The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (11) ◽  
pp. 48-6212-48-6212
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
New Science ◽  
The Mind

Beérkezett könyvek

2008 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-770
Author(s):  
Csaba Pléh
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
New Science ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Oxford University Press

Danziger, Kurt: Marking the mind. A history of memory . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008Farkas, Katalin: The subject’s point of view. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008MosoninéFriedJudités TolnaiMárton(szerk.): Tudomány és politika. Typotex, Budapest, 2008Iacobini, Marco: Mirroring people. The new science of how we connect with others. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2008Changeux, Jean-Pierre. Du vrai, du beau, du bien.Une nouvelle approche neuronale. Odile Jacob, PárizsGazzaniga_n

scholarly journals Agency, Responsibility, Selves, and the Mechanical Mind

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Fiorella Battaglia
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Human Machine Interaction ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
Area Of Concern ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Brain

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these three main approaches to the mind, and particularly as applied to an “extended mind”, the paper identifies a major area of transformation in philosophy of action, which is understood in terms of additional epistemic devices—including a legal perspective of regulating the human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. I argue this is a new area of concern within philosophy, which will be characterized in terms of self-objectification, which becomes “alienation” following Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technology. The paper argues that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.

scholarly journals False Consciousness and the Socially Extended Mind

Perspectives ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-35
Author(s):  
Ane Engelstad
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Social Analysis ◽  
False Consciousness ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Cognitive Dynamics ◽  
Reliable Tool ◽  
External Objects ◽  
The Mind

Abstract In this paper I present a problem for the Marxist idea of false consciousness, namely how it is vulnerable to accusations of dogmatism. I will argue that the concept must be further developed if it is to provide a plausible tool for systematic social analysis. In the second half of the paper I will show how this could be done if the account of false consciousness incorporates Shaun Gallagher’s theory of the socially extended mind. This is a theory that explores how the mind expands towards external objects and systems. I will conclude that it helps to reinstate false consciousness as a reliable tool for the analysis of cognitive dynamics within power structures.

Surrealism, Chance and the Extended Mind

2020 ◽  
pp. 171-188
Author(s):  
Kerry Watson
Keyword(s):  
Distributed Cognition ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Objective Chance ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Exquisite Corpse ◽  
Automatic Drawing ◽  
Unconscious Mind ◽  
Artistic Skill ◽  
Unconscious State

This chapter discusses how the Surrealists engaged with techniques like automatic drawing, the exquisite corpse, collage, frottage and decalcomania, and how this might be interpreted in the context of theories of distributed cognition, enactivism, embodiment, and the extended mind. The Surrealists’ use of ‘objective chance’ was driven by a belief in the existence of an unconscious state of mind which could only be accessed obliquely, by using techniques which bypassed both artistic skill and conscious thought. ‘Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?’. This question is posed by Clark and Chalmers (1998) as an introduction to the concept of the extended mind, but it could just as well be the very question the Surrealists were trying to address in their search for a universal truth, the key to which they believed to be the unconscious mind as defined by Freud.

The Elusive Extended Mind

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-31
Author(s):  
Fred Adams
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Intelligent Behavior ◽  
The Mind

For nearly twenty years Andy Clark has been the chief architect and proponent of the thesis of extended mind. But it is only the cognitive processes in the mind that extend, according to Clark (not consciousness itself). However, when it comes to saying what a cognitive process is such that one can determine whether it does or does not extend, Clark is less forthcoming. He has offered a Dennettian “cognition is as cognition does.” He has offered that cognition is “what supports intelligent behavior.” In some cases he comes very close to asserting that we don’t really need to say what cognition is. This chapter explains why this all matters and why the failure to be more forthcoming makes the extended mind an elusive entity.

Language, languaging, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 677-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sune Vork Steffensen
Keyword(s):  
Extended Mind ◽  
Stable System ◽  
Ecological Approach ◽  
Social Phenomenon ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Mind

After a brief summary of Andy Clark’s book, Supersizing the Mind (2008) I address Clark’s approach to language which I argue to be inadequate. Clark is criticized for reifying language, thus neglecting that it is an interpersonal activity, not a stable system of symbols. With a starting point in language as a social phenomenon, I suggest an ecological approach to the extended mind hypothesis, arguing against Clark’s assumption that the extended mind is necessarily brain-centered.

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