Victorian Social Science: From Singular to Plural*

Author(s):  
Lawrence Goldman

This chapter provides an overview of the history of social science in Britain and the ways in which it was institutionalised in the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century social science was the product of three great changes, intellectual, material and spiritual. The European Enlightenment stimulated the development of and institutionalisation of the natural sciences, creating a new model for the study of human societies. The material changes include the expansion of population, growth of industries and manufacturing and development of mass culture and democracy. Rationalism and industrialisation caused the third change, the decline of conventional Christian belief and worship. The chapter also analyses the ‘statistical movement’, a dominant genre of social science up to 1860, and social evolution, which provided the leading paradigm for sociological thinking from the mid-century onwards.

1947 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Waldemar Gurian

The history of the Catholic Church includes men who, after brilliant services to the Church, died outside her fold. Best known among them is Tertullian, the apologetic writer of the Early Church; less known is Ochino, the third vicar-general of the Capuchins, whose flight to Calvin's Geneva almost destroyed his order. In the nineteenth century there were two famous representatives of this group. Johann von Doellinger refused, when more than seventy years old, to accept the decision of the Vatican Council about papal infallibility. He passed away in 1890 unreconciled, though he had been distinguished for years as the outstanding German Catholic theologian. Félicité de la Mennais was celebrated as the new Pascal and Bossuet of his time before he became the modern Tertullian by breaking with the Church because Pope Gregory XVI rejected his views on the relations between the Church and die world. As he lay deathly ill, his niece, “Madame de Kertanguy asked him: ‘Féli, do you want a priest? Surely, you want a priest?’ Lamennais answered: ‘No.’ The niece repeated: ‘I beg of you.’ But he said with a stronger voice: ‘No, no, no.


Author(s):  
James Haire

United and uniting churches have made a very significant contribution to the ecumenical movement. In seeking to assess that contribution, the chapter first defines what these churches are, considers the different types of union that have been created, examines the characteristics of these churches, and looks at the theological rationale for them. It goes on to trace the history of their formation from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and particularly during the years leading up to and following the Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches at New Delhi in 1961, under the influence of Lesslie Newbigin. Giving a theological assessment, it emphasizes that the existence of these churches, despite difficulties, provides places where the final unity of Christ’s one body is most clearly foreshadowed. They will always present proleptic visions of that goal.


Author(s):  
Theodore M. Porter

This chapter discusses statistics as social science. The systematic study of social numbers in the spirit of natural philosophy was pioneered during the 1660s, and was known for about a century and a half as political arithmetic. Its purpose, when not confined to the calculation of insurance or annuity rates, was the promotion of sound, well-informed state policy. Political arithmetic was, according to William Petty, the application of Baconian principles to the art of government. Implicit in the use by political arithmeticians of social numbers was the belief that the wealth and strength of the state depended strongly on the number and character of its subjects. Political arithmetic was supplanted by statistics in France and Great Britain around the beginning of the nineteenth century. The shift in terminology was accompanied by a subtle mutation of concepts that can be seen as one of the most important in the history of statistical thinking.


Author(s):  
Russell Keat

A central issue in the philosophy of the social sciences is the possibility of naturalism: whether disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, economics and psychology can be ‘scientific’ in broadly the same sense in which this term is applied to physics, chemistry, biology and so on. In the long history of debates about this issue, both naturalists and anti-naturalists have tended to accept a particular view of the natural sciences – the ‘positivist’ conception of science. But the challenges to this previously dominant position in the philosophy of science from around the 1960s made this shared assumption increasingly problematic. It was no longer clear what would be implied by the naturalist requirement that the social sciences should be modelled on the natural sciences. It also became necessary to reconsider the arguments previously employed by anti-naturalists, to see whether these held only on the assumption of a positivist conception of science. If so, a non-positivist naturalism might be defended: a methodological unity of the social and natural sciences based on some alternative to positivism. That this is possible has been argued by scientific realists in the social sciences, drawing on a particular alternative to positivism: the realist conception of science developed in the 1970s by Harré and others.


1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1067-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B Myerson

John Nash's formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash's work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory were developed and how they changed the course of economic theory.


1937 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. D. H. Cole

The principal purpose of these notes is to correct certain misunderstandings which I believe to be widely prevalent concerning the character of British Trade Unionism during the quarter of a century which followed the establishment in 1850—1851 of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The period covered thus begins with the inauguration of the ‘new model’ type of Amalgamated Society, and extends to the end of the trade boom of the early seventies, stopping just short of the Great Depression which set in about 1875.


1930 ◽  
Vol 76 (315) ◽  
pp. 764-771
Author(s):  
A. Wohlgemuth

Psychology was for centuries a part of philosophy, the happy, undisputed hunting-ground of the speculative metaphysician. With the beginning of the nineteenth century a new era dawned gradually for psychology. Anatomists, physiologists and physicists began to invade this reserve of the metaphysician. These early attempts of Gall and Spurzheim, Johannes Müller, E. H. Weber, Du Bois Reymond, Helmholtz, Lotze, Fechner, Thomas Young and many others are too well known to detain us. They lead up to the work of Wilhelm Wundt and the establishment of psychology as one of the natural sciences, from speculation without facts to speculation allied with experiment. However, as usually happens, the swing of the pendulum goes from one extreme to the other. For whilst the metaphysical psychologist would ignore physiology and neurology, maintaining that what is not itself a phase of consciousness cannot be used to explain consciousness, some of the physiological psychologists would overshoot the mark and attempt a psychology without consciousness. Thus we find the behaviourists (Watson) and the objective psychologists (Bechterew). Pavlov appears to belong to the latter school. But as Prof. Brett, in his History of Psychology, rightly says: “Modern psychology lies between two points: it emerges from anatomy and physiology, and terminates in a region where those sciences cease to guide.”


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