NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN: ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

10.6036/10156 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-358
Author(s):  
Pablo Fernández Arias ◽  
DIEGO VERGARA RODRIGUEZ

Centralized Temporary Storage Facility (CTS) is an industrial facility designed to store spent fuel (SF) and high level radioactive waste (HLW) generated at Spanish nuclear power plants (NPP) in a single location. At the end of 2011, the Spanish Government approved the installation of the CTS in the municipality of Villar de Cañas in Cuenca. This approval was the outcome of a long process of technical studies and political decisions that were always surrounded by great social rejection. After years of confrontations between the different political levels, with hardly any progress in its construction, this infrastructure of national importance seems to have been definitively postponed. The present research analyzes the management strategy of SF and HLW in Spain, as well as the alternative strategies proposed, taking into account the current schedule foreseen for the closure of the Spanish NPPs. In view of the results obtained, it is difficult to affirm that the CTS will be available in 2028, with the possibility that its implementation may be delayed to 2032, or even that it may never happen, making it necessary to adopt an alternative strategy for the management of GC and ARAR in Spain. Among the different alternatives, the permanence of the current Individualized Temporary Stores (ITS) as a long-term storage strategy stands out, and even the possibility of building several distributed temporary storage facilities (DTS) in which to store the SF and HLW from several Spanish NPP. Keywords: nuclear waste, storage, nuclear power plants.

Author(s):  
Andre´ Voßnacke ◽  
Wilhelm Graf ◽  
Roland Hu¨ggenberg ◽  
Astrid Gisbertz

The revised German Atomic Act together with the Agreement between the German Government and the German Utilities of June 11, 2001 form new boundary conditions that considerably influence spent fuel strategies by stipulation of lifetime limitations to nuclear power plants and termination of reprocessing. The contractually agreed return of reprocessing residues comprises some 156 casks containing vitrified highly active waste, the so-called HAW or glass canisters, coming form irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies to be shipped from COGEMA, France and BNFL, UK to Germany presumably until 2011. Several hundred casks with compacted residues and other waste will follow. The transports are scheduled presumably beyond 2020. The central interim storage facilities in Ahaus and Gorleben, formerly intended to accumulate up to 8,000 t of heavy metal (HM) of spent fuel from German nuclear power plants, offer sufficient capacity to receive the totality of residues to be returned from reprocessing abroad. GNB has developed, tested, licensed, fabricated, loaded, transported and stored a large number of casks for spent fuel and is one of the world leaders for delivering spent fuel and high level waste casks. Long-term intermediate storage of spent fuel is carried out under dry conditions using these casks that are licensed for transport as well as for storage. Standardized high performance casks such as the types CASTOR® HAW 20/28 CG, CASTOR® V/19 and CASTOR® V/52 meet the needs of most nuclear power plants in Germany. Up to now GNS has co-ordinated the loading and transport of 27 casks loaded with 28 canisters each from COGEMA back to Germany for storage in Gorleben for up to 40 years. In all but one case the cask type CASTOR® HAW 20/28 CG has been used.


Author(s):  
Rudrapati Sandesh Kumar ◽  
Payal Shrivastava

Finding a solution for nuclear waste is a key issue, not only for the protection of the environment but also for the future of the nuclear industry. Ten years from now, when the first decisions for the replacement of existing nuclear power plants will have to be made, The general public will require to know the solution for nuclear waste before accepting new nuclear plants. In other words, an acceptable solution for the management of nuclear waste is a prerequisite for a renewal of nuclear power. Most existing wastes are being stored in safe conditions waiting for permanent solution, with some exceptions in the former Eastern Bloc. Temporary surface or shallow storage is a well known technique widely used all over the world. A significant research effort has been made by the author of this paper in the direction of underground repository. The underground repository appears to be a good solution. Trying to transform dangerous long lived radionuclides into less harmful short lived or stable elements is a logical idea. It is indeed possible to incinerate or transmute heavy atoms of long lived elements in fast breeder reactors or even in pressurised or boiling water reactors. There are also new types of reactors which could be used, namely accelerator driven systems. High level and long lived wastes (spent fuel and vitrified waste) contain a mixture of high activity (heat producing) short lived nuclides and low activity long lived alpha emitting nuclides. To avoid any alteration due to temperature of the engineered or geological barrier surrounding the waste underground, it is necessary to store the packages on the surface for several decades (50 years or more) to allow a sufficient temperature decrease before disposing of them underground. In all cases, surface (or shallow) storage is needed as a temporary solution. This paper gives a detailed and comprehensive view of the Deep Geological Repository, providing a pragmatic picture of the means to make this method, a universally acceptable one.


