scholarly journals Le système monétaire européen : Un point de vue nord américain

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Yves Fortin ◽  
Martin Perron
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
European Monetary System ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Inflation Rates ◽  
National Governments ◽  
The Impact

Is the european monetary System (EMS) a useful approach to the problems it is meant to solve and to the pursuit of the objectives that its promoters have set for themselves? A review by the authors of a number of economic motives which underly the creation of the EMS leads them to conclude that the various economic problems which the european readily blame on floating exchange rates find in fact their origins in the economic policies pursued by the national governments. Moreover, the authors consider that the defense of parities in the EMS, either through intervention in the exchange markets or by other means, can involve high economic costs and that in the longer run market forces always triumph when parities no longer reflect the fundamental positions of the respective economies. Among the other factors which limit the usefulness of the EMS the authors identify the continuing lack of macro-economic policy coordination by participating countries, its regional character, the underestimation of the importance of the american dollar in the international monetary system and the impact of its fluctuations on european currencies and the tendency of the EMS to harmonize inflation rates at a higher level than should be aimed for. The authors therefore conclude that it is doubtful that the EMS constitutes a useful instrument of economic policy and that efforts towards european monetary union based on such a system of parities can be successful under present circumstances.

Transgovernmental Interaction in the International Monetary System, 1960–1972

1973 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russell
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary System ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Interaction Patterns ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
The Impact

The main hypothesis of this article is that transgovernmental interaction among central banks and finance ministries of industrialized countries was as significant in economic policy formation as intergovernmental interaction. Elite interview data indicate, however, that the international consultative process among deputy central bank governors and deputy finance ministers conformed more closely to the intergovernmental image of international politics than had been expected. Both interaction patterns within the deputies’ consultative group and the impact of international consultations upon national economic policies could be explained moderately well in terms of a unified rational actor model. Examination of the transgovernmental interaction does suggest ways to systematically modify and improve interpretations based upon the rational actor model. In addition, the degree of politicization of issues may prove to be a reliable guide when deciding whether the transgovernmental dimension of an issue requires detailed study.

scholarly journals Le système monétaire européen : Le point de vue européen

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Lelart
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
European Monetary System ◽  
The United States ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
International Capital Markets ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
American Interest ◽  
International Environment ◽  
The Stability

The evolution of the international monetary System prompted the nine members of the E.E.C. to establish a European Monetary System. The new statutes of the I.M.F. have in fact legalized the practice of flexible exchange rates and sanctioned the dollar's inconvertibility while eliminating the role of gold. Further, the increasing importance of the international capital markets fosters the unlimited expansion of international liquidities. it is in response to this context then that Europe seeks to create a zone of stability and to manage its own international tender in accordance with rules that it has set for itself. The author draws a positive conclusion as the System has operated without major problems so far. Nevertheless, difficulties remain: the international environment has not improved given the abrupt strengthening of the dollar and the increase in American interest rates. In addition, progress with regard to cooperation among the Nine remains slow and political change in France makes any prognosis respecting the future of the European Monetary System difficult. It was anticipated that the System would be Consolidated rapidly. It would in that event contribute more effectively to the stability of the international monetary System. It could, on the other hand, sharpen competition between Europe and the United States, between the Ecu and S.D.Rs. and between the European Monetary Fund and the International Monetary Fund.

Impact of Central Bank Intervention during Periods of Speculative Pressure: Evidence from the European Monetary System

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmut Stix
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Markov Switching ◽  
European Monetary System ◽  
Turbulent Regime ◽  
Markov Switching Model ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Central Bank Intervention ◽  
Switching Model ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
The Impact

Abstract This paper studies the effects of Banco de Espanna and Banque de France interventions during the 1992-93 European Monetary System crises. In particular, a Markov Switching model is estimated where interventions influence the probabilities of transition between a calm and a turbulent regime. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of intervention on the expected rate of realignment. On balance, the results are consistent with the view that publicly known interventions but not secret interventions increased both the probability of switching to the turbulent regime as well as the expected realignment rate.

The international economy as a constraint on U. S. macroeconomic policymaking

1988 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-637 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Stephen Weatherford
Keyword(s):  
International Economic ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
Policy Coordination ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Trade And Exchange

International economic factors increasingly influence American trade and exchange policy, and interdependence also circumscribes the autonomous choice of domestic policies. But the growing concern of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) policymakers over the potential for macroeconomic policy coordination to enhance national as well as world welfare implies that international economic relations present opportunities rather than constraints under some circumstances. This suggests that understanding domestic economic policy choice within its international context involves not only how policy choices are made within the bounds of international constraints, but also when countries might cooperate to modify the constraints themselves. This research looks to four important historical cases for information on these questions: the first three are the series of cumulating crises in the international monetary system during the 1960s and early 1970s, the fourth is the energy supply shock of 1973 and the recession that followed. The article describes the process of policy selection in each of these cases, contrasting domestic versus international premises for policy choice. The economics literature has emphasized the magnitude of domestic welfare gains available from coordinated national economic policies. Although the cases considered here do not contradict the importance of payoffs, they underline the corresponding role of political, economic, and strategic uncertainty in conditioning elites' policy choices.

Brauchen wir eine neue Weltwährungsordnung?

1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Renate Ohr ◽  
Otmar Issing ◽  
Friedrich Thießen
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
International Monetary System ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
High Volatility

AbstractThe economic policy forum discusses the question of whether we need a new international monetary system. Renate Ohr argues that various interventionist policy measures such as fixed exchange rates or a tobin-tax are inappropriate in order to avoid high volatility. Instead of a new international monetary system, a co-operative system which is flexible enough to react to disturbances and unequal developments is proposed by the author. This includes a better information basis about national economic policy goals and strategies. The existing “non-system” allows for sufficient flexibility to adjust to changing economic conditions. The role of the IMF should be strengthened by intensifying its function of surveillance and using it more as a forum for international co-operation.Otmar Issing goes even further than Ohr by rejecting any change to the existing international monetary system. He claims that flexible exchange rates neither had a negative impact on international trade nor on inflation. Furthermore he fears that a reform would result in the adoption of instruments reducing the elasticity of the system and its scope for adjustment. If politicians still demand political action, they should start with disciplining their national policies. In particular, the author suggests that they adopt a more steady monetary policy.Friedrich Thießen claims that national emotions prevent states from standardising different monetary areas within bi- or multilateral systems. Therefore he suggests a supranational monetary policy which makes it easier for states to give up sovereignty. Such a policy should include the following elements: neutrality towards nationally oriented economic policies, locational neutrality, innovative neutrality, hedge neutrality and profit neutrality. An international body such as the International Monetary Fund should be in charge of the monetary policy.

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