scholarly journals Los derechos fundamentales en la encrucijada de la lucha contra el terrorismo yihadista. Lo que el constitucionalismo y el derecho de la Unión Europea pueden ofrecer en común

Author(s):  
Rosario Serra Cristóbal

En la encrucijada de la lucha contra el terrorismo yihadista, numerosos derechos y libertades se han visto lamentablemente restringidos. Lo que se analiza en este trabajo es si, desde el marco de la UE, cabe establecer límites a esa capacidad individual de los Estados de adoptar decisiones en materia de seguridad nacional. Se defiende que contamos con principios e instrumentos, que son compartidos en el constitucionalismo europeo y que constituyen el fundamento de la UE, que pueden ayudar a que el peso de las políticas antiterroristas en Europa no recaiga exclusivamente en la defensa de la seguridad a costa de un sacrificio desproporcionado de nuestras libertades.At the crossroads of the fight against Jihadist terrorism, many rights and freedoms result limited. This dissertation analyses whether limits could be settle, from the EU framework, on the States’ autonomy to decide on national security policies. The essay argues that principles and tools exist, that are common to both the European constitutionalism and to the EU’ basis, and could contribute to balance the counter-terrorism fight strategies in favour of national security but without a disproportionate damage to our liberties.

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Rosario Serra Cristóbal

Resumen:La gestión coordinada de las fronteras y el funcionamiento eficaz de los sistemas de tratamiento de datos de circulación de personas pueden servir como mecanismo de alerta temprana frente al riesgo de ataques terroristas. Puede fortalecer la capacidad colectiva de los Estados para detectar, prevenir y combatir el terrorismo al facilitar el intercambio oportuno de información, permitiendo así adoptar de forma responsable decisiones cruciales.Este trabajo analiza los concretos instrumentos de gestión de datos en fronteras que pueden ser útiles en la lucha antiterrorista, porque el primer paso en inteligencia reside en la obtención de información, que luego será analizada y tratada para convertir esa información en conocimiento. Como tendremos oportunidad de comprobar, muchas de las bases de datos en fronteras se crearon para controlar la entrada de inmigrantes en las fronteras europeas, pero la información que ofrecen dichos sistemas puede servir también para luchar contra ese reto que nos amenaza, el del terrorismo yihadista. No obstante, este trabajo subraya que se trata de fenómenos distintos.Es cierto que la nueva oleada de ataques yihadistas ha coincidido, en el mismo espacio temporal, con la mayor crisis migratoria a la que se ha tenido que enfrentar Europa debido a crisis humanitarias y posteriormente a la guerra de Siria u otros conflictos. Pero, no son lo mismo. El terrorismo yihadista y la inmigración poco o nada tienen que ver, por mucho que se hayan querido vincular o se hayan pretendido justificar determinadas políticas contra la inmigración como algo necesario para luchar contra el terrorismo yihadista, con el fácil argumento de que frenando la inmigración se evita la entrada de potenciales terroristas en Europa.El trabajo advierte del riesgo de que la lucha contra el terrorismo sea utilizada para reforzar los controles de personas en las fronteras con el verdadero objetivo de frenar los flujos migratorios. Al tiempo, subraya la necesidad de que en dichos controles se sigan directrices y prácticas claras y se respeten plenamente las obligaciones que los Estados tienen de conformidad con el Derecho internacional, tal como ha recordado el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. De hecho, no son pocos los casos en los que estos Tribunales han subrayado la relevancia indubitada de principios como la reserva de ley, la necesidad o la proporcionalidad como sustrato de la licitud de muchas medidas que incluyen el tratamiento de datos personales.Summary:1. Jihadist terrorism as a cross-border phenomenon. 2. The benefit of data exchange on crossing-borders in the Schengen area. 3. New guidelines on data processing and the safeguard of national security. 4. The register of passengers (The Personal Name Record or PNR). 5. When the data cross the external borders. The exchange of data with third countries. 5.1. The failed PNR Agreement with Canada and the EU Court of Justice’s standards regarding the transfer of passengers’ data. 5.2. The exchange of data with the United States. The EU-US Umbrella Agreement and the Privacy Shield. 6. The use of profiles and blacklists of alleged terrorists in cross-bording. 7. ConclusionsAbstract:EU Coordinated border management and effective functioning of data processing systems related to the movement of persons may serve as an early warning mechanism against the risk of terrorist attacks. It can strengthen the collective capacity of States to detect, prevent and combat terrorism by facilitating the timely exchange of information, thereby enabling crucial decisions to be adopted in a responsible manner.This paper analyzes the concrete border data management tools that can be useful in the fight against terrorism. The first step in intelligence lies in obtaining information, which will then be analyzed and treated to turn that information into useful knowledge. As we will have an opportunity to verify, numerous border databases were created to control the entry of immigrants into European borders, but the information offered by these systems can also serve to fight against this challenge that threatens us, that of jihadist terrorism.Nevertheless, we emphasize that terrorism and immigration are different phenomena. The truth is that the new wave of Jihadist attacks took place along the largest migratory crisis that Europe faced due to different humanitarian crises and to the war in Syria and other conflicts. But they represent different realities. Jihadist terrorism and immigration have little or nothing in common. In spite of this, many wish to link both with a view to justify certain anti-immigration policies as necessary actions for coping with Jihadist terrorism. This has been done based on a simple narrative: holding back immigration prevents the entry of potential terrorists in Europe.This paper shows that the risk that the fight against terrorism will be used as a basis to reinforce people controls at the borders, while the true objective of these measures is to curb migratory flows. At the same time, it underlines the need for clear guidelines and practices to be followed when implementing such controls. It also vindicates the need for States to observe their obligations laid down by international law, as recalled by the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Court of the Justice. In fact, in many cases, these jurisdictions highlighted the undoubted relevance of the statutory reserve principle, the principle of necessity or the principle of proportionality, as legal basis for the adoption of measures that include personal data processing.


