scholarly journals Hume and reliabilism

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (34) ◽  
pp. 27-51
Author(s):  
Hsueh Qu
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Generality Problem ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
Contemporary Context ◽  
Epistemological Framework

Hume's epistemological legacy is often perceived as a predominantly negative sceptical one. His infamous problem of induction continues to perplex philosophers to this day, and many of his sceptical worries maintain their interest in contemporary eyes (e.g. with regard to reason, the senses, substance, causation). Yet Hume's positive epistemological contributions also hold significance for philosophy in this day and age. In this paper, I aim to situate Hume's epistemology in a more contemporary context, particularly with regard to the theme of reliabilism that runs throughout this epistemology. This will take the shape of examining correspondences and contrasts between Hume's epistemologies in the Treatise and Enquiry and reliabilism, as well as an examination of how Hume's framework might handle some major challenges for reliabilist epistemologies. In particular, I argue that that while Hume is tempted to an epistemology that is intimately tied to truth in the Treatise, he backs away when confronted with the excesses of scepticism in the conclusion of Book 1, and winds up with an epistemology most similar to the contemporary epistemological frameworks of dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism. Yet, largely because of his reliance on the passions (a respect in which he diverges from these two contemporary frameworks), the epistemology of the Treatise remains crucially dissociated from truth. Meanwhile, in the first Enquiry, he proceeds to develop a two-tiered epistemological framework that first accords all our justification with default authority, and then founds all-things-considered epistemic justification on our evidence for the reliability of our faculties. The first tier most resembles the contemporary epistemological framework of conservatism, while the second tier most closely resembles approved-list reliabilism. In this, a clear reliabilist thread runs through the epistemology of the Enquiry. I will also argue that although Hume did not appear to fully appreciate one of the most significant challenges for reliabilism-that is, the generality problem-his philosophical framework nevertheless contains the beginnings of a response to it.

Appearance and Explanation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Complete Theory ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
The World ◽  
The Way

McCain and Moretti develop a new appearance/seemings-based theory of epistemic justification. This theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, takes as a reasonable starting point the idea that how things appear provides evidence about how the world is. However, unlike other appearance-based theories, Phenomenal Explanationism does not rely on an overly simplistic account of evidential support where things appearing a particular way is sufficient for rationally believing they are that way. Instead, Phenomenal Explanationism takes the insight that appearances are evidence and imbeds it into a broader explanationist framework. In this broader framework the world appearing a particular way provides sufficient justification for believing the world is that way just in case the world being the way it appears best explains the total evidence. Although Phenomenal Explanationism draws inspiration from Phenomenal Conservatism and explanationist theories, it is superior to both in that it offers a satisfying, complete theory of epistemic justification.

John Dewey and the dialogue between architecture and neuroscience

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Robinson
Keyword(s):  
John Dewey ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Architectural Theory ◽  
Architectural Practice ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
Climate Crisis ◽  
The Given ◽  
Perceptual Systems ◽  
Epistemological Framework

Sustainability is the most significant force to change architecture since the breakthrough of modernism a century ago. So far the contributions of architects to this mandate have largely amounted to technological interventions. Yet the urgent call for sustainability demands going beyond merely technological solutions to modify behavioral patterns, cultural habits and even our deeply ingrained ideas about ourselves. The very notion that architecture could modify behavioral patterns, or the sedimentation of habits seems far-fetched in an epistemological framework that has drawn strict lines between outside and inside, subject and object, body and mind — all the dualities that the cognitive and neurosciences have been gradually working to undermine. Our practice as architects has been unconsciously shaped by centuries of formalist thinking that have turned buildings into inanimate objects; a habit of thinking that has weakened our role and contributed to the sense that architecture is a luxury item, one among many consumable commodities — though we can no longer deny that it is the very fabric of our survival and flourishing.Further, the once healthy plurality of our architectural theory has left us without a coherent philosophical framework with which to confront the climate crisis. For John Dewey, theory and practice were not ontologically separate domains, but two distinct yet inseparable and necessary aspects of engaging in the world. This essay explores how Dewey's pragmatic philosophy could help to build a theoretical framework that would allow us to apply and integrate the findings of the cognitive and neurosciences into our architectural practice and education, so that we might respond not only to the constraints and opportunities of the given context — site, program and energy resources—but also to the limits and affordances of our perceptual systems and the whole of our body and mind.

A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byeong D. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Wilfrid Sellars ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
Constructivist View ◽  
Wide Acceptance ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
Instrumental Principle

ABSTRACT: Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle and the constructivist view of the concept of epistemic justification, I argue that it is reasonable to accept induction.

Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Swinburne
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Many

Phenomenal conservativism in epistemology is a view which endorses the principle of credulity: namely, the principle that every belief with which a person finds himself is a justified belief (one which the believer is justified in having) in the absence of any evidence that the belief is false (which might take the form of evidence that the belief has been produced by an unreliable process). This chapter investigates the senses of ‘belief’, ‘justified’, and ‘evidence’ on which this doctrine is true, and the senses in which it is false. It concentrates in particular on the many different senses in which a belief can be said to be ‘justified’ or ‘rational’; and it applies these results to religious claims concerning religious experience.

