‘Armailt làidir de mhilìsidh’: Hanoverian Gaels and the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745

In 1745–6, thousands of troops were raised in the Highlands and Islands in support of the house of Hanover. Often neglected due to the intense focus on Highland Jacobitism, these Gaels were instrumental in the defeat of the Jacobites. The study of pro-Hanoverian forces in the Gàidhealtachd tells us much not only about the military history of the 1745 rebellion but also about the nature of the whig regime in Scotland. In contrast to the ideological frameworks increasingly used to make sense of the Jacobite period, this article argues that pragmatic negotiations between the central government and the whig clans helped mobilise and empower regional responses to the rebellion. Exploiting the government's need for Gaelic allies in late 1745, Highland leaders, officers, and enlisted men used military service to shore up a nexus of political, financial and security imperatives. By examining the recruitment and service of anti-Jacobite Gaels, this article shows that—even in the epicentre of the rebellion—the Hanoverian state possessed important structural strengths that enabled it to confront the threat of armed insurrection. In so doing, the article reveals the political and fiscal-military networks that sustained whig control in Scotland.

Recruiting Asian Americans with the Right Stuff

Asian Americans who joined the OSS were highly qualified individuals. They were nearly all proficient or native in the Asian languages and were highly educated, many with advanced degrees. They held qualifications necessary for their assigned tasks as creators for propaganda materials, for gathering and interpreting data for strategic and tactical intelligence reports, and for conducting raids behind enemy lines; they were not relegated to menial tasks performed by bottom-ranked soldiers. Many were commissioned and noncommissioned officers, which meant that European American enlisted men had to salute and obey their orders. They were recruited from Asian immigrant communities that were politically divided and regionally attached, making any assessment of their recruits’ loyalty difficult at best, even if three-quarters of them were American-born or naturalized US citizens.

They Ought to Be Remembered

The failed attacks of May 19 and 22 produced many opportunities for participants to garner honors or deserve infamy, and those incidents either strengthened the rest of their lives or haunted them forever. A number of Federals failed the test of combat and shirked their duty, but the military justice system was weak and porous at best. While some of these acts of combat failure were officially reported, little was done by the system to punish the men. Officers were allowed to resign and the process of dealing with enlisted men was rarely called into use. It was easier to allow the individual to reflect and improve in his future conduct. Sgt. Joseph E. Griffith became a national hero because of his exploit at Railroad Redoubt. In fact, Griffith eventually won an appointment to West Point where he graduated and became an officer in the U. S. Army. Fourteen-year-old Orion P. Howe of the 55th Illinois became famous for telling William T. Sherman of the need for more cartridges as he returned from the failed attack of May 19 with a slight wound. Many members of the Forlorn Hope were awarded with Congressional Medals of Honor after the war.

Effects of military life on changes in body mass index of enlisted men: a cross-sectional study

BackgroundObesity is a serious health problem with an incidence that is increasing rapidly. Enlisted men are a distinctive group characterised by 24-hour community-living and are likely to experience changes in body weight as a result of regular diet and exercise during enlistment.MethodsThis study reviewed data from the Second Military Health Survey. Changes in body mass index (BMI) before and during military service were analysed using paired t-test. We calculated OR and 95% CI for factors affecting weight improvement during military service through logistic regression.ResultsThe mean BMI in the underweight group increased by 5.87 kg/m2 during service, while that in the normal weight group increased by 1.18 kg/m2. In contrast, the mean BMI in the overweight group decreased by 5.47 kg/m2 during service. The OR for an improved BMI in the subjective good health group compared with the subjective poor health group was statistically significant (OR=1.71, 95% CI 1.02 to 2.87). The OR for an improved BMI was significantly higher in the group with three or more times per week of strength training than in the group with one to two times per week of strength training, and was higher among the marines compared with the Army soldiers (OR=1.48, 95% CI 1.03 to 2.12 and OR=2.15, 95% CI 1.07 to 4.32, respectively).ConclusionsStrength training showed a statistically significant increase in BMI during military service. Furthermore, the BMI of men who were underweight before their service increased, while it decreased among those who were overweight.

What the Sentiment of the Army Really Is

This chapter begins with an analysis of how General Ulysses Grant's Overland Campaign drained the Army of the Potomac of much of its veteran core of officers and enlisted men. The survivors, hunkered in the trenches of Petersburg, watched as recruits and conscripts refilled the army's ranks. The chapter then focuses on the spirited contest over the 1864 presidential election between Lincoln and McClellan. Veterans who had not reenlisted organized paramilitary campaign clubs at home and communicated with those still at the front. When it came time to vote, the army's reenlisted soldiers, many of whom had fought under McClellan, largely spurned him. Those who had served longest viewed the election through the lens of loyalty, and McClellan had consorted with treason by aligning with the opposition party.

