Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-76
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-62
Author(s):  
Adam Weiler Gur Arye

The paper focuses on Reid's unique epistemological distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities and examines it in relation to other facets of his philosophy: his stance vis-à-vis the scientific inquiries of secondary qualities; his aesthetics; his analysis of the perception of the primary quality of hardness; his theory of learning. An inquiry into the primary/secondary distinction which takes into account such a broad context will reveal it to be far more sophisticated, dynamic and flexible than an analysis of the distinction which solely takes into consideration the passages in which the Scottish philosopher directly and straightforwardly introduces it.


Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold I. Davidson ◽  
Norbert Hornstein

Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore look not only at the current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory.


Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock

This chapter defends the interpretation of Reid put forth in Chapter 4. Reid's primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical, conceptual rather than phenomenological, and causal in a loose and lawlike sense. Since such a reading is at odds with every other reading of Reid on this matter, rival interpretations receive extensive treatment as well.


2019 ◽  
pp. 260-310
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl

Chapter Seven undertakes to articulate Hume’s scepticism with regard to the third dimension of the Pyrrhonian Fourfold—technê. More particularly, the chapter examines the instruments he deploys against dogmatism, that is his technologies of doubt. The chapter devotes special attention to Hume’s sceptical arguments regarding the epistemic capacities of reason and the senses, especially in regard to the primary/secondary quality distinction and what Hume calls ‘false philosophy.’ The text argues that Hume is an entirely radical sceptic who refuses all epistemic and metaphysical claims, including those related to personal identity, the immateriality of the soul, hidden substances, energies, and powers, including the causal power. The chapter explains what exactly counts for Hume as dogmatism and what is not consistent with scepticism. The chapter explores the import to empiricism of Hume’s Copy Principle.


Author(s):  
Michel Treisman

This chapter aims to present a psychological model of how people perceive time, and to explain some experimental evidence supporting it. It suggests that the apparently close correspondence between the spatiotemporal structures of the perceived world and of the physical world, in contrast to the complex and controversial relation between, for example, perceived colour and light, lies at the root of the primary quality/secondary quality distinction. It also examines the neural mechanisms by which people keep track of time. The answer to this question is a model in which the nervous system itself produces temporal information, in the form of a ‘pacemaker’ or pacemakers that emit pulses at regular characteristic intervals; the model also includes a ‘calibration unit’ to allow for flexibility in the accuracy of timing. The chapter ends by surveying the experimental evidence for this model, including EEG studies.


1982 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Wilson Averill

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