A Property Owning Democracy or a Liberal (Democratic) Socialism?

1998 ◽  
pp. 132-139
Author(s):  
Wonsup Jung
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Mixed Regime ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Rawlsian Justice ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Liberal Socialism

This paper deals with the characteristic features of Rawls’ property-owning democracy, and whether a liberal democratic socialism can be compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism. I argue that a property-owning democracy can be compatible with Rawlsian justice while liberal socialism cannot. I understand the choice between property-owning democracy and liberal socialism as the problem of which kind of regime is more compatible with the pluralism of modern democracies. Property-owning democracy is more compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism since it permits a wider variety of the conceptions of the good than liberal socialism while at the same time permitting worker-managed firms; thus I argue that it can be understood as a "mixed" regime.

Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

The possibility of democratic socialism in Habermas

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098689
Author(s):  
Pedro A. Teixeira
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Theory Of Democracy ◽  
Economic Regime ◽  
The Ideal

In keeping with the radical openness of his theory of democracy, Habermas avoided pre-determining the ideal mode of economic organization for his favoured model of deliberative democracy. Instead of attempting a full-blown derivation, in this article, I propose adapting the Rawlsian method of comparing different political–economic regimes as candidate applications of his theory of justice to Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy. Although both theorists are seen as endorsing liberal democratic world views, from the perspective of political economy, the corollary of their conceptions of democracy would arguably veer elsewhere: in Rawls’s case, into the territory of property-owning democracy or democratic socialism, and in Habermas’s, into any political–economic regime which guarantees the real exercise of full political and discursive liberties against the background of legitimate lawmaking. The ultimate aim of this article is to discuss whether a concrete conception of democratic socialism, if any, is compatible with Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy.

The reasons of the unreasonable: Is political liberalism still an option?

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372110405
Author(s):  
Benedetta Giovanola ◽  
Roberta Sala
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Harsh Criticism ◽  
Sense Of Justice

In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

I. G. AGAFONNIKOV — PORTRAIT OF A CONDUCTOR AND TEACHER

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-112
Author(s):  
S. V. Miroshnichenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Middle Level ◽  
Choral Conductor ◽  
Musical Education ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Methodological Guidelines ◽  
Pedagogical Principles

The article presents a portrait of the outstanding choral conductor and teacher Igor Germanovich Agafonnikov (1932–2005) and highlights his pedagogical principles and methodological guidelines. The main feature of Agafonnikov's pedagogical style is the ability to create an atmosphere of special trust and respect towards students. It is pointed out the continuity of his pedagogical work with the historic traditions of Russian choral school represented by his mentors: Evstolia Nikolaevna Zvereva in the School at the Moscow State Conservatory named after P. I. Tchaikovsky and Vasily Petrovich Mukhin at the Moscow Conservatory. The author considers the main provisions of I. G. Agafonnikov's methodological work "Reflections on Choirmaster Training in the Middle Level of Musical Education", which fully reflects the fundamental principles of the teacher-conductor. Characteristic features of his individual pedagogical style, based on the liberal-democratic and tolerant methods of students' education under constant activity of all participants of the pedagogical process, are summarized. The professor's methodological approach to the work with students and the choir is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the rehearsal process, in which the conductor encourages the singers to perform consciously and meaningfully.

scholarly journals Islam and the End of History

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 512-535
Author(s):  
Ali A. Mazrui
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Former Soviet Union ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
End Of History ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The End Of History ◽  
Seminal Article ◽  
The Cold War

IntroductionThe debate about the end of history raises issues that sometimestouch almost upon the philosophy of history, insofar as they relate to thesignificance of not only a particular century but of the human species.Francis Fukuyama provoked this debate in his seminal article entitled,"The End of History?" in the journal The National Interest. 'At the end ofthe twentieth century, Fukuyama saw "an unabashed Victory of economicand political liberalism."' His central argument was that the whole worldwas moving towards a liberal democratic capitalist system that was destinedto be the final sociopolitical paradigm of all human evolution. AsFukuyama put it:What we may be witnessing is just not the end of the Cold War,or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but theend of history as such that is, the end point of mankind's ideologicalevolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracyas the final form of human govemment.For Fukuyama, at the time of writing the original article (in 1989),the momentous changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, ...

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Core ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
Special Concern ◽  
Formal Equality ◽  
Democratic Societies

The introduction acknowledges that although liberalism promises equality for all citizens, liberal democratic societies fall short of this ideal in many ways. Of special concern is the inequality that members of socially subordinated groups endure despite the guarantee of formal equality. Liberal theorists have not yet adequately shown that liberalism can address such group based subordination and can secure substantive equality for all. The introduction explains that the aim of this book is to show that at least one version of liberalism—political liberalism—is a feminist liberalism and that the core commitments of this view restrict all reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups. An overview of each chapter is provided.

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