The Morally Constitutive State

Author(s):  
Toni Erskine

This chapter discusses the idea of the morally constitutive state. It introduces the second point of theoretical opposition for embedded cosmopolitanism. This forms an approach to international ethics that was extracted from MacIntyre’s essay on patriotism; the approach is termed as communitarian realism. The chapter also addresses statist perspectives, namely the extended political liberalism, from which John Rawls champions his ‘Law of Peoples’, and the ‘constitutive theory of individuality’ of Mervyn Frost.

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Higinio Llano Alonso

Este artículo se centra en The Law of Peoples (1999), libro con el que John Rawls cierra el tríptico de su concepción socio-democrática de la justicia dentro de la tradición liberal, iniciada a principios de la década de los ‘70 con A Theory of Justice (1971), donde describe la justicia como equidad como un ideal moral universal al que deben aspirar todas las sociedades, y continuada dos décadas más tarde con Political Liberalism (1993), obra en la que el pensador estadounidense abunda en su idea de extender una concepción política de la justicia al Derecho de los pueblos y a su función reguladora de las relaciones justas entre los pueblos. De cualquier modo, pese a que Rawls admite expresamente la ascendencia que tienen sobre su idea de justicia el contractualismo y el iusnaturalismo kantianos, así como la influencia que ejerce sobre su estudio dedicado al Derecho de gentes la doctrina universalista e iusirenista del Derecho internacional público, veremos hasta qué punto satisfizo o defraudó Rawls con su visión pluralista del orden mundial las expectativas de quienes esperaban que hiciera una defensa firme de la justicia universal y de la democracia cosmopolita. 


Magistro ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
William Farfán Moreno

Antes de abordar cualquiera de las problemáticas que surgen en la obrade John Rawls –The Law of Peoples–, es imprescindible comprender variosde los constructos que emplea el filósofo norteamericano en su propuestafilosófico-política desde A Theory of Justice hasta Political Liberalism.Los constructos son el procedimiento que asegura una convivencia políticaya sea entre ciudadanos, como lo propone Rawls en A Theory of Justice y locomplementa luego en Political Liberalism, o entre naciones a través de supropuesta en The Law of Peoples. Por lo tanto, el objetivo de este documentoes realizar una reconstrucción de tales constructos dentro de la propuestanormativa con la intención de plantear los problemas que surgen al interiordel derecho de gentes “rawlsiano”.


2011 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira

A edição especial da Revista Dissertatio pretende refletir sobre a importância da filosofia moral e política de John Rawls no cenário filosófico atual no ano em que sua obra mais conhecida, A Theory of Justice (TJ), completa quarenta anos. Esta data comemorativa é apenas um pretexto para uma avaliação integral do projeto de Rawls, o que inclui obras posteriores, como, por exemplo, Political Liberalism (PL) e The Law of Peoples (LP). Os artigos aqui reunidos procuram tematizar tanto a estrutura quanto o conteúdo da teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness), avaliando atentamente as suas virtudes e, também, as suas fraquezas


2000 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 125-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Brown

John Rawls is the most influential English-language political philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century – indeed, perhaps since John Stuart Mill. His influence rests partly on the very format of his masterwork, A Theory of Justice. But Theory is a flawed and incomplete masterpiece, and the “Rawls industry” that has developed around his work has been stimulated by these imperfections. Indeed, Rawls himself has corrected and elaborated upon his original formulations in a series of essays compiled in Political Liberalism and his recent Collected Papers. One of the most controversial features of Theory concerns its handling of international issues; Rawls turned to this question explicitly in an Amnesty International Lecture of 1993, “The Law of Peoples” (published in his Collected Papers), which he has now extended into a monograph with the same title. The latter is the main focus of this essay, which also includes a sketch of Rawls's project as a whole as a necessary preliminary.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 621-644
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls develops a theory of global justice whose scope and ambitions are quite modest. Far from justifying a global resource distribution principle modeled on the difference principle, Rawls’s theory does not argue for significant redistribution among peoples. This paper focuses on Rawls’s claim that the character and scope of his account of global justice are determined by the constructivist method that he employs to extend political liberalism’s project from the domestic to the global sphere. The principles of an acceptable law of peoples, he argues, are simply those principles that would be selected by rational representatives of peoples from the standpoint of a suitably characterized fair choice position. This paper argues that Rawls’s constructivist method in fact provides support for an account of global justice of greater scope and ambition than Rawls’s Law of Peoples.


2011 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira

Meu principal objetivo neste artigo é analisar o problema da justificação moral para John Rawls a partir dos textos A Theory of Justice (TJ, IX, § 87), Political Liberalism (PL III, § 2), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JF I, § 9), The Law of Peoples (LoP I, § 1), “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (ODPE), “The Independence of Moral Theory” (IMT), “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (JFPnM). Minha intenção é a de caracterizar a teoria da justiça como equidade como um sistema coerentista de justificação que conta com uma epistemologia coerentista holística, uma teoria do contrato social que introduz uma ontologia social e uma estratégia pragmatista na teoria contratualista. No escopo deste trabalho, analisarei as características da epistemologia coerentista holística pressuposta e de como ela resolve os problemas de regresso epistêmico, dogmatismo, dualismo, assimetria e circularidade.


Jus Cogens ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Tasioulas

AbstractThis article offers a critique of Ronald Dworkin’s article “A New Philosophy for International Law”, (Philos Public Aff 41: 1–30, 2013). It begins by showing that Dworkin’s moralised theory of law is built on two highly questionable background assumptions. On the one hand, a descriptively implausible characterisation of a positivist-voluntarist view of international law as the reigning “orthodoxy”. On the other hand, the methodologically questionable assumption that a theory of international law must discharge the dual function of explaining the validity of international law in a manner that underwrites its presumptive legitimacy. In its core part, the article then offers a sustained criticism of Dworkin’s moralised account of the validity and legitimacy of international law. Various problems are identified with the “principle of salience” that Dworkin offers in place of consent as a ground for international law. A key concern is the difficulties that stem from Dworkin’s willingness to proceed on the “fantasy” assumption that his theory needs to get off the ground, i.e. that there is an international court with compulsory jurisdiction and reliable mechanisms for enforcing its judgements. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on how Dworkin’s “fantasy-based” approach led him to over-estimate the degree to which international law can be a vehicle for the global spread of liberal democratic values. More minimalist ambitions for international legal order, along the lines suggested by John Rawls in The Law of Peoples, seem more realistic.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098541
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kędziora

The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concerns the question of how to do political philosophy under conditions of cultural pluralism, if the aim of political philosophy is to uncover the normative foundation of a modern liberal democracy. Rawls’s political liberalism tries to bypass the problem of pluralism, using the intellectual device of the veil of ignorance, and yet paradoxically at the same time it treats it as something given and as an arbiter of justification within the political conception of justice. Habermas argues that Rawls not only incorrectly operationalizes the moral point of view from which we discern what is just but also fails to capture the specificity of democracy which is given by internal relations between politics and law. This deprives Rawls’s political philosophy of the conceptual tools needed to articulate the normative foundation of democracy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document