Fiscal Squeeze in Germany:

Author(s):  
Martin Lodge ◽  
Kai Wegrich

Decisive fiscal squeeze might surprise observers of the German political system, insofar as party political dynamics, welfare state complexity, and intergovernmental financial arrangements are commonly said to inhibit decisive reforms. This chapter traces the fiscal squeeze carried out in post-unification Germany in the 1990s and 2000s and highlights how the politics of fiscal squeeze had damaging political consequences for the Social Democratic Party. Squeeze at the federal government level was largely about ‘natural wastage’ in staff numbers and targeted cutbacks. The welfare state witnessed considerable reform as a result of cumulating pressures resulting from unification, triggering significant political consequences. Finally, squeezing at the level of the intergovernmental fiscal transfers reflected attempts to contain fiscal pressures on local governments, and wider pressures within the system of German federalism, leading to the creation of a constitutional ‘debt brake’ on public budgets.

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (11) ◽  

The Second Senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) heard oral arguments on June 19, 2001, in the “NATO Strategic Concept” case. The parliamentary fraction of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) in the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) brought the case to the Federal Constitutional Court as an Organstreitverfahren (dispute between federal organs), which permits one federal organ (in this case, the Federal Parliament as represented by one of its party fractions) to challenge the constitutionality of an action taken by another federal organ (in this case, the Bundesregierung [Federal Government - executive branch]). The Federal Government consists of a parliamentary coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) headed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and the Alliance 90/the Greens (Greens), whose most prominent figure in the Federal Government is Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.


2018 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Thau

Abstract In Denmark, as in other Western European countries, the working class does not vote for social democratic parties to the same extent as before. Yet, what role did the social democratic parties themselves play in the demobilization of class politics? Building on core ideas from public opinion literature, this article differs from the focus on party policy positions in previous work and, instead, focuses on the group-based appeals of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark. Based on a quantitative content analysis of party programs between 1961 and 2004, I find that, at the general level, class-related appeals have been replaced by appeals targeting non-economic groups. At the specific level, the class-related appeals that remain have increasingly been targeting businesses at the expense of traditional left-wing groups such as wage earners, tenants and pensioners. These findings support a widespread hypothesis that party strategy was crucial in the decline of class politics, but also suggests that future work on class mobilization should adopt a group-centered perspective.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubomír Kopeček ◽  
Pavel Pšeja

This article attempts to analyze developments within the Czech Left after 1989. Primarily, the authors focus on two questions: (1) How did the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) achieve its dominance of the Left? (2)What is the relationship between the Social Democrats and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)? We conclude that the unsuccessful attempt to move the KSČM towards a moderate leftist identity opened up a space in which the Social Democrats could thrive, at the same time gradually assuming a pragmatic approach towards the Communists. Moreover, the ability of Miloš Zeman, the leader of the Social Democrats, to build a clear non-Communist Left alternative to the hegemony of the Right during the 1990s was also very important.


Author(s):  
Charles S. Maier

This chapter examines issues arising from the elections that were held in France, Germany, and Italy in the spring of 1924, asking in particular whether the elections could resolve the political ambiguities persisting in the three countries. It suggests that the presence of important political alternatives could not guarantee that the voting would yield clear decisions. Even where significant majorities or shifts of opinion occurred, the results were not unequivocal in terms of the issues at stake. Choices on the ballot did not parallel real policy alternatives. Superficially decisive victories led merely to coalitions built around opportunity rather than policy. The chapter considers the limits of Benito Mussolini's majority, the setback suffered by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the polls, and the coalition between the Radical Socialist Party and the SPD to form the Cartel des Gauches.


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