scholarly journals Are inspections conducted by selected administrative bodies compliant with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the European Convention on Human Rights?

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-79
Author(s):  
Lucia Smolková

This paper analyses the case law of the Slovak Constitutional Court and the Slovak Supreme Court dealing with inspections conducted by selected Slovak administrative bodies – especially by the administrative bodies in the area of foodstuffs administration – where inspected companies complain that their rights guaranteed by the Slovak Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, namely the protection of their business premises, have been violated. The paper thus also deals with and analyses the related case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its (non)-application by the Slovak judicial bodies in their decision-making practice.

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Spano

In its landmark 2013 judgment of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that a life sentence which is not de jure and de facto reducible amounts to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment, as enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author, a judge of the Strasbourg Court, analyses the Vinter judgment both as it stands alone as well as how it fits into and, now, influences the Court’s case-law on Article 3 and 5 of the Convention, before reviewing the procedural requirements laid down by the Court for a ‘Vinter review’ of life sentences. In doing so, the author examines the underlying tensions between the conception of penal policy as falling within the exclusive domain of domestic decision-making and the individualistic and dignitarian notion of human rights in which the Convention system is firmly grounded. The article is based on the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice which the author gave on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-83
Author(s):  
Janusz Roszkiewicz

This article concerns the right to the protection of religious feelings as a value which justifies a restriction of freedom of expression. The right to the protection of religious feelings can be protected by three methods: civil, penal and administrative. The issue is discussed from the point of view of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the European Convention on Human Rights, with particular emphasis on the case-law of the Polish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerttu Mäger

The paper was written to analyse the enforceability of the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights in Russia, particularly in light of recent amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court and relevant case law of the Constitutional Court of Russia. Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, obliging member states to execute the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, does not leave room for ‘cherry-picking’ in enforcing the judgements. However, the Constitutional Court has suggested that Russian authorities should indeed engage in cherry-picking and may refuse to enforce judgements that are not in accordance with the Russian Constitution as interpreted by the Constitutional Court. In December 2015, the Russian parliament amended the Law on the Constitutional Court so as to empower said court to declare judgements of the European Court of Human Rights unenforceable when implementation would be in conflict with the Constitution of Russia. The paper discusses the background of these developments and alternatives for overcoming the conflict between domestic legislation and the instruments of the Council of Europe.


Author(s):  
Justice Adrian Hardiman

The chapter of Mr. Justice Adrian Hardiman positions the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of the Irish domestic legal system and highlights the political motivations behind the decision to give effect to the Convention in Irish law at a sub-constitutional and interpretive level. The chapter argues that the the principle of subsidiarity is under threat in the decision in O’Keeffe, where, in his view, the Strasbourg Court dramatically expanded its jurisdiction and encroached upon national sovereignty. Mr. Justice Hardiman is particularly concerned that the Strasbourg court entertained a claim that was not presented in the High Court or Supreme Court and that the judgment appeared to merge O’Keeffe’s claims under direct State responsibility and vicarious liability. He argues that this reflects a departure from prior case law for the ECtHR. Mr. Justice Hardiman’s second concern centres on the use by the court of language of ‘objective’, ‘core objective’ and ‘core grievance’, suggesting that use of these terms implies that, at the discretion of the ECtHR, the simple word ‘all’ may mean ‘some’ or even ‘at least one’.


Author(s):  
María Díaz Crego

En febrero del año 2006, el TS modificaba la forma de cómputo de la redención de penas por el trabajo, regulada en el ya derogado Código Penal de 1973. Esa modificación tenía consecuencias muy importantes para algunos de los condenados bajo el imperio de ese Código, que vieron cómo se alargaba su tiempo de permanencia en prisión hasta en 15 años. Las relevantes consecuencias derivadas de la aplicación de la llamada «doctrina Parot» llevaron a muchos de los reclusos afectados ante el TC y el TEDH. Sin embargo, los pronunciamientos de estos dos tribunales han sido divergentes: si bien el TC ha estimado muy pocos de los recursos de amparo interpuestos, el TEDH parece haber rechazado de forma frontal la doctrina introducida por el TS. En este marco, el presente trabajo analiza las decisiones de estos dos tribunales y trata de determinar cómo deben actuar las autoridades españolas tras la condena a España en el caso Del Río Prada, a fin de resolver el problema de fondo planteado por la aplicación de la doctrina Parot a una gran cantidad de reclusos.In February 2006, the Spanish Supreme Court modified its case-law regarding some provisions of the abrogated Criminal Code of 1973 that allowed the early release of prisoners if they worked while serving their sentence and they demonstrated good conduct. This change in the Spanish Supreme Court case-law had relevant consequences for some convicted prisoners as it meant an important extension of imprisonment years. Many of the prisoners affected by this new case-law appealed against the decisions extending their time in prison before the Spanish Constitutional Court and, after that, before the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the decisions adopted by these Courts while reviewing the Spanish Supreme Court case law, and to determine what the Spanish authorities must do after the European Court decision in «Del Río Prada», the sole case in which the European Court has examined the Spanish Supreme Court case-law.


