Feasibility, Normativity, and Institutional Guarantees

Author(s):  
John Tomasi

This chapter considers John Rawls' conception of ideal theory, with particular emphasis on the implications of problems of feasibility for normative political philosophy and market democracy's institutional guarantees. It defends Rawls' general view of ideal theory, first by explaining why the objection to market democracy—that even if market democratic institutional forms appear attractive in theory, they are unlikely to deliver the goods in practice and so are defective for that reason—has little force when applied against the idealism of left liberalism. It then examines why such arguments are equally ineffective when trained against the idealism of free market fairness. It also analyzes Rawls' idea of “realistic utopianism” before concluding by asking whether market democratic regimes that treat economic liberty as constitutionally basic can realize all the requirements of justice as fairness.

Author(s):  
John Tomasi

This chapter defends a “market democratic” interpretation of justice as fairness that it calls free market fairness, with a particular focus on institutions. The discussion encompasses the difference principle, fair equality of opportunity, fair value of political liberties, and the rest of the first principle guarantee of basic liberties. Market democracy is explored in light of some secondary considerations of justice: the just savings principle, environmental justice, and duties of international aid. The chapter also examines how free market fairness interprets the component of justice as fairness in question and how that interpretation compares to John Rawls' social democratic interpretation. Finally, it asks whether market democratic regimes can satisfy the distributional requirements of free market fairness.


1987 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 139-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sibyl Schwarzenbach

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls fromwithinhis own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longerwhether‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what preciseformsuch a socialism should take.


Author(s):  
John Tomasi

This chapter considers two concepts of fairness, starting the discussion by focusing on market democracy's thick conception of economic freedom in relation to social justice. Market democracy breaks with traditional classical liberal and libertarian traditions in founding politics on a deliberative ideal of democratic citizenship, even as it makes room for a variety of rival conceptions of the nature of public reason. The chapter offers a market democratic interpretation of John Rawls' notion of justice as fairness. It also examines what free market fairness says about a society in which citizens are experiencing the blessings of liberal justice, along with its alternative perspective to social democracy's emphasis on instilling in the citizenry a sense of democratic solidarity. Finally, it compares the interpretations of social democracy and free market fairness regarding justice as fairness and the difference principle, respectively.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Ben Jackson ◽  
Zofia Stemplowska

A striking aspect of the initial reception of John Rawls is that he was embraced by leading market-liberal theorists such as Friedrich Hayek and James Buchanan. This article investigates the reasons for the free-market right's sympathetic interest in the early Rawls by providing a historical account of the dialogue between Rawls and his key neoliberal interlocutor, James Buchanan. We set out the common intellectual context, notably the influence of Frank Knight, that framed the initial work of both Buchanan and Rawls and brought them together as seeming allies during the early 1960s. We then analyze a significant theoretical divergence between the two in the 1970s related to their contrasting responses to the politics of those years and to differences over the importance of ideal theory in political thought. The exchanges between Buchanan and Rawls demonstrate that Rawlsian liberalism and neoliberalism initially emerged as entwined critiques of mid-twentieth-century political economy but could not sustain that alliance when faced by the new claims for civil and social rights that became a marked feature of politics after the 1960s.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-300
Author(s):  
M. Victoria Costa (William & Mary)

This article examines the many traces of John Rawls’ theory of justice in contemporary philosophy of education. Beyond work that directly explores the educational implications of justice as fairness and political liberalism, there are many interesting debates in philosophy of education that make use of Rawlsian concepts to defend views that go well beyond those advocated in justice as fairness. There have also been methodological debates on Rawls’ distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory which concern the proper balance between empirically informed discussion and fruitful normative reflection.


Author(s):  
John Tomasi

Can libertarians care about social justice? This book argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, the book presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, the book argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, it encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, the book offers a “market democratic” conception of social justice: free market fairness. It argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberties and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to this book, free market fairness is social justice, American style. The book offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice—one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.


Author(s):  
Jason Brennan

Market-based economies outperform the alternative forms of economic organization on almost every measure. Nevertheless, this leaves open what the optimal degree of government regulation, government-provided social insurance, and macroeconomic adjustment is. Most economists seem to favor mostly, but not completely, free markets. Although regulation can in principle correct certain market failures, whether it will do so in practice depends in part on how pervasive and damaging corresponding government failures will be. Philosophers, unlike economists, tend to think that questions about the value of the free market are not settled entirely by examining how well free markets function. Some philosophers even claim that markets are intrinsically unjust. In their view, markets encourage wrongful exploitation, lead to excessive economic inequality, and tend to induce people to treat each other in inhumane ways. Among those philosophers who are more sanguine about markets, one major question concerns the moral status of economic liberty. Some philosophers, such as John Rawls, hold that economic liberty is purely of instrumental value. Citizens should be granted a significant degree of economic freedom only because this turns out, empirically, to produce good consequences. However, other philosophers, such as Robert Nozick and John Tomasi, argue that economic freedom is valuable in part for the same reasons that civil and political liberties are valuable—as a necessary means to respect citizens’ autonomy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 163-192
Author(s):  
Zhang Guoqing

AbstractJohn Rawls assumes that in the original position, under the veil of ignorance, after bargaining amongst each other, free, equal, moral and rational persons would make a rational decision to accept the principles of justice as fairness and thus the principles are established. Critics, however, question the authenticity and validity of this justification strategy. When rational individuals take the principles of justice as an original agreement, it is not a real contract. Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is just a personal notion, some individuals may accept it, but it is impossible to be accepted by all human beings in a real world. Therefore there is a justification/acceptance paradox of those principles which are the core of his political philosophy. So how should we justify those principles? Its answers may be provided not in the light of a philosophical justification but of a scientific one.


Author(s):  
Simon Căbulea May

John Rawls defines ideal theory in terms of a strict compliance assumption. The standard interpretation of ideal theory is telic: the function of the strict compliance assumption is to help specify a realistic utopia as a telos for political decision making. The chapter defends an alternative, deontic interpretation of ideal theory, one based on the fundamental Rawlsian idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation. It claims that the participants of a genuinely cooperative scheme are mutually accountable in that they have the standing to make demands of one another. It argues that the logic of these moral demands implies that the rules of any cooperative scheme must be justified on the basis of a strict compliance assumption. Since society as a whole constitutes a cooperative scheme in justice as fairness, the same conclusion holds of its principles of justice. The chapter also defends the possibility of a non-utopian ideal theory.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

G. A. Cohen was one of the most gifted, influential, and progressive voices in contemporary political philosophy. At the time of his death in 2009, he had plans to bring together a number of his most significant papers. This is the first of three volumes to realize those plans. Drawing on three decades of work, it contains previously uncollected articles that have shaped many of the central debates in political philosophy, as well as papers published here for the first time. In these pieces, Cohen asks what egalitarians have most reason to equalize, he considers the relationship between freedom and property, and he reflects upon ideal theory and political practice. Included here are classic essays such as “Equality of What?” and “Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat,” along with more recent contributions such as “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice,” “Freedom and Money,” and the previously unpublished “How to Do Political Philosophy.” On ample display throughout are the clarity, rigor, conviction, and wit for which Cohen was renowned. Together, these essays demonstrate how his work provides a powerful account of liberty and equality to the left of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Isaiah Berlin.


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