2020 ◽  
pp. 62-71
Author(s):  
M. Sapon ◽  
O. Gorbachenko ◽  
S. Kondratyev ◽  
V. Krytskyy ◽  
V. Mayatsky ◽  
...  

According to regulatory requirements, when carrying out handling operations with spent nuclear fuel (SNF), prevention of damage to the spent fuel assemblies (SFA) and especially fuel elements shall be ensured. For this purpose, it is necessary to exclude the risk of SFA falling, SFA uncontrolled displacements, prevent mechanical influences on SFA, at which their damage is possible. Special requirements for handling equipment (in particular, cranes) to exclude these dangerous events, the requirements for equipment strength, resistance to external impacts, reliability, equipment design solutions, manufacturing quality are analyzed in this work. The requirements of Ukrainian and U.S. regulatory documents also are considered. The implementation of these requirements is considered on the example of handling equipment, in particular, spent nuclear fuel storage facilities. This issue is important in view of creation of new SNF storage facilities in Ukraine. These facilities include the storage facility (SFSF) for SNF from water moderated power reactors (WWER): a Сentralized SFSF for storing SNF of Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South-Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants (СSFSF), and SFSF for SNF from high-power channel reactors (RBMK): a dry type SFSF at Chornobyl nuclear power plant (ISF-2). After commissioning of these storage facilities, all spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian nuclear power plants will be placed for long-term “dry” storage. The safety of handling operations with SNF during its preparation for long-term storage is an important factor.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
David A. Hakobyan ◽  
Victor I. Slobodchuk

The problems of reprocessing and long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at nuclear power plants with RBMK reactors have not been fully resolved so far. For this reason, nuclear power plants are forced to search for new options for the disposal of spent fuel, which can provide at least temporary SNF storage. One of the possible solutions to this problem is to switch to compacted SNF storage in reactor spent fuel pools (SFPs). As the number of spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) in SFPs increases, a greater amount of heat is released. In addition, no less important is the fact that a place for emergency FA discharging should be provided in SFPs. The paper presents the results of a numerical simulation of the temperature conditions in SFPs both for compacted SNF storage and for emergency FA discharging. Several types of disturbances in normal SFP cooling mode are considered, including partial loss of cooling water and exposure of SFAs. The simulation was performed using the ANSYS CFX software tool. Estimates were made of the time for heating water to the boiling point, as well as the time for heating the cladding of the fuel elements to a temperature of 650 °С. The most critical conditions are observed in the emergency FA discharging compartment. The results obtained make it possible to estimate the time that the personnel have to restore normal cooling mode of the spent fuel pool until the maximum temperature for water and spent fuel assemblies is reached.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
You Shi ◽  
Dong Ning ◽  
Yi-zhong Yang

Boron carbide (B4C) particle-reinforced aluminum matrix composite is the key material for use as neutron absorber plate in fuel storage applications for Generation III advanced passive nuclear power plants in China. This material has once depended upon importing with various restrictions so that it has meaningful practical significance to realize the localized manufacturing for this material in China. More importantly, since it is the first time for this material to be used in domestic plant, particular care should be taken to assure the formal supplied products exhibit high stabilized and reliable service in domestic nuclear engineering. This paper initiates and proposes a principle design framework from technical view in qualification requirements for this material so as to guide the practical engineering application. Aiming at neutron absorber materials supplied under practical manufacturing condition in engineering delivery, the qualification requirements define B4C content, matrix chemistry, 10B isotope, bulk density, 10B areal density, mechanical property, and microstructure as key criteria for material performance. The uniformity assessment as to different locations of this material is also required from at least three lots of material. Only qualified material meeting all of the qualification requirements should proceed to be verified by lifetime testing such as irradiation, corrosion, and thermal aging testing. Systematic and comprehensive performance assessments and verification for process stabilization could be achieved through the above qualification. The long-term service for this neutron absorber material in reliable and safe way could be convincingly expected in spent fuel storage application in China.


