scholarly journals The status of persons of japanese ancestry in the United States and Canada during world war II: a tragedy in three parts

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward G. Hudon
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
World War ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Lieu De Travail ◽  
The Status ◽  
Japanese Ancestry ◽  
Le Canada

Dès l'attaque de Pearl Harbor par le Japon, le 7 décembre 1941, les États-Unis et le Canada ont tous deux pensé que leur sécurité était menacée par la présence de personnes d'origine et de descendance japonaises sur la côte du Pacifique, où existait déjà un fort sentiment anti-japonais. Les droits des individus paraissent avoir été tout à fait oubliés par ceux qui, dans les deux pays, furent chargés de remédier à cette situation plutôt imaginaire que réelle. Sans qu'il ne soit tenu compte de la nationalité et de la loyauté des personnes, tout un groupe ethnique a été ainsi obligé d'abandonner ses biens et placé de force dans des centres de détention éloignés du foyer et du lieu de travail habituel. Aux États-Unis, ce déplacement massif fut le résultat d'Executive Orders, de Relocation Orders et de Civilian Exclusion Orders. Au Canada, cette déportation fut décidée par ordres en conseil. La British Columbia Security Commission, composée de trois personnes, eut la responsabilité d'organiser et de diriger l'évacuation de toutes les personnes de race japonaise de certaines régions de la Colombie Britannique. Cette Commission eut à déterminer le moment de l'évacuation, le mode de transport, l'endroit de détention, etc. . . Aux États-Unis, quatre-vingt-dix jours après que l'évacuation eut été entreprise sous surveillance militaire, 110,142 personnes avaient été déplacées à partir de certaines régions des États de Californie, de Washington, d'Oregon et d'Arizona. Au Canada, une fois que la Commission de sécurité de la Colombie Britannique eut accompli son travail, toutes les personnes d'origine et de descendance japonaises, soit environ 21,000 personnes, avaient été repoussées à l'intérieur d'une bande de terre large de cent milles partant de la côte du Pacifique. Aux États-Unis, les Japonais purent contester ce déplacement pendant qu'il eut lieu, avant la fin de la guerre. Au Canada, ce ne fut possible qu'après la guerre, et que relativement à la validité des ordres de déportation. Dans le cas des États-Unis, trois cas ont été examinés par la Cour suprême. Dans deux causes, Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) et Korematsu v. United States (1944), le pouvoir du Gouvernement des États-Unis d'agir ainsi en temps d'urgence a été affirmé. Dans une troisième, Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, l'idée que le Gouvernement peut dans ces circonstances détenir une personne loyale a été rejetée. Dans ce jugement le juge William O. Douglas a écrit : « Un citoyen reconnu comme fidèle ne pose aucun problème d'espionnage ou de sabotage. La fidélité est une matière du coeur et de l'esprit, et non de race, de croyance, ou de couleur. Celui qui est fidèle n'est par définition ni espion ni saboteur. Quand le pouvoir de détenir dérive du pouvoir de protéger l'effort de guerre de l'espionnage et dit sabotage, la détention qui n'a aucun rapport avec cet objectif est sans autorisation ». Au Canada, la Cour suprême s'est divisée sur la question de la validité de la déportation des épouses, des enfants de moins de seize ans et des sujets britanniques résidant au Canada. Le Conseil privé fut toutefois d'avis que les ordres en conseil devaient être envisagés dans leur ensemble et qu'ils n'étaient pas ultra vires. D'un point de vue rétrospectif, le traitement des Japonais-américains et des Japonais-canadiens pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale montre qu'en temps d'urgence, même l'homme raisonnable et juste peut parfois oublier les droits d'autrui et agir d'une façon très étrange.

The Japanese Invasion

Jazz in China ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 67-78
Author(s):  
Eugene Marlow
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Manifest Destiny ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
World War ◽  
Prisoner Of War ◽  
Internment Camps

During World War II, the Japanese constructed prisoner of war camps in fifteen countries, including China. These camps numbered approximately 240. The Japanese—whose attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 brought the United States into World War II— saw their global role as manifest destiny, particularly with respect to China. Militarist Japan's attempt to conquer China began by seizing Manchuria in 1931 and became a full-fledged invasion from 1937 [when they attacked Shanghai] to 1945. This chapters shows that American jazz musicians—all of whom were playing in Shanghai—were not immune to the Japanese invasion and occupation. Some landed in internment camps in China and the Philippines.

Raleigh Schorling in World War II

1951 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-78
Author(s):  
Joseph J. Wickham
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
Training Program ◽  
United States Navy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
World War ◽  
Enlisted Men ◽  
Training Courses

During World War II, Raleigh Schorling gave extensively of his time and knowledge to the Training Program of the United States Navy. The idea of a Navy training program was not entirely new. In fact, as far back as World War I, the Navy had instituted a system of Training Course Manuals for use by enlisted men who were striving for promotion in their respective rates. However, the available training courses in all ratings were limited in number and, at the time of Pearl Harbor, considerably outdated. Naval Aviation meanwhile had become a large and extremely important part of the Navy. There were more than 22 regular aviation ratings and 13 specialist designations, but only four training manuals.

