scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Stress Effect of Cross-Regional Transfer of Resource-Exhausted Enterprises

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Hui Yu ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Baohua Yang ◽  
Cunfang Li
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Eastern China ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Western China ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Stress Effect ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Countermeasures And Suggestions

This paper analyses the stress effect of cross-regional transfer of resource-exhausted enterprises from eastern China to central and Western China. A tripartite evolutionary game model including the central government, the local government of the operation recipient region, and the resource-exhausted transfer enterprises is established under the assumption of limited rationality. By analysing the evolutionary equilibrium and using MATLAB, for example, analysis, the relationship between equilibrium probability and various parameters, as well as the key influencing factors of equilibrium strategy were explored. The research shows, first, that the degree of punishment imposed by the central government on the local governments, the implementation of regulation by the local governments, and the amount of rewards/punishments implemented by the local governments for transfer enterprises are the key factors affecting evolutionary stability. Second, it shows that the local governments’ penalty for transfer enterprises has a significant impact on the convergence speed of enterprises’ strategic choice to “Completely Control Pollution.” Finally, from the perspective of the relationships between the central government and the local governments, as well as with transfer enterprises, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to effectively prevent the stress effect of the cross-regional transfer behaviour of resource-exhausted enterprises.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chong Jia ◽  
Ruixue Zhang ◽  
Dan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Information Modeling ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Building Information ◽  
Realistic Problem ◽  
Social Capitals ◽  
The Cost

With the development of building information technology, Building Information Modeling (BIM) has become an important way to effectively solve the cross-organization information collaboration of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, and how to promote the adoption of BIM in PPP projects has become a realistic problem to be solved urgently. This study discusses the adoption of BIM among stakeholders in PPP projects based on prospect theory and evolutionary game theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model including governments, social capitals, and contractors is established. The behavioral evolution mechanism of each stakeholder on BIM adoption is explored by analyzing the evolutionary equilibrium, and the key influencing factors of equilibrium strategy are analyzed by using numerical simulation. The results demonstrate that first, the degree of the cost to all stakeholders involved in the adoption of BIM, as well as the punishment for governments’ passive promotion of BIM, the punishment for social capitals’ passive adoption of BIM and the reward for contractors’ active application of BIM are the key factors affecting evolutionary stability. Second, according to prospect theory, the main stakeholders usually make decisions through subjective judgment and perceived value which ultimately lead to deviation in their behaviors. The deviations will hinder the establishment of ESS point (1, 1, 1) and make the system difficult to converge to the optimal state. Finally, from the perspective of governments, social capitals, and contractors, countermeasures and management implications are put forward to effectively promote the adoption of BIM in PPP projects.

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Shan Gao ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Media Use ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Media Influence ◽  
Social Media Use ◽  
The Public

Despite the expectation that social media use in the public sector contributes to enhancing government's transparency, few studies have been investigated whether social media use actually leads to more disclosure during environmental incidents in practice and how social media influence local governments and their officials' information disclosure. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local government in social media context, and examine the internal mechanism that how social media influence the progress of information disclosure during environmental incidents. The findings indicate that social media plays an active constructive role in central-local government game relations. Specific- ally, social media can provides an efficient information channels for the central government supervise regional officials in environmental incidents, and thus improves its supervision efficiency, and it also provides an important means for internet mobilization and online-offline interaction by encouraging the public exchange information and express their views, and in turn forces local governments and their officials tend to disclosure ahead.

scholarly journals Will Third-Party Treatment Effectively Solve Issues Related to Industrial Pollution in China?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7685
Author(s):  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Yao Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Trial Basis ◽  
Local Levels

China expanded the application of the third-party treatment model (TPTM) in 2017 for effectively tackling the issues related to industrial pollution on a trial basis, and the model could diversify the government’s toolbox for addressing industrial pollution. With multiple players such as local governments, polluters, and environmental services providers (ESP) involved in the TPTM, appropriate guidance and coordination among the three players are critical to the success of the TPTM. This study constructs an evolutionary game model for the three players to capture their interaction mechanisms and simulates the three-player evolutionary game dynamics with the replicator dynamics equation. The simulation results show that heavier penalties for pollution and lower regulatory costs incurred by local governments could effectively improve the performance of the TPTM. Moreover, although environmental incentives provided by the central government to local levels do not affect the ultimate performance of the TPTM, they do shorten the time needed for the effect of the TPTM to emerge. The study concludes by proposing policy recommendations based on these results.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mining ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Safe Production ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Competition on Regional R&D Efficiency: Does Legal Environment Matter in China’s Innovation System?

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baocheng He ◽  
Jiawei Wang ◽  
Jiaoyang Wang ◽  
Kun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
High Efficiency ◽  
Eastern China ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Western China ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Promoting Effect ◽  
Spatial Panel Data ◽  
The Impact

Local governments are encouraged to compete in R&D investments and activities in China’s innovation system. We aim to understand the influence of government competition on regional R&D efficiency. We are also interested in examining how the attributes of legal environment act as a moderating variable for the relationship between government competition and R&D efficiency. We developed Tobit spatial models with spatial panel data of 30 provinces of China in 2008–2016. The results show that: (1) There exists spatial dependence of R&D efficiency, and the regions with high efficiency have “spillover effect” on the surrounding areas. (2) Government competition has a significant promoting effect on R&D efficiency and/or R&D efficiency spillover. Specifically, government competition has both R&D efficiency promotion and R&D efficiency “spillover” promotion in Eastern China, only R&D efficiency positive spillover promotion in Middle-area and R&D efficiency promotion but negative spillover in Western China. (3) The impact of government competition on efficiency is affected by the legal environment, and the promotion effect of government competition only exists in good legal environment. The results of this study reveal an important way to improve R&D efficiency by establishing a new R&D competition mechanism for local government which is oriented by efficiency and ruled by the legal environment.

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shan Gao ◽  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
Efficient Information

In recent years, social media has had a crucial role in promoting governments to act more responsibly. However, few studies have investigated whether social media use actually leads to increased disclosure during environmental incidents, or how social media influences regional governments’ information disclosure, even though delayed and insufficient disclosure on relevant incidents is often widespread in China. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local governments, and examine the role of social media on game participants’ strategy selections in the information disclosure game. The results indicate that social media plays an active role in promoting the regional government to proactively disclose information during environmental incidents through two mechanisms: the top–down intervention mechanism, and the bottom–up reputation mechanism. More specifically, social media can provide efficient information channels for the central government to supervise local officials’ limited disclosure during environmental incidents, essentially sharing the central government’s supervision costs, and thus improving its supervision and intervention efficiency. Social media helps focus the public’s attention on the limited disclosure of local officials in environmental incidents, and actively mobilizes citizens to protest to maintain their interests, placing considerable pressure on the reputation of local governments.

Comparison Analysis and Strategies on the Regional Internet Industry Development in China

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 2087-2091 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Ma ◽  
Li Hua Chen ◽  
Qi Qi Hu ◽  
Yi Ping Luo
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Eastern China ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Central China ◽  
Western China ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Industry Development ◽  
Internet Industry ◽  
Development Level ◽  
Better Than

The internet has become an important engine of economic growth and social progress. China is a vast territory country and the local governments have different policy to promote the application of the internet technology. Therefore, the development of China’s internet industry and regional differences will be studied to discover the regional spread pattern of the internet industry in this article, in order to provide suggestions for the depth development of China’s internet industry. The main finding is there are a lot of differences among China’s internet regional development level. The internet development level of Eastern China has been significantly better than the central and western provinces and cities, and Central China has been better than Western China from 2006 to 2010. Finally, the suggestions will be presented for the regional internet industry development.

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