A Republic in the Ranks

The Union Army of the Potomac was a hotbed of political activity during the Civil War. It proved a source of constant frustration for Abraham Lincoln, and its commander, George B. McClellan, even secured the Democratic nomination for president in 1864. This book uses untapped sources to recast our understanding of soldier ideology and presents the most comprehensive view yet of the army’s political story. It recounts the struggle between Republicans and Democrats for political allegiance among the army’s rank and file, in the process showing that the army’s captains, majors, and colonels spurred a pro-Republican political awakening among the enlisted men that burst onto the public stage through newspaper editorials, unit resolutions, and letters to home front politicians. The book traces the heated campaigning and voting activity on the front lines during critical elections such as the 1864 presidential contest, highlighting how an army that had once revered McClellan renounced him for consorting with the forces of peace activism and treason. Union soldiers asserted themselves as the guardians of civic virtue and used the power of political organization to set the terms in a heated debate over wartime loyalty.

‘I Do Think We Can Carry On’: The Women’s War Efforts Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress, 1939-1946

The Jewish community’s involvement in the Canadian war effort during the Second World War has been a topic of scholarly interest for decades. However, this scholarship has largely focused on the activities of men, whether as soldiers or members of volunteer organizations, most notably the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC). When women’s contributions are noted, it has generally been a mention of undefined volunteer work or their activities as soldiers’ wives and mothers, thus ignoring the monumental efforts of Jewish women. In particular, the Women’s War Efforts Committee (WWEC) of the CJC contributed thousands of hours of unpaid labour, fundraising, running a Next-of-Kin League for the wives, mothers, and children of enlisted men, and working with other women’s organizations for the war effort. However, it was their work on massive projects such as the furnishing of recreation spaces on armed forces bases and the opening of Servicemen’s Centres across Canada that would be most impactful. This paper will explore how the activities of the WWEC increased the visibility of the Jewish community in Canada and contributed to changing the public perception of Jews from that of an unwanted immigrant community to that of an accepted minority group. It will also examine the tensions between the men and women of the CJC and the shifting public roles of women within the Jewish community.

't Volk is voogd en meester moede

Tot hij in april 1916 in de buurt van Diks-muide gewond raakte, was de dichter August Van Cauwelaert als broer van de politicus Frans Van Cauwelaert de man die soldatenklachten aanhoorde en die de spanningen tussen Franstalige bevelhebbers en de Vlaamse manschappen registreerde. Maar door de informatie die hem tijdens zijn her-stel in het Zuid-Franse Cannes bereikte, stond Gust Van Cauwelaert gaandeweg dichter bij de Frontbeweging dan zijn broer Frans. Dat blijkt uit een drietal hekeldichten die hij tijdens en na de oorlog schreef aan het adres van de Belgisch regering in Le Havre en aan koning Albert.Gust achtte zijn broer te goedgelovig in zijn contacten met de Belgische regering en met koning Albert. Meermaals waarschuwde hij Frans dat hij op het punt stond zijn prestige te verspelen. Eind december 1916 schreef hij hem: “Het feit dat gij geloofd hebt in de beloften die van hogerhand gedaan werden aangaande onze zaak, en dat vertrouwen hebt meegedeeld, heeft u kwaad gedaan, geloof me”.De verdeeldheid binnen de Vlaamse beweging die Gust had voorspeld was een feit toen hij in augustus 1919 werd gedemobiliseerd.__________ ‘Volk is voogd en meester moede Until he was wounded in the vicinity of Diksmuide in April 1916, the poet August Van Cauwelaert, as the brother of the politician Frans Van Cauwelaert, was the man who listened to soldiers’ complaints and who kept a record of tensions between French-speaking commanders and Flemish enlisted men. But, due to the information that reached him during his recuperation in Cannes in the South of France, Gust Van Cauwelaert gradually moved closer to the Front Movement than his brother Frans. This can be seen in three satirical pieces that he wrote during and after the war, directed at the Belgian government in Le Havre and to King Albert.Gust considered his brother to be too credulous in his contacts with the Belgian government and King Albert. On several occasions he warned Frans that he was about to forfeit his prestige. In the end of December 1916 he wrote to him: “The fact that you have believed in the promises that were made from on high regarding our cause, and that you have made that confidence known out loud, has done you harm, believe me.”The division among the Flemish Movement that Gust had predicted was a fact by the time he was demobilized in August 1919.