Conclusion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuge Wei
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
English Language ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
World War ◽  
National Image ◽  
Complex Process ◽  
Nationalist Government ◽  
Current History

The period between 1928 and 1941 witnessed two marked trends: the growing sympathy for China’s anti-Japanese cause in the English-language press and the development of China’s foreign propaganda system. The two processes were closely connected. Even before China became a military ally of the United States and Britain after Pearl Harbor, it had already become an emotional ally. A change in national image is always a complex process. Other elements, such as the conflict of interests between the Western powers and Japan as well as Japanese atrocities in China, may well have contributed to the shift in public opinion. Yet it is undeniable that China’s continuous propaganda efforts intensified the existing tensions between Japan and the Western powers and strongly promoted the change. History does not allow “what if” questions. Yet some hypothetical scenarios are useful in urging us toward a reevaluation of the significance of certain stories and events that are absent from current history telling. Would the United States have entered the war in 1941 without any propaganda effort from the Nationalist government? Had the United States delayed confrontation with Japan and stayed out of East Asia, could Chiang Kai-shek’s government have survived Japan’s encirclement? If the Chiang Kai-shek regime had collapsed in the early 1940s, would World War II have ended with the same result?...

Paradoxes ofOstpolitik: Revisiting the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, 1970

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 409-440
Author(s):  
William Glenn Gray
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
Ethnic Germans ◽  
To Come

AbstractThis article reexamines the diplomacy of Willy Brandt’sOstpolitik, focusing on two landmark achievements in 1970: the Moscow Treaty in August, and the Warsaw Treaty in December. On the basis of declassified US and German documentation, it argues that envoy Egon Bahr’s unconventional approach resulted in a poorly negotiated treaty with the Soviet Union that failed to address vital problems such as the status of Berlin. The outcome deepened political polarization at home and proved disconcerting to many West German allies; it also forced the four World War II victors—Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union—to save Brandt’sOstpolitikby grinding out an agreement on access to Berlin. By contrast, West German negotiations in Warsaw yielded a treaty more in line with West German expectations, though the results proved sorely disappointing to the Polish leadership. Disagreements over restitution payments (repacked as government credits) and the emigration of ethnic Germans would bedevil German-Polish relations for years to come. Bonn’sOstpolitikthus had a harder edge than the famous image of Brandt kneeling in Warsaw would suggest.

The Sailor

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David F. Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
International Strategy ◽  
World War ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
The Us ◽  
New Perspective

In The Sailor, David F. Schmitz presents a comprehensive reassessment of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's foreign policymaking. Most historians have cast FDR as a leader who resisted an established international strategy and who was forced to react quickly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, launching the nation into World War II. Drawing on a wealth of primary documents as well as the latest secondary sources, Schmitz challenges this view, demonstrating that Roosevelt was both consistent and calculating in guiding the direction of American foreign policy throughout his presidency. Schmitz illuminates how the policies FDR pursued in response to the crises of the 1930s transformed Americans' thinking about their place in the world. He shows how the president developed an interlocking set of ideas that prompted a debate between isolationism and preparedness, guided the United States into World War II, and mobilized support for the war while establishing a sense of responsibility for the postwar world. The critical moment came in the period between Roosevelt's reelection in 1940 and the Pearl Harbor attack, when he set out his view of the US as the arsenal of democracy, proclaimed his war goals centered on protection of the four freedoms, secured passage of the Lend-Lease Act, and announced the principles of the Atlantic Charter. This long-overdue book presents a definitive new perspective on Roosevelt's diplomacy and the emergence of the United States as a world power. Schmitz's work offers an important correction to existing studies and establishes FDR as arguably the most significant and successful foreign policymaker in the nation's history.

The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World Order

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Norton Moore
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
World War ◽  
Popular Support

For all their greatness, democracies historically have difficulty in perceiving and deterring totalitarian aggression. William Stevenson reminds us in A Man Called Intrepid that debate raged within the United States as to whether we should enter World War II on the side of England even after the rest of Europe had fallen to the Nazis. The American ambassador to England cautioned against such entry, arguing that England was militarily doomed. President Roosevelt, who had months earlier secretly committed U.S. intelligence assets to British support, felt that he did not have the necessary popular support to enter the war. And the British were so concerned about American indecisiveness that even after Pearl Harbor they executed a covert operation to persuade Hitler to declare war on the United States, which, of course, he did before America entered the war against Germany.

“Dixie Carmen”: War, Race, and Identity in Oscar Hammerstein's Carmen Jones (1943)

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNEGRET FAUSER
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Carolina ◽  
African American ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
African Americans ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
World War ◽  
Porgy And Bess ◽  
Night Club

AbstractIn December 1943, an all–African American cast starred in the Broadway premiere of Carmen Jones, Oscar Hammerstein II's adaptation of Georges Bizet's Carmen. When Hammerstein began work on Carmen Jones a month after Pearl Harbor, in January 1942, Porgy and Bess was just being revived. Hammerstein's 1942 version of Carmen, set in a Southern town and among African Americans, shows the influence of the revised version of Porgy and Bess, with Catfish Row echoed in a cigarette factory in South Carolina and the Hoity Toity night club. It took Hammerstein more than eighteen months to find a producer, and when the show opened by the end of 1943, the setting in a parachute factory and urban Chicago reflected new priorities brought on by wartime changes. Commercially one of the most successful musical plays on Broadway during its run of 503 performances, Carmen Jones offers a window on the changing issues of culture, class, and race in the United States during World War II. New archival evidence reveals that these topics were part of the work's genesis and production as much as of its reception. This article contextualizes Carmen Jones by focusing on the complex issues of war, race, and identity in the United States in 1942 and 1943.

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