scholarly journals Unas notas sobre el tratamiento jurídico-civil de la transexualidad en España

Author(s):  
Francisco Javier Jiménez Muñoz

El reconocimiento jurídico-civil de la realidad de la transexualidad no se ha producido hasta tiempos muy recientes. No obstante, este reconocimiento venía realizado en un ámbito exclusivamente jurisprudencial, y además de modo muy restringido, pues se exigía haber completado totalmente el proceso quirúrgico de cambio de sexo y, partiendo de que se trataría de una ficción jurídica, se reconocían efectos meramente registrales y de cambio de nombre. La Ley 3/2007 vino a suponer un cambio radical, al eliminar el requisito del tratamiento quirúrgico, reconocer a la reasignación todos los efectos que se derivan para el interesado de su nueva condición y desjudicializar el procedimiento, integrándolo en el ámbito del expediente gubernativo de rectificación registral. Ahora, los únicos requisitos, junto a los personales de nacionalidad española, mayoría de edad y capacidad suficiente, serán los del informe médico o psicológico de diagnóstico de disforia de género y ausencia de trastornos de personalidad que pudieran influir determinantemente en su existencia y tratamiento médico de adaptación de al menos dos años, salvo que razones acreditadas de salud o edad imposibiliten su seguimiento.The civil legal recognition of transsexuality has not occurred until recently. However, this recognition came only carried out in case law, and also in a very restricted way, as it was required to have fully completed the surgical process of sex change and, assuming that it would be a legal fiction, they were recognized only registration effects and change of name. The Act No. 3/2007 came to mean a radical change, by eliminating the requirement of surgical treatment, recognizing to registration reallocation all the effects that accrue to the applicant from his/her new status and dis judicializing the procedure, integrating it into the field of gubernatorial record registration correction. Now, the only requirements, along with Spanish nationality, age and sufficient capacity shall be those of medical or psychological diagnosis of gender dysphoria and absence of personality disorders that could influence decisively in its existence, and treatment adjustment of at least two years unless proven reasons of health or age make impossible its fulfillment.

Author(s):  
Lize Mills

<p><br />As is the case with marriage, divorce should be entered into freely and voluntarily. The State should not demand that a marriage be ended if neither one of the spouses wishes for it to be terminated. Yet, several countries still impose such an obligation in instances where one or both of the parties to the marriage changed their sex during the existence of the marriage, in order for such a person to attain legal recognition of the sex change. This article analyses some of the case law in Europe and South Africa where the courts have had to intercede in instances in which differential treatment was being justified in the name of so-called pragmatism. It examines some of the possible reasons for imposing this obligation upon married couples and the effect that this requirement has on their lives. Furthermore, it explores why it is incorrect to require the termination of marriage after a change of sex, how genderism and transphobia has caused differential and discriminatory treatment of transsexual persons, and how institutional bias and a lack of appreciation for the lived reality of people who do not necessarily fit into categories of generated systems, continue to negate the human rights of some humans.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 627-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dunne ◽  
Jule Mulder

This Case Note discusses the recent judgment of the German Constitutional Court (1 BvR 2019/16) requiring either the legal recognition of sex categories beyond male or female, or the aboltion of sex registration requirements. The Note considers the Court's decision within the broader constitutional case law on gender identity, and explores both the progressive potential, and the future—perhaps unforeseen—consequences, of the ruling. The Case Note proceeds in three sections. Section A introduces the facts of the constitutional challenge, and sets out both the submissions of the complainant, as well as the reasoning of the Constitutional Court. In Section B, the Case Note explores the domestic law novelty of the decision, placing particular emphasis on the application of a constitutional equality framework to persons who experience intersex variance. Finally, in Section C, the Case Note contextualizes the judgment, situating the reasoning of the Constitutional Court within wider movements for transgender—otherwise known as trans—and intersex rights.


Laws ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen O’Connell

Sexual harassment across multiple grounds, including race, disability, sexuality and age, remains an entrenched problem that is poorly dealt with in law. Prevalence rates for intersectional sexual harassment are higher for certain groups, while legal redress is low. This paper examines case law on sexual harassment in Australia where there are intersectional factors and asks whether the “intersectionality” section inserted into the federal Sex Discrimination Act in 2011 has impacted legal practice and decision-making. In particular, it considers the situation of sexual harassment claimants with behavioural and personality traits that are considered “disordered” and the specifically gendered disability stereotypes that shape their treatment in law. Recent cases in Australia dealing with the sexual harassment of people with personality disorders show that intersectionality provisions of sexual harassment laws may in fact be used to undermine a legal claim by a person with disability rather than strengthen it. This article argues that an intersectional legal feminist perspective on harassment is needed for the law to work.


1987 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
Jerold Taitz

AbstractTranssexualism is a condition in which an individual's psychological gender is the opposite of his or her anatomical sex. A “sex-change” operation can bring anatomical sex into line with gender, but it cannot create a new biological sex capable of procreation. The operation is expensive, dangerous and lengthy, yet in 1983 there were an estimated 6,000 post-operative transsexuals in the United States. Certain European countries have legislation recognizing the post-operative transsexual's new sex. Case law in the United Kingdom and the United States, however, prevent post-operative transsexuals from gaining legal recognition. The author does see some hope, however, for a change in the trend against recognition of transsexuals’ post-operative sex. This Article discusses the reasons behind this trend and concludes that the greater danger would be a consensus of medical opinion holding that sex-change surgery is unnecessary, questioning the very existence of post-operative transsexuals. Finally, the author calls for legislative action to remove judicially-imposed obstacles and to give legal recognition to the postoperative transsexual's new sex and identity.


2021 ◽  
Vol Publish Ahead of Print ◽  
Author(s):  
Yulia Furlong ◽  
Aleksandar Janca

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 706-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Young ◽  
Janice Habarth ◽  
Bruce Bongar ◽  
Wendy Packman

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