Author(s):  
Lyusya Mozhechuk ◽  
Andriy Samotuha

The article deals with the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in protecting the right to social security. There is the analysis of the case law of the ECtHR on the violation of the right to social security, namely the right to receive a pension, which the ECtHR classifies as property rights. The authors have outlined the ways to improve the practice of the ECtHR in this area in modern national and world socio-economic conditions. According to available estimates, around 50 per cent of the global population has access to some form of social security, while only 20 per cent enjoy adequate social security coverage. Ensuring an ap-propriate mechanism for the protection of human and civil rights is a priority for every country. However, according to case law, the number of complaints of violations or non-recognition of their rights is growing every year. An important role in the protection of human rights in today's conditions is played by an international judicial body - the European Court of Human Rights. In Ukraine, where socio-economic rights are recognized at the constitutional level, their guarantee content in the current laws is still not clearly defined, and therefore, as evidenced by the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, legal mechanisms their protection, in particular the means of judicial control remain ineffective. The right to social security is the right to access and retention of benefits, both in cash and in kind, without discrimination in order to protect, in particular, against (a) lack of income from work caused by illness, disability, maternity, occupational injuries , unemployment, old age or death of a family member; (b) inaccessible access to medical care; (c) insufficient family support, especially for children and adult dependents. It is well known that the European Convention does not contain many socio-economic rights as such (with a few exceptions - protection of property and the right to education). Thus , the former president of the ECtHR Jean-Paul Costa specifically pointed to another important European human rights treaty – the European Social Charter. Human rights are a universal value, and their protection is the task of every state. The European Court of Human Rights plays an important role in protecting human rights in modern conditions. The functioning of such an international judicial institution can not only solve a problem of protection of violated rights, but also affect the development of the judicial system of each state. The main principle of realization and judicial protection of social rights is non-discrimination on the grounds of sex, age, race, national and social origin of the individual, and the role of auxiliary institutions of the Council of Europe in generalizing and improving the ECtHR’s activity has been emphasized.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-467
Author(s):  
Hamdija Šarkinović

The paper deals with property, which is guaranteed by Article 58 of the Constitution of Montenegro and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The constitutional-law concept of the right to property in Montenegro is broader than the traditional civil law concept, as it includes all real rights, as the European Court under the notion of property, in addition to the usual, includes all acquired rights of a person. The autonomous concept of property and possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was separately covered, consisting of three rules: principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions, deprivation of possessions, and control of the use of property. The application of the text of justification of interference with property in the case law of the European Court is explained, which includes the text of legality, the text of a legitimate aim in the general or public interest and the text of proportionality. However, the case law of the ordinary courts in the field of guarantees of property rights, constitutional and convention’s is not harmonized with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and represents one of the main tasks of the Constitutional Court in the coming period. The Constitutional Court of Montenegro follows the concept of property enshrined in the Constitution and gives the property meaning as the constitutional and convention human right guaranteed by the Constitution, and its inviolability as one of the fundamental values of the constitutional order, although the case law of the Constitutional Court has not fully and always been coherent with the aforementioned principles.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 441
Author(s):  
María del Mar Navas Sánchez

