Designing Realistic Utopia

Author(s):  
Jürgen Sirsch

Building on the work of John Rawls, this book offers a conception of ideal theory which provides practical guidance and a critical perspective on politics, institutions and society. The author develops this approach by discussing recent criticism of ideal theory by authors such as Amartya Sen and Raymond Geuss. Answering Sen’s criticism, the author proposes a novel account of feasibility in relation to ideal theory, especially with regard to ideal institutional design. As a reply to Geuss’ criticism, he discusses constructivist approaches of moral theory-building. Building on this discussion, the book develops an account of practical ideal–theoretical thinking that can be used for evaluating and criticizing societies and can guide institutional design under nonideal conditions.

Author(s):  
David Estlund

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Milica Trifunovic

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls? theory as presented in his books ?A Theory of Justice? and ?The Law of Peoples.? The article tries to show the importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.


Author(s):  
John Tomasi

This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's institutional guarantees. It defends Rawls' general view of ideal theory, first by explaining why the objection to market democracy—that even if market democratic institutional forms appear attractive in theory, they are unlikely to deliver the goods in practice and so are defective for that reason—has little force when applied against the idealism of left liberalism. It then examines why such arguments are equally ineffective when trained against the idealism of free market fairness. It also analyzes Rawls' idea of “realistic utopianism” before concluding by asking whether market democratic regimes that treat economic liberty as constitutionally basic can realize all the requirements of justice as fairness.


Author(s):  
Christopher Thompson

The distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important methodological concern in contemporary political theory. At issue is the extent to which political theorizing is a practical endeavor and, consequently, the extent to which real-world facts should either be factored into political theorizing or else be assumed away. The distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory was first introduced by John Rawls in his classic A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s ideal theory is an account of the society we should aim for, given certain facts about human nature and possible social institutions, and involves two central assumptions. First, it assumes full compliance of relevant agents with the demands of justice. Second, it assumes that historical and natural conditions of society are reasonably favorable. These two assumptions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for his ideal theory. For Rawls, nonideal theory primarily addresses the question of how the ideal might be achieved in practical, permissible steps, from the actual, partially just society we occupy. The account of ideal and nonideal theory advanced by Rawls has been subject to criticism from different directions. Amartya Sen accepts Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory but argues that Rawlsian-style nonideal theory is too ideal. Given the many and severe injustices we face we do not need to know what ideal (or “transcendental”) justice looks like; our focus should not be on how to transition toward this ideal. Instead, the advancement of justice requires a comparative judgment which ranks possible policies in terms of being more or less just than the status quo. G. A. Cohen, by contrast, argues that Rawlsian-style ideal theory is not really ideal theory as such, but instead principles for regulating society. Our beliefs about normative principles should, ultimately, be insensitive to matters of empirical fact; genuine ideal theory is a form of moral epistemology (an exercise of identifying normative truths).


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW MASON

Political theorists disagree about the extent to which issues of feasibility, stability, institutional design and human nature can be bracketed in analysing the concept of justice. At one end of the spectrum some argue that no analysis of justice can be adequate in the absence of an account of how it could be implemented, whereas at the other end there are those who argue that principles of justice are logically independent of issues of feasibility. Influenced by the work of John Rawls, many theorists occupy the middle ground, maintaining that analyses of justice must be realistic, that is, realizable under the best of foreseeable conditions. Against Rawls and others, this article argues that feasibility does not constrain what can count as an adequate principle of justice but nevertheless maintains that there are limits on such principles that derive in part from human nature, which divergent theories of justice must respect. It also distinguishes between different levels of analysis, some of which are governed by feasibility constraints.


Author(s):  
John Oberdiek

The Introduction situates the book’s aims among the aims of contemporary moral and legal philosophy, and traces the underappreciation of what might be called the morality of risking to features of moral and legal philosophy as traditionally practiced. Moral theory has traditionally been concerned with ideal theory, prescinding from the epistemic limitations that give rise to questions of risk. Legal theory, though more sensitive to our epistemic limitations, has nevertheless focused on the most practical issues that revolve around risk, paying little attention to those not already attended to by positive law. The Introduction previews the various issues that a normative framework of imposing risk must address and provides a chapter-by-chapter overview of the volume as a whole.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Colin Farrelly

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructed and defended an abstract account of distributive justice founded upon hypothetical theoretical devices like the original position and veil of ignorance, the principle of maximin, and conceptual analyses of equality of opportunities. Such a methodology places a premium on abstract hypotheticals (vs. the actual history of injustice), and idealizations that involve making claims that are actually false, in order to simplify an argument. This chapter critically examines the idealizations employed by Rawls’s original theory of justice. It argues that Rawlsian ideal theory is inherently flawed because Rawls’s idealizations make our normative theorizing prone to the valuation distortions that arise in what psychologists call a “focusing illusion.”


1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.


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