Significance These are the first terrorist attacks on EU territory since the Paris attacks in November 2015. The attacks on Zaventem Airport and Maelbeeck metro station come just four days after Salah Abdeslam, a key suspect in the events in Paris, was arrested in Brussels. Impacts As Belgium emerges as the central HQ for jihadist terrorism in Europe, pressure on the authorities to tighten security will increase. European solidarity will be tested and new measures are to be expected. Far-right movements might thrive even more in the EU. New security policies may be implemented, including more border controls.


Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (6(75)) ◽  
pp. 283-305
Author(s):  
Christopher Reeves

The article analyses the Polish government’s recently published National Security Strategy in an attempt to discern the broad outlines of the strategic culture within Poland’s strategic community. The article adopts a ‘fourth generation’ approach to the conception of strategic culture, which posits that there are often rival subcultures within strategic communities, which can often result in dramatic shifts in a state’s security policies over time. There is a brief discussion of how conflicting subcultures can be identified in Poland’s foreign policies in the past before the article discusses what Poland’s current Strategy reveals about the strategic culture of today’s decision-makers. It broadly argues that there are obvious continuities in Poland’s security policies, notably in terms of how the Russian Federation is regarded as a hostile state and the degree to which NATO and the EU serve to strengthen Poland’s security. It is also possible to see more minor shifts in Poland’s security policies in recent years, such as a renewed emphasis on territorial defence and a willingness to align itself with several states which are relatively antagonistic towards the EU.


2014 ◽  
pp. 13-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Glazyev

This article examines fundamental questions of monetary policy in the context of challenges to the national security of Russia in connection with the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and the EU. It is proved that the policy of the Russian monetary authorities, particularly the Central Bank, artificially limiting the money supply in the domestic market and pandering to the export of capital, compounds the effects of economic sanctions and plunges the economy into depression. The article presents practical advice on the transition from external to domestic sources of long-term credit with the simultaneous adoption of measures to prevent capital flight.


Author(s):  
H. O. Androshchuk

Ukraine’s healthcare system faces unprecedented national security challenges in the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. A particularly acute issue is countering counterfeit pharmaceuticals, preventing drug shortages, joining efforts of the authorities and national manufacturers of drugs and medical supplies. According to the UN, more than 60 % of the population lives below the poverty line in Ukraine. Timely response to these challenges and taking preventive measures will save lives, minimize the volume and consequences of the pandemic. The paper provides an economic and legal analysis, trends, risks and threats to national security of the state and health protection during a pandemic, in order to protect intellectual property rights, adequate coordination of actions at the national and international levels. The impact of counterfeiting on the criminal landscape in the EU, and also business and economy, is shown based on the analysis of studies by the OECD, the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Europol. The foundations of anti-counterfeiting management, measures to implement a standard anti-counterfeiting strategy are proposed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-392
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Cawkwell

Britain’s war in Afghanistan – specifically its latter stages, where the UK’s role and casualties sustained in the conflict rose dramatically – coincided with the institutional emergence of Ministry of Defence-led ‘Strategic Communication’. This article examines the circumstances through which domestic strategic communication developed within the UK state and the manner in which the ‘narratives’ supporting Britain’s role in Afghanistan were altered, streamlined and ‘securitised’. I argue that securitising the Afghanistan narrative was undertaken with the intention of misdirecting an increasingly sceptical UK public from the failure of certain aspects of UK counter-insurgency strategy – specifically its counter-narcotics and stabilisation efforts – by focusing on counter-terrorism, and of avoiding difficult questions about the UK’s transnational foreign and defence policy outlook vis-à-vis the United States by asserting that Afghanistan was primarily a ‘national security’ issue. I conclude this article by arguing that the UK’s domestic strategic communication approach of emphasising ‘national security interests’ may have created the conditions for institutionalised confusion by reinforcing a narrow, self-interested narrative of Britain’s role in the world that runs counter to its ongoing, ‘transnationalised’ commitments to collective security through the United States and NATO.


Author(s):  
Pavel Kotyza ◽  
Josef Slaboch

Being a member of the EU, today the Czech Republic is not entirely dependent on domestic production of food and farming commodities. Since borders inside the EU are open, particular commodities can flow without any tariff measures. But food self-sufficiency belongs to internal factors of national security and therefore it deserves sufficient attention. The aim of this article is to evaluate, based on an analysis, the self-sufficiency rate of the Czech Republic and Poland in selected commodities of crop production between marketing years 2000/2001–2009/2010, with special attention to the most important and cultivated commodities – basic cereals, oilseeds, corn and potatoes. Based on analyses of self-sufficiency rate it can be concluded, that both countries can be considered as stabilised with restpect to rate of self-sufficency of selected crops – none of the presented groups falls under 80%. For most described commodities the trend of self-sufficiency rate in the Czech Republic and Poland is stabilised or growing. Only production of potatoes is coming close to critical treshhold in CZ, therefore national strategies should be put in place to maintain the self-sufficiency rate above the critical limit. After an analysis of internation trade it can be concluded that the Czech Republic is specialised exporter of not-processed commodities but country significantly falls behind Poland in competitiveness of processing of commodities.


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