Resumen:Este artículo aborda el probablemente más controvertido supuesto relativo a la relación dialéctica entre las libertades de expresión e información y el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen. El que tiene como titular de este último derecho a quien puede ser considerado, en general, como un personaje público. Lo hace, además, desde una doble perspectiva. Por un lado, se muestra la evolución experimentada en el régimen jurídico del derecho a la propia imagen de este tipo de personas desde que en 1978 y de manera novedosa nuestra Constitución reconociera por vez primera el derecho a la propia imagen comoun derecho fundamental autónomo y diferenciado de la intimidad en el artículo 18.1 CE hasta nuestros días. Se trata de un proceso que ha venido marcado por varios hitos: la aprobación en 1982 de una norma (la Ley Orgánica 1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad y a la propia imagen) en la que el legislador establece pautas muy concretas acerca del modo en que han de resolverse este tipo de conflictos; la intensidad con la que esta Ley ha condicionado la jurisprudencia de los jueces y tribunales de la jurisdicción ordinaria, particularmente del Tribunal Supremo; y, finalmente, el importante papel desempeñado por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional que, prescindiendo de las prescripciones legislativas y operando conforme a categorías constitucionales, ha terminado por erigir, en un proceso que, a su vez, hemos diferenciado en dos etapas, al interés público presente en las imágenes controvertidas, en el elemento decisivo para resolver este tipo de conflictos. Pero por otro, además, se presta especial atención a las recíprocas relaciones que a propósito de este supuesto se han establecido a lo largo de estas décadas entre las jurisprudencias de los Tribunales Constitucional,  Supremo y de Estrasburgo. En este sentido, nos ha parecido especialmenteinteresante fijarnos no solo en el modo en que el Tribunal Constitucional se ha servido del canon europeo (art. 10.2 CE) para construir su propia doctrina sobre el derecho fundamental a la propia imagen de los personajes públicos, sino también y muy particularmente, en la forma en que esta doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional ha sido seguida o no por el Tribunal Supremo y, por tanto, en el modo en que este último se ha sentido vinculado, si es que lo ha hecho, a la misma, dando así cumplimiento a su obligación constitucional (art. 5.1 LOPJ).Summary:1. Introduction. 2. The little, but adequate, express influence of the european canon in the first constitutional case law on the fundamental right to own´s image. 3. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the constitutional case law prior to STC 19/2014. Its almost null follow-up by the supreme court. 4. The fundamental right to their own image of public figures in the latest constitutional case law. Its —now yes— reception by the supreme court. 5. The relationship of constitutional case law with that of the European Court of Human Rights on this specific right, seen through STC 19/2014. 6. Conclusions.Abstract:This paper tackles the probably more controversial case concerning the dialectical relation between the freedoms of expression and information and the fundamental right to the own image. The one that refers to so-called «public figures». It does so from a dual perspective. On the one hand, it shows the evolution experienced in the right to their image of this type of people since Spanish Constitution, in 1978, recognized for the first time the right to own image as a fundamental right autonomous and different from the right to a private life (art. 18.1) to the present day. This is a process that has been marked by several landmarks: the adoption in 1982 of a rule (Organic Law 1/1982, of May 5, on civil protection of the right to reputation, privacy and own image) inwhich the legislator lays down very specific guidelines as to how such conflicts should be resolved; the intensity with which this Law has conditioned the case law of judges and courts of ordinary jurisdiction, particularly the Supreme Court; and finally, the important role played by the case law of the Constitutional Court, which, regardless of the legislative requirements and taking constitutional categories as references, has finally established, in a process that we have differentiated in two stages, the public interest of the images (or, in other words, the contribution made by photos to a debate of general interest) in the decisive element to solve this type of conflicts. But on the other hand, special attention is also paid to the reciprocal relations that have been established over these decades among the case law of the Constitutional, Supreme and Strasbourg Courts. On this regard, we have found particularly interesting to look not only at the way in which the Constitutional Court has used the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (Article 10.2 Spanish Constitution) to establish its own doctrine on the fundamental right to their image of public figures, but also, especially, in the way in which this doctrine of the Constitutional Court has been followed or not by the Supreme Court and therefore if the latter has fulfilled its constitutional obligation (Article 5.1 Organic Law of the Judiciary).


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria-Artemis Kolliniati

This book is aimed at academics whose research relates to the European Convention on Human Rights and those who are interested in the philosophy of law. It is also aimed at judges and lawyers who deal with the ECHR, and with European Court of Human Rights health-related case law in particular. Furthermore, it can be used by students who wish to deepen their knowledge of the philosophical issues relating to human rights and the ECHR. The main objectives of this book are threefold. First, it proposes that Joseph Raz’s notion of the ‘double dimension of human rights’ offers a middle-ground approach to human rights that judges can use to scrutinise the social aspects of those rights. Secondly, it proposes that Joseph Raz’s philosophy of law must be read as a theory on the ‘double dimension of human rights’, rather than as an interest theory on such rights. Thirdly, this book does not just focus on the theory of human rights; it also analyses how human rights are applied and read in practice, focusing on the ECHR and ECtHR case law.


2019 ◽  
pp. 19-23
Author(s):  
P. M. Synytsyn

The article has been devoted to the analysis of the nature of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of constitutional law of Ukraine. The nature of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights has been characterized depending on the following factors: state legal system, constitutional approach to the relation between national and international law, the level of bindingness of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights for public authorities. The author has concluded on the duality of nature the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, namely that, the author considers that the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have a complicated, complex structure, combining the properties of both a right-interpreting act and a judicial precedent. According to the author, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are intended not only to resolve the cases under trial, but also to specify and interpret the rules of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It has been established that the current Ukrainian legislation, establishing the primacy of the rule of law before the law, provides for the obligation of the judicial authorities to apply the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of law and at the same time the duty of the state to enforce the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in cases where Ukraine is the defendant. In addition, as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows, the judiciary itself emphasizes in its decisions the interpretative nature and the binding nature of all its decisions to be taken into account by all States parties. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine constantly uses the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights to form its own legal positions, after which they actually become a substantive element of the motivating part of the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. It has been concluded that regardless of whether or not the decision of the European Court of Human Rights has been ruled on Ukraine, it is a source of constitutional law in Ukraine.


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