scholarly journals Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in Administration) Court of Appeal [2011] EWCA Civ 347

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-205
Author(s):  
Robert Pearce ◽  
Jennifer Shearman

THE PURSUIT OF PROPRIETARY REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTYThere is an old adage that if an opportunity looks too good to be true, then it almost certainly is. Despite this, the law reports are filled with examples of people seeking redress for the fallout from “get rich quick” schemes that have gone wrong. One type of scam, exemplified by the fraudulent investment scheme run by Bernard Madoff from the United States and which collapsed in 2008, is known as a “Ponzi1 scheme”.2 The wrongdoer in such a scheme invites “investments” promising a high rate of return. The funds subscribed are not in fact invested (or if they are, they are invested in vehicles which produce a lower rate of return than that promised). Instead, the money from new subscribers is used to pay the rewards to earlier subscribers. In due course the scheme is bound to collapse, because there will be a point at which the new funds coming in are insufficient to make the payments to existing subscribers, and the bubble of new investment can continue only for as long as there is confidence on the part of subscribers, encouraging fresh deposits. When the scheme begins to unravel, it falls apart very quickly, since the assets held by the wrongdoer are inevitably inadequate to reimburse all of the subscribers in full. In the ensuing insolvent liquidation, subscribers stand to recover only a small fraction of their subscription as unsecured creditors unless they can demonstrate that they have a proprietary interest in some of the remaining assets. Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd is a case involving what the judge at first instance called a “classic Ponzi scheme”.

2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Jenny Morgan

This article explores the possible reasons for the absence of a public discourse about sexual harassment in Australia, which can be contrasted with a relatively well-developed legal discourse. It also briefly compares the debate about sexual harassment in the United States and Australia that followed in the wake of controversial and very public sexual harassment cases in each country. It argues that the debate in the wake of the Clarence Hill-Anita Thomas hearings in the United States was much more productive than the debate in Australia after the publication of Helen Garner’s book, The First Stone. The discussion in Australia focused on whether the young women in the case had ‘over-reacted’ and whether there were generational differences in women’s reactions to sexual harassment. The more interesting (and I would argue, far more important) questions of what is sexual harassment is and what are its effects were ignored. This article goes on to explore one aspect of what sexual harassment is and does by examining what women actually do in response to sexual harassment through an analysis of some of the stories of targets of harassment as they appear in the law reports. In this way it tries to make some of the legal discourse about sexual harassment a part of the public discourse about the phenomenon.


2019 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 722-727

Diplomatic relations — Diplomatic agents — Immunity from jurisdiction — Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 — Article 31(1)(c) — Action by domestic servant alleging that she had been trafficked and forced to work by former employers — Certification of diplomatic status of former employers — Whether diplomatic immunity continuing despite subsequent termination of diplomatic status — Whether commercial activity exception applicable to hiring of domestic servant — Whether subsequent attempts at service defective — Whether Court lacking jurisdiction — The law of the United States


1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-258
Author(s):  
Donald VanDeVeer

In a recent trial in the United States a physician was convicted of manslaughter during the performance of a hysterotomy on a woman pregnant from twenty to twenty eight weeks. Some members of the jury, in their deliberations, were much impressed by seeing a photograph of a fetus of about the same age. The experience apparently provided some jurors with reason to conclude that the fetus which did die during or immediately after the hysterotomy was a human being or a person or, at least, was so like a child that the killing of it was prohibited by the law of homicide. If being a human being is not the same as being a pre-natal progeny of homo sapiens, it is difficult to understand how one could “tell by looking” whether the fetus is a human being. But the sight of a fetus of twenty weeks or longer does, I think, tempt us to think that from a moral standpoint we ought to extend the same treatment to such fetuses, or virtually the same, as we extend to newborn babies and young children. The visual similarities between middle or late stage fetuses and newborn babies is striking.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (290) ◽  
pp. 446-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Valencia Villa

Over the years the Americas have made significant contributions to the development of international humanitarian law. These include three nineteenth-century texts which constitute the earliest modern foundations of the law of armed conflict. The first is a treaty, signed on 26 November 1820 by the liberator Simón Bolívar and the peacemaker Pablo Morillo, which applied the rules of international conflict to a civil war. The second is a Spanish-American work entitled Principios de Derecho de Genres (Principles of the Law of Nations), which was published in 1832 by Andrés Bello. This work dealt systematically with the various aspects and consequences of war. The third is a legal instrument, signed on 24 April 1863 by United States President Abraham Lincoln, which codified the first body of law on internal conflict under the heading “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” (General Orders No. 100). This instrument, known as the Lieber Code, was adopted as the new code of conduct for the armies of the Union during the American Civil War.


1994 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Sherron de Hart

“ERA Won't Go Away!” The words were chanted at rallies and unfurled on banners at countless marches as the deadline—June 30, 1982—approached for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. To include in the Constitution the principle of equality of rights for women, supporters insisted, was an essential of republican government in a democratic society. Congress had shared that perception in 1972, passing a series of measures aimed at strengthening and expanding federal legislation banning discrimination on the basis of sex. Included was a constitutional amendment simply stating that “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of sex.” Thirty-five of the thirty-eight states necessary for a three-fourths majority needed to amend the Constitution had given their approval.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document