Author(s):  
Jay F. Kunze ◽  
James M. Mahar ◽  
Kellen M. Giraud ◽  
C. W. Myers

Siting of nuclear power plants in an underground nuclear park has been proposed by the authors in many previous publications, first focusing on how the present 1200 to 1600 MW-electric light water reactors could be sited underground, then including reprocessing and fuel manufacturing facilities, as well as high level permanent waste storage. Recently the focus has been on siting multiple small modular reactor systems. The recent incident at the Fukushima Daiichi site has prompted the authors to consider what the effects of a natural disaster such as the Japan earthquake and subsequent tsunami would have had if these reactors had been located underground. This paper addresses how the reactors might have remained operable — assuming the designs we previously proposed — and what lessons from the Fukushima incident can be learned for underground nuclear power plant designs.


Author(s):  
Yuchen Hao ◽  
Yue Li ◽  
Jinhua Wang ◽  
Bin Wu ◽  
Haitao Wang

Abstract In nuclear power plants, the amount of spent fuel stored on-site is limited. Therefore, it is necessary to be shipped to off-site storage or disposal facilities regularly. The key risk in the transfer of spent fuel involves a release of radiation that could cause harmful effects to people and the environment. Transfer casks with impact limiters on both ends are always employed to ensure safe containment of radioactive materials, which should be verified by the 9 meters drop test onto an unyielding surface according to IAEA SSR-6. In this paper, we focus on the influence of the impact-limiter parameters, including geometry dimensions and mechanical properties, on the results of drop events to achieve an optimized approach for design. The typical structure of impact limiter is bulk energy-absorbed material wrapped by thin stainless-steel shells. Compared to traditional wood, foam has advantages of isotropy and steady quality. In this paper, theoretical and numerical methods are both adopted to investigate the influence of impact limiters during hypothetical accidental conditions for optimizing buffer influence and protecting the internal fuel components. First of all, a series of polyurethane foam is selected according to the theoretical method, because its mechanical property is related to density. Therefore, using explicit finite element method to investigate the influence of parameters of foam in impact limiter. These discrete points from the above result can be utilized to establish damage curves by date fitting. Finally, a design approach for spent fuel transfer cask is summarized, to provide a convenient formula to predict the damage and optimize structure design in drop condition. Furthermore, this design approach can be applied in the multi-module shared system of SNF, which can contain different fuel assemblies.


Author(s):  
Krista Nicholson ◽  
John McDonald ◽  
Shona Draper ◽  
Brian M. Ikeda ◽  
Igor Pioro

Currently in Canada, spent fuel produced from Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is in the interim storage all across the country. It is Canada’s long-term strategy to have a national geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel for CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The initial problem is to identify a means to centralize Canada’s spent nuclear fuel. The objective of this paper is to present a solution for the transportation issues that surround centralizing the waste. This paper reviews three major components of managing and the transporting of high-level nuclear waste: 1) site selection, 2) containment and 3) the proposed transportation method. The site has been selected based upon several factors including proximity to railways and highways. These factors play an important role in the site-selection process since the location must be accessible and ideally to be far from communities. For the containment of the spent fuel during transportation, a copper-shell container with a steel structural infrastructure was selected based on good thermal, structural, and corrosion resistance properties has been designed. Rail has been selected as the method of transporting the container due to both the potential to accommodate several containers at once and the extensive railway system in Canada.


Author(s):  
Eugene Imbro ◽  
Thomas G. Scarbrough

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established an initiative to risk-inform the requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) for the regulatory treatment of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) used in commercial nuclear power plants. As discussed in several Commission papers (e.g., SECY-99-256 and SECY-00-0194), Option 2 of this initiative involves categorizing plant SSCs based on their safety significance, and specifying treatment that would provide an appropriate level of confidence in the capability of those SSCs to perform their design functions in accordance with their risk categorization. The NRC has initiated a rulemaking effort to allow licensees of nuclear power plants in the United States to implement the Option 2 approach in lieu of the “special treatment requirements” of the NRC regulations. In a proof-of-concept effort, the NRC recently granted exemptions from the special treatment requirements for safety-related SSCs categorized as having low risk significance by the licensee of the South Texas Project (STP) Units 1 and 2 nuclear power plant, based on a review of the licensee’s high-level objectives of the planned treatment for safety-related and high-risk nonsafety-related SSCs. This paper discusses the NRC staff’s views regarding the treatment of SSCs at STP described by the licensee in its updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in support of the exemption request, and provides the status of rulemaking that would incorporate risk insights into the treatment of SSCs at nuclear power plants.


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