scholarly journals Is there a need for political liberalism to have an account of pre-overlapping consensus reasoning?

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
Nebojsa Zelic
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Further Development

In his Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong argues for internal conception of political liberalism which goal is to show that a liberal well-ordered society is internally coherent ideal and that citizens who would be raised in such society could endorse and support their own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in particular way These institutions should be justified by particular conception of public reason which main feature is that overlapping consensus is the first stage of its justificatory structure. So, public reasoning of citizens in well-ordered society should be based solely on values and ideas inherent to liberal conception of justice - freedom, equality, fair system of cooperation and burdens of judgment. Another important feature of Quong?s conception of public reason concerns its scope. Quong argues for a wide scope of public reason which demands that all coercive or binding laws or public policies should be justified (whenever possible) on basis of these values alone. Thus, reasonable citizens in well-ordered society by definition accord deliberative priority to public reasons over their other comprehensive or nonpublic beliefs whenever they exercise their collective political power over one another. The problem I raise in this paper is that it is very likely that in well-ordered society there will be a group of citizens that will not accord full deliberative priority to political values, especially not at all levels of political deliberation. On certain issues they will like to see their particular values being realized through common political institutions. If our political theory excludes this group from justificatory constituency on this particular issue or categorize them as unreasonable it can easily undermine their general adherence to liberal conception of justice and endanger stability of well-ordered society. Thus, my point is that we need a further development of political liberalism to solve such problems not as a part of non-ideal theory but as a part of its ideal of well-ordered society.

Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Stability

Since its publication in 1993, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism has been central to debates concerning political legitimacy, democratic theory, toleration, and multiculturalism in contemporary political theory. Yet, despite the immense body of literature which has been produced since Rawls’s work was published, very little has been said or written regarding the place of political parties and partisanship within political liberalism. This book aims to fill this gap in the literature. Its central argument is that political liberalism needs and nourishes political parties, and that political parties are therefore not hostile but vital to it. First, partisanship generates its own distinctive kind of political obligations, additional to any political obligations people may have qua ordinary citizens. Second, contrary to what many critics argue, and despite its admittedly restrictive features, Rawls’s conception of public reason allows significant scope for partisan advocacy and partisan pluralism, and in fact the very normative demands of partisanship are in syntony with those of public reason. Third, parties contribute to the overlapping consensus that for Rawls guarantees stability in diverse societies. Fourth, political liberalism nourishes political parties, by leaving many issues, including religious and socio-economic ones, open to democratic contestation. In summary, parties contribute both to the legitimacy and to the stability of political liberalism.

Exclusive Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

Political Parties and the Overlapping Consensus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Creative Agency ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
The Common ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Political Liberal

This chapter rejects the ‘extrinsic’ view of public reason examined in Chapter 4, and argues that political parties can play an important role in helping citizens to relate their comprehensive doctrines to political liberal values and institutions. Once we understand the distinctive normative demands of partisanship, this chapter claims, we can see that there is no inherent tension between them and the demands of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This is because partisanship (unlike factionalism) involves a commitment to the common good rather than the sole advancement of merely partial interests, and this implies a commitment to public reasoning. The chapter further examines three distinctive empirical features of parties that particularly enable them to contribute to an overlapping consensus. These are their linkage function, their advancement of broad multi-issue political platforms, and their creative agency.

scholarly journals JUSTICE, FEASIBILITY, AND IDEAL THEORY: A PLURALIST APPROACH

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 32-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Mason
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Privileged Position ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Pluralist Approach

Abstract:A qualified pluralism is defended that recognizes value in a variety of forms of political theory and resists arguments that purport to show that one particular approach should occupy a privileged position. Against realists, it is argued that abstract analyses of political values that bracket a wide range of facts about people and their circumstances can be both coherent and important, whereas against those who think “ideal theory” or the identification of ultimate principles should come first, it is argued that the case for always giving priority to either one of these is weak.

scholarly journals Reviewing Public Reason: A Critique of Rawls’ Political Liberalism and the Idea of Public Reason

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 715-729
Author(s):  
Rachael Patterson
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Liberal Neutrality ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism

