governance is a system designed to improve corporate performance through supervision of management performance to ensure accountability to stakeholders based on a regulatory framework. Board of directors as a field of research becomes a major point for intersection of many other issues of corporate governance, such as financial reporting, firm performance, earnings management, stock market, and reaching even well-established fields of research such as accounting and finance. Most of the papers published in this issue (volume 18, issue 1, special issue) of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal are linked to the board of directors’ issues directly or indirectly.

scholarly journals Analisis Struktur Kepemilikan dan Good Corporate Governance terhadap Manajemen Laba pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Idonesia

2021 ◽  
pp. 220-225
Author(s):  
Jova Yolanda ◽  
Dian Efriyenti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors

Earnings management practice is the decision to choose a particular accounting method that can achieve the goal of increasing reported profits or reducing investment losses. Misappropriation of financial statements by management can affect the amount of reported income. This study aims to determine whether ownership structure and good corporate governance have a significant influence on earnings management. The study was conducted on pharmaceutical sub-sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in a row for the 2016-2020 period. The sample technique used is purposive sampling, so as many as 7 samples of companies are used. The data testing method uses multiple linear analysis. The results of the data test show that partially institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on earnings management, independent commissioners, the audit committee, and the board of directors has a negative but not significant effect on earnings management. Simultaneously the results state that institutional ownership, independent commissioners, audit committees, and the board of directors have an effect but not significantly on earnings management.

scholarly journals Earnings Quality, Family Influence and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from Malaysia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Wan Adibah Binti Wan Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Family Influence ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
And Control

<p>This study investigates whether family ownership and control, and corporate governance are associated with earnings quality, and whether family influence in firms weakens the association between corporate governance and earnings quality. This study uses a panel sample of 527 publicly traded firms over the period 2003-2008 from the Malaysia Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia). Identifying family firms as firms in which family members hold a significant portion of shares and possess control over the board of directors, this study finds that family firms have significantly higher earnings quality. The results remain unchanged, even after using alternative measures of earnings quality and family influence. This study also finds that the earnings quality of firms in Malaysia is positively associated with the size and independence of the audit committee and negatively associated with the size of the board of directors. However, these relationships exist only for nonfamily firms. These results on the corporate governance variables suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance could be mediated by family influence. Using multivariate regressions that include interaction variables for corporate governance and family firms, the study finds that the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality is mediated by family ownership and control. The result is consistent with the argument that the monitoring role of corporate governance reduces when there is substantial control by family owners in a firm. Overall, this study concludes that family ownership and control drives higher quality earnings for firms regardless of their corporate governance structure.</p>

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