Phenomenal Conservatism and Its Promises

2021 ◽  
pp. 3-29
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Good Starting Point

This chapter discusses Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) and its promises as a theory of epistemic justification. It also explores common objections raised against PC including that it is too liberal, it conflicts with Bayesianism, and it runs afoul of cognitive penetration. It is argued that these common objections fail to pose a genuine threat to PC. Additionally, it is argued that there are a number of benefits provided by the appearance-based approach to epistemic justification championed by PC. As a result, this chapter shows that PC is a good starting point for theorizing about the nature of epistemic justification even though it cannot make good on all of its promises.

Seemings

2019 ◽  
pp. 380-418
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Phenomenal Conservatism ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Global Principle ◽  
Support Relation

Chapter 12 concludes the book by contrasting phenomenal accessibilism with Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism. Section 12.1 defines phenomenal conservatism as the global principle that you have epistemic justification to believe a proposition just when it seems strongly enough on balance to be true. Section 12.2 explains the concept of a seeming and outlines an argument that there are no nonperceptual seemings. Section 12.3 argues that phenomenal conservatism imposes implausible restrictions on evidence: all seemings are evidence, but not all evidence is seemings. Section 12.4 argues that phenomenal conservatism gives an overly simplistic account of the evidential support relation: it cannot explain why epistemic rationality requires not only perceptual coherence, but also introspective coherence, logical coherence, and metacoherence. Section 12.5 argues that phenomenal accessibilism is needed to explain these essential characteristics of epistemically rational thinkers. Section 12.6 concludes by summarizing why phenomenal accessibilism is superior to phenomenal conservatism.

scholarly journals Co-creation of experiential qualities

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 562-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vuk Uskoković
Keyword(s):  
Active Role ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Natural Basis ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Epistemological Framework

Cognitive sciences have been interminably in search for a consistent philosophical framework for the description of perceptual phenomena. Most of the frameworks in usage today fall in-between the extremes of constructivism and objective realism. However, whereas constructivist cognitive theories face difficulties when attempting to explain the experiential commonality of different cognitive entities, objectivistic theories fail in explaining the active role of the subject in the formation of experiences. This paper undertakes to compare and eventually combine these two major approaches to describing cognitive phenomena. It is argued that constructivist explanations inevitably refer to a ‘hidden’ ontological source of experience, and that a compromise between the constructivist and realistic standpoints presents a natural basis for understanding cognitive phenomena. A view of all experiences as co-created through an interplay between a constructivist creativity and a realistic source of perceptual stimuli is proposed. A middle ground between the hardly compatible constructivist and objectivistic approaches to experiential realities is proposed from the standpoint of experiential co-creation. Traditionally divided, idealistic and realistic philosophical stances may thus become merged into a single consistent epistemological framework. Many favorable cognitive and psychosomatic consequences may arise from acknowledging the balance between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ creativity proposed by the co-creational thesis.

scholarly journals The Epistemological Aspect of Ibn Al-Haytham’s Scientific Thought

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohd Syahmir Alias ◽  
Mohd Shukri Hanapi
Keyword(s):  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Scientific Methods ◽  
Cognitive Reasoning ◽  
Content Analysis Method ◽  
Scientific Epistemology ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Epistemological Framework ◽  
Epistemological Aspect

The discussions on epistemology are closely related to the source and methodology of obtaining knowledge. Today’s modern scientific methodology which is driven by logical positivism philosophy lay too much importance on data that can be observed by the senses and is rational to the mind. Therefore, it have a few differences from the Islamic epistemological framework which are value driven in process. However, it was said that Ibn al-Haytham is one the earliest Muslim scholars to base his research on scientific methods. The question is how Ibn al-Haytham obtains scientific knowledge? Does it fit into Islamic epistemological framework? Hence, this article intends to identify the epistemological aspects of Ibn al-Haytham’s scientific thoughts by using the content analysis method. The findings showed that Ibn al-Haytham’s scientific epistemology is based on reflection on the verses of al-Qur’an, belief in God’s law (sunnatullah) of nature, observation by the senses, cognitive reasoning, and intuition. Therefore, the source of knowledge pertaining to Ibn al-Haytham’s scientific thoughts is integrated as what shown in the discussion of Islamic epistemology.

A Flawed Framework

2020 ◽  
pp. 147-166
Author(s):  
Hsueh M. Qu
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
Epistemological Framework

This chapter argues that the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11) that is pivotal to Hume’s response to scepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature is deeply flawed in a number of respects. First, Hume lacks any grounds for endorsing it; second, it is unable to dismiss superstition, forcing Hume to appeal to unsatisfactory grounds of dangerousness in order to reject such religious enquiries; finally, in founding epistemic justification on the passions, which are not sensitive to truth, Hume’s resulting epistemology seems somewhat divorced from truth. Thus, it is little surprise that Hume would have looked to offer a new epistemological framework in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that could rectify these problems.

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