scholarly journals Impact of Emotional Perceived Value on the Uncertain Evolution of the Housing Bubble

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (13) ◽  
pp. 1543
Author(s):  
Yang Tang ◽  
Kairong Hong ◽  
Yucheng Zou ◽  
Yanwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Perceived Value ◽  
Housing Bubble ◽  
Analysis Framework ◽  
Policy Environment ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In China, the housing bubble is not only an economic issue but also an important social and political issue. According to game theory, the housing bubble is an equilibrium result of the interaction between policy environment and participants’ behavior. In this process, due to the interaction between speculation, regulation, and emotions, the development and evolution of the housing bubble are faced with uncertainty. Different from traditional econometric analysis, this article adopts the evolutionary game analysis method in order to establish a multi-stage evolutionary game analysis framework for the housing bubble. Firstly, by analyzing the emotional perceived value of related subjects under optimism, pessimism, and uncertainty, this article explores the mechanism of emotional perceived value on the housing bubble under the condition of inconsistent policy objectives. Secondly, it introduces emotional perceived value into the evolutionary game analysis framework of housing bubbles and analyzes the strategic combination and game equilibrium between investors and local governments under different emotions. Finally, taking Hainan province as an example, it conducts a MATLAB numerical simulation on the uncertain evolution of the housing bubble and proposes a staged strategy combination to deal with the housing bubble. The results show that: (1) emotional perceived value is affected by policy environment; (2) changes in the strength of policy effects make emotional perceived value change, which has different incentive effects on investors’ speculation and local governments’ regulation; (3) there are differences in emotional perceived value in different stages, which improves the uncertainty of the game equilibrium result between investors and local governments; and (4) considering the evolutionary characteristics of the housing bubble in different stages, its countermeasures should not only prevent insufficient regulation but also avoid excessive regulation. The above conclusions can provide theoretical and practical references for predicting the behavior of real estate investors, identifying the evolution mechanisms and rules of real estate bubbles and formulating relevant regulatory policies.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Research on the Impact of Environmental Regulation on Overcapacity in Coal Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Bo Fan ◽  
Tingting Guo ◽  
Ruzhi Xu ◽  
Wenquan Dong
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Coal Industry ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Clean Production ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
The Impact

Currently, the world is facing two significant challenges: low-carbon development and overcapacity. Government departments must reexamine their development strategy of energy industry. Implementing environmental regulatory policies and technological innovation can help alleviate coal industry’s overcapacity, while sustainable development requires joint actions of governments, enterprises, and the market. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, power industry, and coal enterprise. Under the premise of bounded rationality, the evolution path of each player in the game under the market incentive environmental regulation is analyzed, and the influence of the change of parameters of each player on the result is numerically simulated. The study found that strengthening environmental regulation by local governments is an inevitable choice to promote the transformation and upgrading of coal industry and power industry. In addition, reducing law enforcement costs and technological innovation costs are the fundamental point of the coordinated development of the three parties. Technological innovation in the power industry will reduce the probability of coal companies’ choosing clean production strategies, while seeking low-cost clean production technology and financial support is the key to coal companies’ optimization of production capacity.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stress Effect of Cross-Regional Transfer of Resource-Exhausted Enterprises

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Hui Yu ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Baohua Yang ◽  
Cunfang Li
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Eastern China ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Western China ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Stress Effect ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Countermeasures And Suggestions

This paper analyses the stress effect of cross-regional transfer of resource-exhausted enterprises from eastern China to central and Western China. A tripartite evolutionary game model including the central government, the local government of the operation recipient region, and the resource-exhausted transfer enterprises is established under the assumption of limited rationality. By analysing the evolutionary equilibrium and using MATLAB, for example, analysis, the relationship between equilibrium probability and various parameters, as well as the key influencing factors of equilibrium strategy were explored. The research shows, first, that the degree of punishment imposed by the central government on the local governments, the implementation of regulation by the local governments, and the amount of rewards/punishments implemented by the local governments for transfer enterprises are the key factors affecting evolutionary stability. Second, it shows that the local governments’ penalty for transfer enterprises has a significant impact on the convergence speed of enterprises’ strategic choice to “Completely Control Pollution.” Finally, from the perspective of the relationships between the central government and the local governments, as well as with transfer enterprises, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to effectively prevent the stress effect of the cross-regional transfer behaviour of resource-exhausted enterprises.

scholarly journals The evolutionary game analysis of cross-regional ecological compensation - based on the perspective of the main functional area

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 04043
Author(s):  
PAN He-si ◽  
LIU Hong-zhi
Keyword(s):  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Functional Area ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Upper Limit

Under the new normal, the carrying capacity of ecological environment in China has reached or approached the upper limit. The root cause is the lack of an endogenous mechanism for the protection and compensation of forest resources. Therefore, clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders can help to break through the dilemma. An evolutionary game model between beneficiary regions and the protected regions was constructed, based on the “restraint-encouragement” mechanism of the central government.The results show that in cross-regional ecological compensation, the optimal strategy of “ protectioncompensation” depend on the net profits of local governments and the central government's fines.

scholarly journals Evaluating the Minor Coarse Cereals Product Crowdfunding Platform through Evolutionary Game Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Yu ◽  
Muhammad Hafeez ◽  
Lihan Liu ◽  
Muhammad Tariq Mahmood ◽  
Hong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Relative Price ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Price Difference ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Advance Payment ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Social ◽  
Sowing Period ◽  
Modern Era

In the modern era, the minor coarse cereals (MCC) are particularly popular among consumers. Price fluctuations cause misperceptions for growers, but also bring about complications for processing enterprises and consumers. To solve this problem, a multi-grain product crowdfunding platform is proposed. To this end, an evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the game equilibrium between growers and crowdfunders. The analysis determines that evolutionary game equilibrium is related to the relative price difference between the sowing period and the harvest period, and to the social/logistical cost. Under normal circumstances, the crowdfunder may default when the sowing-period price is greater than the harvest-period price. The grower may default if the sowing-period price is less than the harvest-period price. Therefore, in the design of a crowdfunding system for MCC products, a certain percentage of advance payment (30%) and certain default deposits should be collected from crowdfunders and growers, respectively.

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