Evolutionary game analysis of ecological rehabilitation between central and local governments: From the perspective of fiscal decentralization

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
潘鹤思 PAN Hesi ◽  
李英 LI Ying ◽  
柳洪志 LIU Hongzhi
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Rehabilitation ◽  
Game Analysis

scholarly journals Impact of Emotional Perceived Value on the Uncertain Evolution of the Housing Bubble

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (13) ◽  
pp. 1543
Author(s):  
Yang Tang ◽  
Kairong Hong ◽  
Yucheng Zou ◽  
Yanwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Perceived Value ◽  
Housing Bubble ◽  
Analysis Framework ◽  
Policy Environment ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In China, the housing bubble is not only an economic issue but also an important social and political issue. According to game theory, the housing bubble is an equilibrium result of the interaction between policy environment and participants’ behavior. In this process, due to the interaction between speculation, regulation, and emotions, the development and evolution of the housing bubble are faced with uncertainty. Different from traditional econometric analysis, this article adopts the evolutionary game analysis method in order to establish a multi-stage evolutionary game analysis framework for the housing bubble. Firstly, by analyzing the emotional perceived value of related subjects under optimism, pessimism, and uncertainty, this article explores the mechanism of emotional perceived value on the housing bubble under the condition of inconsistent policy objectives. Secondly, it introduces emotional perceived value into the evolutionary game analysis framework of housing bubbles and analyzes the strategic combination and game equilibrium between investors and local governments under different emotions. Finally, taking Hainan province as an example, it conducts a MATLAB numerical simulation on the uncertain evolution of the housing bubble and proposes a staged strategy combination to deal with the housing bubble. The results show that: (1) emotional perceived value is affected by policy environment; (2) changes in the strength of policy effects make emotional perceived value change, which has different incentive effects on investors’ speculation and local governments’ regulation; (3) there are differences in emotional perceived value in different stages, which improves the uncertainty of the game equilibrium result between investors and local governments; and (4) considering the evolutionary characteristics of the housing bubble in different stages, its countermeasures should not only prevent insufficient regulation but also avoid excessive regulation. The above conclusions can provide theoretical and practical references for predicting the behavior of real estate investors, identifying the evolution mechanisms and rules of real estate bubbles and formulating relevant regulatory policies.

scholarly journals Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

2022 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 222-233
Author(s):  
Zhaopeng Chu ◽  
◽  
Chen Bian ◽  
Jun Yang ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Control Policy ◽  
Environmental Taxes ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Air Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Consequences

In the institutional context of China’s political centralization and fiscal decentralization, this study explores the environmental regulations that make the central and local governments join efforts in air pollution control. Policy simulations in an evolutionary game show that the best approach is to internalize environmental costs and benefits in local governments’ objective function. The effectiveness of several policy instruments is examined individually and jointly, including administrative inspection, transfer payment, and environmental taxes. It is shown that in case environmental consequences are not internalized, appropriate application of policy instruments can incentivize goal-oriented local governments to choose the socially optimal strategy.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stress Effect of Cross-Regional Transfer of Resource-Exhausted Enterprises

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Hui Yu ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Baohua Yang ◽  
Cunfang Li
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Eastern China ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Western China ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Stress Effect ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Countermeasures And Suggestions

This paper analyses the stress effect of cross-regional transfer of resource-exhausted enterprises from eastern China to central and Western China. A tripartite evolutionary game model including the central government, the local government of the operation recipient region, and the resource-exhausted transfer enterprises is established under the assumption of limited rationality. By analysing the evolutionary equilibrium and using MATLAB, for example, analysis, the relationship between equilibrium probability and various parameters, as well as the key influencing factors of equilibrium strategy were explored. The research shows, first, that the degree of punishment imposed by the central government on the local governments, the implementation of regulation by the local governments, and the amount of rewards/punishments implemented by the local governments for transfer enterprises are the key factors affecting evolutionary stability. Second, it shows that the local governments’ penalty for transfer enterprises has a significant impact on the convergence speed of enterprises’ strategic choice to “Completely Control Pollution.” Finally, from the perspective of the relationships between the central government and the local governments, as well as with transfer enterprises, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to effectively prevent the stress effect of the cross-regional transfer behaviour of resource-exhausted enterprises.

scholarly journals The evolutionary game analysis of cross-regional ecological compensation - based on the perspective of the main functional area

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 04043
Author(s):  
PAN He-si ◽  
LIU Hong-zhi
Keyword(s):  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Functional Area ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Upper Limit

Under the new normal, the carrying capacity of ecological environment in China has reached or approached the upper limit. The root cause is the lack of an endogenous mechanism for the protection and compensation of forest resources. Therefore, clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders can help to break through the dilemma. An evolutionary game model between beneficiary regions and the protected regions was constructed, based on the “restraint-encouragement” mechanism of the central government.The results show that in cross-regional ecological compensation, the optimal strategy of “ protectioncompensation” depend on the net profits of local governments and the central government's fines.

Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Economies

2004 ◽  
pp. 126-141
Author(s):  
A. Chernyavsky ◽  
K. Vartapetov
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Finance Reform ◽  
Fiscal Transfers ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Subnational Government ◽  
Tax Autonomy

By employing the methodology developed by the OECD the paper assesses the degree of revenue decentralization in Russia in comparison with other post-communist European countries. The paper provides theoretical arguments underpinning fiscal decentralization, analyzes the composition of subnational government revenues, the level of regional and local tax autonomy and types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The analysis presents the composition of revenues depending on the degree of subnational and local government control. In comparison with other transition countries fiscal decentralization in Russia is relatively low. It is concluded that Russia's public finance reform has not progressed towards providing greater fiscal autonomy for regional and local governments.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document