scholarly journals Can an Ideal Court Model in Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Established?

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 115-152
Author(s):  
Dominik Wolski

Any discussion of private antitrust enforcement usually focuses on substantive law and proceedings applicable to private antitrust cases. Those elements are important, however, the efficacy of both public and private enforcement relies upon rules of law (substantive and procedural) along with their application. The latter constitutes a substantial aspect affecting the institutions which make decisions in private antitrust enforcement cases, namely the relevant courts. The enforcement of competition law is inextricably intertwined with the economy and markets. As a result, antitrust cases are demanding for non-specialist judges, who usually do not have enough knowledge and experience in the field of competition. Even if the Damages Directive has already been implemented in all EU Member States, there is still room for discussion about developing an optimal court model for the adjudication of private antitrust enforcement cases. In the aforementioned discussion the issue of the binding effect of decisions made by the European Commission (EC) and National Competition Authorities (NCAs) in private enforcement cases, as well as the experience of judges stemming from the number of cases they have resolved, cannot be missed. Bearing this in mind, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the model of competent courts operating in private antitrust cases in twenty selected countries including the US, the UK and the vast majority of EU Member States. Taking into account that a theoretically pure concept of an ideal model of relevant court operations presumably does not exist, it is essential to try to figure out what the main characteristics of the courts might be that can lead to effective private antitrust enforcement.

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 177-196
Author(s):  
Evelin Pärn-Lee

One of the main objectives of the so-called Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) was to make antitrust enforcement more effective. Although in most EU countries private antitrust enforcement has been possible subject to general rules of civil law; the number of private antitrust litigations has remained relatively low. It is presumed that the complementary roles of public and private enforcement, as well as the synergy between them, will take effect if formal decisions taken during public enforcement will have binding effect with regard to follow-on private litigations. According to the Damages Directive, final national decisions on competition infringements shall have binding effect in follow-on litigations. What is to be understood under ‘binding effect’, and the potential effects thereof, has been subject to a lively debate among academics and practitioners. It has been questioned if decisions of an executive body can bind the judiciary, and if so, to what extent. What is the evidentiary value of a formal decision of a NCA regarding national courts, but also on the court of another Member State. The article deals with the main issues and arguments presented in the general debate on the binding effect of national competition law decisions, and provides a closer look on this topic with regard to specific CEE countries.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini

Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gotting

Even after the 9th amendment of the German Antitrust Act, cartel damage claims push the conception of German civil and civil procedure law to its limits – especially when it comes to proving the cartel damage in court. The UK legislator has now introduced the concept of voluntary redress schemes under which cartel members voluntarily offer compensation to damaged parties. The cartel authority assesses the scheme and may reduce the penalty for the cartel infringement up to a maximum of 20% when approving the scheme. The book examines the questions of whether voluntary redress schemes could improve the system of private enforcement of cartel law, how voluntary redress schemes could be implemented into German law, and how public and private enforcement can be harmonised at this point.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 69-95
Author(s):  
Dominik Wolski

In the vast majority of European countries, private antitrust enforcement falls under general rules of civil law. One of the issues to be discussed in relation to this type of litigation is the principle of liability, which exists in the given legal system, and its presumed impact on private enforcement. This problem has been debated in the course of the implementation works on the Damages Directive into the Polish legal system. A discussion on the principle of liability has taken place at least twice in this context. First, the issue was considered by the Civil Law Codification Commission and expressed in its Assumptions behind the Draft Act on complaints for damages caused by the breach of competition law. Subsequently, the principle of liability was assessed again at the reconciliation conference held at the Ministry of Justice. This is but a part of a broader discussion about the relationship between the rule of liability existing in national laws being applied to private enforcement cases and EU law as well as limitations arising from the latter. After outlining this interplay, the paper will briefly introduce solutions adopted with respect to the principle of liability in the context of private enforcement in selected European countries. The selection is not random, despite the fact that a limited number of countries has been analysed – eight including Poland. These include the most advanced EU Member States when it comes to private antitrust enforcement (such as the UK, Germany or the Netherlands), along with less developed examples (such as Italy or France), and even underdeveloped countries when it comes to the number and popularity of private antitrust litigations (such as Lithuania and Poland). This sort of analysis paints a relatively comprehensive picture of the adopted solutions in relation to the principles of liability governing private enforcement cases in Europe. The same is true for the issue of the burden of proof and presumptions/binding power in civil proceedings of decisions issued by competition authorities. Furthermore, what seemed to be crucial for the drafters of the Damages Directive, this sort of analysis makes it possible to formulate certain conclusions with respect to the relationship between the effectiveness of private enforcement in a given State and the adopted principle of liability. The final conclusions understandably focus on the Polish example, that is, the implementation of the Damages Directive into the Polish legal system.


