scholarly journals Judicial Review, Judicial Revisionism and Judicial Responsibility

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 169-216
Author(s):  
Brian A. Langille

Judicial review of the decisions of labour relations boards has been a nagging problem for the Supreme Court of Canada for decades. The decision of the Court in Le Syndicat des Employés de Production du Québec et de L’Acadie v. Canada Labour Relations Board et al. provides an opportunity for and indeed provokes review of the work of the Court in dealing with this recurring problem. This essay begins by placing in perspective the concrete issue posed in the L’Acadie decision. But the particular facts of that case are used only as a vehicle to explore the nature of the problem of judicial review of labour decisionmakers and the history of the Court's handling of it. A fundamental thesis of this essay is that the Court's work can be best understood as comprising two distinct periods, the early years (pre-1979) and the new era (1979-1984?). This essay articulates the view that during the early years the Court developed a law of judicial review which was wholly inadequate both in functional and doctrinal terms. In the new era the Court simplified and reformed the law of judicial review of labour boards and labour arbitrators. It is only from the perspective of the Court's previous handling of the issue that the decision in L’Acadie can be truly understood. When so viewed the decision is perfectly inadequate. The case creates a new distinction based upon the old confusion of “jurisdiction”. This essay then develops the view that no theory of judicial review which revolves around the notion of “jurisdiction” can ever satisfactorily deal with the issues presented. In this respect the Court's own cases from the “new era” represent a much more sensible, if still a second best approach. Finally, suggestions for a legislative solution to the problem posed by L’Acadie are briefly explored.

1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.


1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell McInnes ◽  
Janet Bolton ◽  
Natalie Derzko

This article takes an in-depth look at the law clerks and the role they play at the Supreme Court of Canada. Such an examination both informs prospective clerks on the nature of the position and promotes a better general understanding of how the judicial process operates at this level. The authors begin their analysis by looking at the history of the law clerks at the Supreme Court. Although the functions of the clerks have changed little since their introduction in 1968, the clerkship program has evolved with a changing Supreme Court, contributing to the institutions "coming of age." The authors then shift their attention to examining the present clerkship program. The article first reveals the manner in which the clerks are selected by the Court. Using data collected by a questionnaire sent to clerks of the 1991-93 terms, the authors also attempt to convey, in a general way, some sense of the people who have served at the Court in recent years. Next, the major functions performed by the clerks are described. While the clerks do have a great deal of responsibility, the authors dispel much of the criticism directed at United States Supreme Court clerks by stating that the law clerks at the Supreme Court of Canada do not have an improper degree of authority. The authors conclude that the clerking experience benefits both the clerks themselves and the procedures of the Court. As such, the law clerks are an entrenched and indispensable part of the judicial process at the Supreme Court of Canada.


2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-833 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy B. Flemming ◽  
Glen S. Krutz

The expanding public policy role of high courts heightens concerns over whether societal and political inequalities affect the outcomes of litigation. However, comparative research on this question is limited. This article assesses whether status inequalities between parties and differences in the experience and resources of attorneys influence the selection of cases for judicial review in the Supreme Court of Canada. A series of statistical models reveal that governments are more likely than other parties to influence whether leave is granted but that the experience and resources of lawyers, unlike in the United States, have little impact. The decentralized, low volume and high access features of the Canadian process may explain this finding.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.


2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 483-507
Author(s):  
Paul Daly

In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, the Supreme Court of Canada attempted to clarify and simplify Canadian judicial review doctrine. I argue that the Court got it badly wrong, as evidenced by four of its recent decisions. The cases demonstrate that the new categorical approach is unworkable. A reviewing court cannot apply the categorical approach without reference to something like the much-maligned “pragmatic and functional” analysis factors. The categories regularly come into conflict, in that decisions could perfectly reasonably be assigned to more than one category. When conflict occurs, it must be resolved by reference to some factors external to the categorical approach. The new, single standard of reasonableness is similarly unworkable without reference to external factors. Different types of decision attract different degrees of deference, on the basis of factors that are external to the elegant elucidation of reasonableness offered in Dunsmuir. Clarification and simplicity have thus not been achieved.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-250
Author(s):  
Ran Hirschl

The Courts, Ian Greene, The Canadian Democratic Audit Series; Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006, pp. xvii, 182.This book is another welcome addition to the Canadian Democratic Audit Series. It sets out to assess the democratic credentials of Canada's judiciary—a most significant branch of government in post-1982 Canada. The book's approach is refreshing in several respects. Instead of the traditional focus on the well-rehearsed debate over the questionable democratic credentials of judicial review, the book attempts to evaluate the adequacy of the Canadian court system in relation to three basic tenets of democracy: participation, inclusiveness, and responsiveness. Unlike most accounts of Canadian political institutions, it pays due attention to elements of the court system beyond the Supreme Court of Canada. In so doing, Greene is able to assess more accurately whether the Canadian judiciary as a whole is living up to that set of reasonable democratic expectations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2102-2117
Author(s):  
Alda Rifada Rizqi

Democracy with integrity will be realized if carried out in accordance with the will of the people as holders of sovereignty, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) as the election organizer has the authority to make regulations that support a better democracy. KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) Regulation No. 20 of 2018 as evidence that the KPU is committed to participating in preventing corrupt behavior. It was considered to have been considered as an effort to protect the interests of the people, but the regulation was submitted to a judicial review at the Supreme Court. Then, based on legal-formal considerations and based on the legal positivism of the Supreme Court, the request for the test is granted. The decision distanced itself from progressive legal values that justified the denial of what was regulated in legislation in order to put forward the values of public justice, because basically the law was made to fulfill human interests, accommodating the will of the people for the sake of order.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document