The Qing Code and Special Judicial Legislation

Author(s):  
Robert J. Antony

Chapter 10 begins the final section on state and local law enforcement with a discussion on the promulgation of several crucial Qing laws. Although officials and other observers throughout the eighteenth century frequently complained about Guangdong’s lawlessness, it was not until the 1780s that the central government began to enact specific laws to deal with bandits, sworn brotherhoods, and social disorder in the province. Between 1780 and 1845, a time when officials perceived a rising crime wave in the province, the government passed at least twelve special substatutes to handle the problems in Guangdong and neighboring provinces. The burst of special legislation during those years was both an indication of a rise in bandit and brotherhood activity in Guangdong as well as the deep concerns that the state had about maintaining law and order.

Author(s):  
Dean A. Dabney ◽  
Richard Tewksbury

Chapter 2 presents the methods of the current study. Three fieldwork projects in two cities are explained, including one researcher’s embeddedness with a plain-clothes, street crime unit, one researcher’s 10 month inclusion with a narcotics investigation unit, and one author’s 18 months of participant observation with a major city’s homicide investigation unit. Additionally, in-depth interviews with 15 federal, state and local law enforcement authorities were conducted. These three sources of data are integrated and triangulate the data used for the analysis.


Author(s):  
David Alan Sklansky

Criminal law and immigration law, once separate fields of governance in the United States, are rapidly growing less distinct. Immigration crimes now account for a majority of all federal prosecutions; deportation is widely seen as a key tool of crime control; immigration authorities run the nation’s largest prison system; and state and local law enforcement officers work hand-in-hand with federal immigration officials. This article traces these trends and assesses their significance. The rise of an intertwined regime of “crimmigration” law has generally been attributed to some combination of nativism, overcriminalization, and a cultural obsession with security, but it also exemplifies, and has helped to reinforce, a crucial and underappreciated development in U.S. legal culture—a rising tendency to treat legal rules and legal procedures as interchangeable tools, to be brought to bear pragmatically and instrumentally on an ad hoc basis. Ad hoc instrumentalism of this kind has genuine strengths, but it also raises significant concerns about the rule of law and political accountability. The accountability concerns, in particular, are exacerbated by two other features of our newly merged system of immigration enforcement and criminal justice: its bureaucratic opacity and its selective application.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Soghoian ◽  
Stephanie K. Pell

In June 2013, through an unauthorized disclosure to the media by ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the public learned that the NSA, since 2006, had been collecting nearly all domestic phone call detail records and other telephony metadata pursuant to a controversial, classified interpretation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Prior to the Snowden disclosure, the existence of this intelligence program had been kept secret from the general public, though some members of Congress knew both of its existence and of the statutory interpretation the government was using to justify the bulk collection. Unfortunately, the classified nature of the Section 215 metadata program prevented them from alerting the public directly, so they were left to convey their criticisms of the program directly to certain federal agencies as part of a non-public oversight process. The efficacy of an oversight regime burdened by such strict secrecy is now the subject of justifiably intense debate. In the context of that debate, this Article examines a very different surveillance technology — one that has been used by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies for more than two decades without invoking even the muted scrutiny Congress applied to the Section 215 metadata program. During that time, this technology has steadily and significantly expanded the government’s surveillance capabilities in a manner and to a degree to date largely unnoticed and unregulated. Indeed, it has never been explicitly authorized by Congress for law enforcement use. This technology, commonly called the StingRay, the most well-known brand name of a family of surveillance devices, enables the government, directly and in real-time, to intercept communications data and detailed location information of cellular phones — data that it would otherwise be unable to obtain without the assistance of a wireless carrier. Drawing from the lessons of the StingRay, this Article argues that if statutory authorities regulating law enforcement surveillance technologies and methods are to have any hope of keeping pace with technology, some formalized mechanism must be established through which complete, reliable and timely information about new government surveillance methods and technologies can be brought to the attention of Congress.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document