This article provides a critical review of Rawls’ effort in Political Liberalism to construct a political theory of justice compatible with the fact of reasonable pluralism. Particular attention is given to the ‘idea of public reason’ and political liberalism’s liberal neutrality. It is argued that because of its liberal neutrality, political liberalism would preclude people from endorsing at least some reasonable comprehensive views and, therefore, as a theory it lacks the necessary stability required to be as successful as Rawls claims.

scholarly journals An overview of Liberalism Without Perfection

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-11
Author(s):  
Ivan Cerovac
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Justification ◽  
The Status ◽  
Critical Scrutiny ◽  
The One ◽  
Influential Book

Quong?s influential book probably represents the most sophisticated defence of Rawlsian political liberalism. This review focuses on its content and systematizes it by chapters, emphasizing its relevance both in the first part, where the author puts the liberal perfectionist position under critical scrutiny by advancing three major objections (regarding autonomy, paternalism and political legitimacy), and the second, where the author presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism that clearly differs from the one presented by Rawls in several important features. The review also summarizes Quong?s innovative arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.

Rawls's Practical Conception of Justice: Opinion, Tradition and Objectivity in Political Liberalism

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-43
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
The Political ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
The Stability

AbstractIn Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes the practical character and aims of his conception of justice. Justice as fairness is to provide the basis of a reasoned, informed and willing political agreement by locating grounds for consensus in the fundamental ideas and values of the political culture. Critics urge, however, that such a politically liberal conception of justice will be designed merely to ensure the stability of political institutions by appealing to the currently-held opinions of actual citizens. In order to evaluate this concern, I suggest, it is necessary to focus on the normative character of Rawls's analysis. Rawls argues that justice as fairness is the conception of justice that citizens of modern democratic cultures should choose in reflective equilibrium, after reflecting fully upon their considered judgments regarding justice. Since judgments in reflective equilibrium are grounded in considered judgment, rather than situated opinions, I argue that the criticism fails.

scholarly journals The limits of conjecture: Political liberalism, counter-radicalisation and unreasonable religious views

Ethnicities ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriele Badano ◽  
Alasia Nuti
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Theory Reasoning ◽  
The Stability

Originally proposed by John Rawls, the idea of reasoning from conjecture is popular among the proponents of political liberalism in normative political theory. Reasoning from conjecture consists in discussing with fellow citizens who are attracted to illiberal and antidemocratic ideas by focusing on their religious or otherwise comprehensive doctrines, attempting to convince them that such doctrines actually call for loyalty to liberal democracy. Our goal is to criticise reasoning from conjecture as a tool aimed at persuasion and, in turn, at improving the stability of liberal democratic institutions. To pursue this goal, we use as case study real-world efforts to counter-radicalise at-risk Muslim citizens, which, at first glance, reasoning from conjecture seems well-placed to contribute to. This case study helps us to argue that the supporters of reasoning from conjecture over-intellectualise opposition to liberal democracy and what societies can do to counter it. Specifically, they (i) underestimate how few members of society can effectively perform reasoning from conjecture; (ii) overlook that the burdens of judgement, a key notion for political liberals, highlight how dim the prospects of reasoning from conjecture are and (iii) do not pay attention to the causes of religious persons’ opposition to liberal democracy. However, not everything is lost for political liberals, provided that they redirect attention to different and under-researched resources contained in Rawls’s theory. In closing, we briefly explain how such resources are much better placed than reasoning from conjecture to provide guidance relative to counter-radicalisation in societies (i) populated by persons who do not generally hold anything close to a fully worked out and internally consistent comprehensive doctrine and (ii) where political institutions should take responsibility for at least part of the existing alienation from liberal democratic values.

scholarly journals Justice and the Fetus: Rawls, Children, and Abortion

2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID M. SHAW
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Political Society ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Over Time

In a footnote to the first edition of Political Liberalism, John Rawls introduced an example of how public reason could deal with controversial issues. He intended this example to show that his system of political liberalism could deal with such problems by considering only political values, without the introduction of comprehensive moral doctrines. Unfortunately, Rawls chose “the troubled question of abortion” as the issue that would illustrate this. In the case of abortion, Rawls argued, “the equality of women as equal citizens” overrides both “the ordered reproduction of political society over time” and also “the due respect for human life.” It seems fair to say that this was not the best choice of example and also that Rawls did not argue for his example particularly well: a whole subset of the Rawlsian literature concerns this question alone.

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