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 463-495
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. A crucial component of the Commission’s task is to monitor Member State compliance and to respond to non-compliance. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for various enforcement mechanisms involving judicial proceedings against the Member States, which are brought either by the Commission or - much less frequently - by a Member State. Article 258 TFEU establishes the general enforcement procedure, giving the Commission broad power to bring enforcement proceedings against Member States that it considers to be in breach of their obligations under EU law. This chapter discusses the function and operation of the infringement procedure; the relationship between ‘public’ and ‘private’ enforcement mechanisms; the Commission’s discretion; types of breach by Member States of EU law; state defences in enforcement proceedings; and the consequences of an Article 258 ruling. The UK version contains a further section analysing the extent to which Article 258 is relevant to the UK post-Brexit.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 127-160
Author(s):  
Vlatka Butorac Malnar

The paper analyses access to documents in cartel-based damages cases from the EU and Croatian perspective. It considers all relevant EU and Croatian legislation and case-law primarily focusing on the expected impact of the newly enacted Damages Directive. It is argued that the new rules on access to documents provided by the Directive will not necessarily have a significant impact on damages proceedings following cartel decisions issued by the Commission. This is due to the introduction of an absolute ban on the disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions via a ‘maximum harmonization’ rule. This conclusion is drawn from statistic figures showing that EU cartel enforcement rests solely on the leniency and settlement procedures. With that in mind, it is concluded that the Directive’s general, permissive rules on access to documents (other than leniency and settlement procedures) will not be applicable in most damages cases following the cartel infringement decision issued by the Commission. However, it is also observed that the Damages Directive’s new rules on access to documents may have the opposite impact on private enforcement in cases following infringement decisions issued by National Competition Authorities (NCAs) which do not rely as much on leniency in their fight against cartels as the Commission. The Directive’s general rule on access to documents will apply in jurisdictions such as Croatia, where all of its cartel decisions so far have been reached within the regular procedure. It is argued that the general access rule, coupled with other rules strengthening the position of claimants in antitrust damages proceedings, might actually be beneficial for both public and private enforcement in such jurisdictions


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 481-514
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. A crucial component of the Commission’s task is to monitor Member State compliance and to respond to non-compliance. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for various enforcement mechanisms involving judicial proceedings against the Member States, which are brought either by the Commission or - much less frequently - by a Member State. Article 258 TFEU establishes the general enforcement procedure, giving the Commission broad power to bring enforcement proceedings against Member States that it considers to be in breach of their obligations under EU law. This chapter discusses the function and operation of the infringement procedure; the relationship between ‘public’ and ‘private’ enforcement mechanisms; the Commission’s discretion; types of breach by Member States of EU law; state defences in enforcement proceedings; and the consequences of an Article 258 ruling. The UK version contains a further section analysing the extent to which Article 258 is relevant to the UK post-Brexit.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 93-111
Author(s):  
Claudia Massa

Directive 2014/104/EU on private antitrust enforcement opted for the exclusion of punitive damages from the category of recoverable damages following a violation of antitrust law. This article will outline the concept of punitive damages and analyse the relevant case-law of the courts of the Member States, of the ECtHR and of the ECJ. Then, it will examine the regime laid down in the Directive and consider the possible reasons why the European legislator opted for this exclusion. Thus, the opportunity to introduce such a provision into the European legal system will be evaluated, taking into consideration the problem of overdeterrence, the problem of the division of functions between public and private enforcement, and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Finally, a possible modification of Article 3(3) of the Directive will be suggested, in the framework of the review that the Commission is required to undertake by December 27, 2020


Author(s):  
Olha Ovechkina

In connection with the decision to withdraw the UK from the EU a number of companies will need to take into account that from 1 January 2021 EU law will no longer apply to the United Kingdom and will become a "third country" for EU Member States, unless the provisions of bilateral agreements or multilateral trade agreements. This means that the four European freedoms (movement of goods, services, labor and capital) will no longer apply to UK companies to the same extent as they did during the UK's EU membership. The purpose of the article is to study, first of all, the peculiarities of the influence of Great Britain's withdrawal from the European Union on the legal regulation of the status of European legal entities. Brexit results in the inability to register European companies and European economic interest groups in the UK. Such companies already registered before 01.01.2021 have the opportunity to move their place of registration to an EU Member State. These provisions are defined in Regulations 2018 (2018/1298) and Regulations 2018 (2018/1299).British companies with branches in EU Member States will now be subject to the rules applicable to third-country companies, which provide additional information on their activities. In the EU, many countries apply the criterion of actual location, which causes, among other things, the problem of non-recognition of legal entities established in the country where the criterion of incorporation is used (including the United Kingdom), at the same time as the governing bodies of such legal entities the state where the settlement criterion is applied. Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of possible non-recognition of British companies, given the location of the board of such a legal entity in the state where the residency criterion applies, it seems appropriate to consider reincarnation at the actual location of such a company. Reducing the risks of these negative consequences in connection with Brexit on cross-border activities of legal entities is possible by concluding interstate bilateral and multilateral agreements that would contain unified rules on conflict of law regulation of the status of legal entities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 55-70
Author(s):  
Katharina Voss ◽  

This article studies the private enforcement conducted in Visita v Booking from the perspective of the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law. This case concerned the question whether the narrow MFN clauses maintained by Booking were contrary to Article 101 TFEU and could therefore be prohibited by a Swedish court. The focus of this article is placed on the assessment carried out by the Swedish courts to determine whether the MFN clauses were restrictive of competition by effect and on the standard of proof attached to the claimant in this regard. With regard to the interaction between public and private enforcement, Visita v. Booking is viewed as an illustration of the increased complexity of competition policy, in particular were novel practices are at issue


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