scholarly journals Strategic decision-making by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus) and children in a Snowdrift-Game task

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Sanchez-Amaro ◽  
Shona Duguid ◽  
Josep Call ◽  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Pan Paniscus ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Resource Distributions ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Evolutionary Context ◽  
The Cost

Chimpanzees must be able to coordinate with others even when conflicts of interest are present. The “Snowdrift-Game” provides a model to understand how organisms coordinate and make decisions under conflict situations. By investigating whether and how chimpanzees solve this dilemma we can gain insight into the mechanisms of cooperation. Moreover, by comparing chimpanzees with their closest relatives, bonobos and humans, we can understand the evolutionary context of decision making in this situation. We presented pairs of captive chimpanzees (N=10; Mage= 20.5 years) and bonobos (N=6, Mage=13.7 years) housed at the Leipzig Zoo in Germany as well as 20 children dyads from the same city, with an adapted version of the Snowdrift games. In our task, subjects were faced with an unequal reward distribution. In the critical condition the higher reward was acquired by letting a partner act, with the risk that if neither partner acted the rewards would be lost after a period of thirty seconds. Both chimpanzees and children were highly successful at coordinating their actions to solve the dilemma (bonobo data is currently under collection). They almost never lost the rewards because at least one partner was willing to pay the cost of getting the decreased reward, to avoid coordination failure (no reward). Both species behaved strategically as they waited longer for their partner to act when this would lead to a higher reward. However, evidence from their resource distributions, their action latencies and their communicative acts suggests that children behaved more strategic than chimpanzees. Our results demonstrate that both species can successfully coordinate their actions in conflict situations although they differ in the way they achieve coordination.

scholarly journals Strategic decision-making by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus) and children in a Snowdrift-Game task

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Sanchez-Amaro ◽  
Shona Duguid ◽  
Josep Call ◽  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Pan Paniscus ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Resource Distributions ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Evolutionary Context ◽  
The Cost

Chimpanzees must be able to coordinate with others even when conflicts of interest are present. The “Snowdrift-Game” provides a model to understand how organisms coordinate and make decisions under conflict situations. By investigating whether and how chimpanzees solve this dilemma we can gain insight into the mechanisms of cooperation. Moreover, by comparing chimpanzees with their closest relatives, bonobos and humans, we can understand the evolutionary context of decision making in this situation. We presented pairs of captive chimpanzees (N=10; Mage= 20.5 years) and bonobos (N=6, Mage=13.7 years) housed at the Leipzig Zoo in Germany as well as 20 children dyads from the same city, with an adapted version of the Snowdrift games. In our task, subjects were faced with an unequal reward distribution. In the critical condition the higher reward was acquired by letting a partner act, with the risk that if neither partner acted the rewards would be lost after a period of thirty seconds. Both chimpanzees and children were highly successful at coordinating their actions to solve the dilemma (bonobo data is currently under collection). They almost never lost the rewards because at least one partner was willing to pay the cost of getting the decreased reward, to avoid coordination failure (no reward). Both species behaved strategically as they waited longer for their partner to act when this would lead to a higher reward. However, evidence from their resource distributions, their action latencies and their communicative acts suggests that children behaved more strategic than chimpanzees. Our results demonstrate that both species can successfully coordinate their actions in conflict situations although they differ in the way they achieve coordination.

The effect on pricing strategies in the process of strategic decision making in view of cost of produced goods

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 1705-1727
Author(s):  
Syed Mohammad Faisal ◽  
Ahmad Khalid Khan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

This research examined the effect of the cost of produced goods on pricing strategies in the process of strategic decision. Also examined in this research is the extended effect of pricing strategies on consumers purchase decision making. The research aimed to answer questions on the extent to which cost of produced goods affects pricing strategies of products, how decision makers realize the value-based pricing strategy of corporations and the extent to which pricing policy help consumers to make purchase decisions. This research being historical and descriptive depended basically on secondary sources of information. The research used a historical and descriptive method and depended basically and simply on secondary devices as sources of data. Results from the data acquired reference that customers have an understanding of fair value reflected in prices of the firm's products. The researcher will use both analytical and descriptive methods which appropriate the context of the current research which is generally based on the theoretical underpinnings and fieldwork. The outcomes indicate that the cost of produced products used in organizations provides quality information; there is an effect of this information on the pricing decision-making; there are parts in which pricing strategy much relied on the information provided by the cost systems.

Driving forces and patterns of water policy making in Egypt

Water Policy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Luzi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Water Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Water Policies

In studies on transboundary river management, it is often assumed that national water policies are made by ‘governments’ or ‘water ministries’ as unitary, rational decision-makers. This article analyzes actors, institutions, and decision-making processes in the Egyptian water sector and explores implications for the design and implementation of water policies. Rational choice is assumed to be only one possible pattern of water policy making, and is distinguished from other mechanisms driven by organizational routines or bargaining over stakeholders' interests. It is found that in Egypt, despite considerable planning capacities, many water policy outcomes are influenced by developments beyond the control of the water ministry. Water governance is also influenced by top-level strategic decision-making, conflicts of interest between sectors, enforcement priority given to policies that prioritize political stability and/or certain privileged interest groups, and intra-organizational resistance to institutional reform. Policies in the traditional core tasks of the water ministry, i.e. water supply and drainage provision, and important strategic decisions regarding water allocation priorities are mainly made in a ‘rational choice’ fashion by the respective authorities. Issues that have emerged more recently, such as water quality or demand management, are subject to interest bargaining between different stakeholder groups in both the planning and the implementation phases.

scholarly journals Chimpanzees, bonobos and children successfully coordinate in conflict situations

2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1856) ◽  
pp. 20170259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Sánchez-Amaro ◽  
Shona Duguid ◽  
Josep Call ◽  
Michael Tomasello
Keyword(s):  
Group Living ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Strategic Decision Making ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Social Animals ◽  
Pull Strategy ◽  
Set Up

Social animals need to coordinate with others to reap the benefits of group-living even when individuals' interests are misaligned. We compare how chimpanzees, bonobos and children coordinate their actions with a conspecific in a Snowdrift game, which provides a model for understanding how organisms coordinate and make decisions under conflict. In study 1, we presented pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos and children with an unequal reward distribution. In the critical condition, the preferred reward could only be obtained by waiting for the partner to act, with the risk that if no one acted, both would lose the rewards. Apes and children successfully coordinated to obtain the rewards. Children used a ‘both-partner-pull’ strategy and communicated during the task, while some apes relied on an ‘only-one-partner-pulls' strategy to solve the task, although there were also signs of strategic behaviour as they waited for their partner to pull when that strategy led to the preferred reward. In study 2, we presented pairs of chimpanzees and bonobos with the same set-up as in study 1 with the addition of a non-social option that provided them with a secure reward. In this situation, apes had to actively decide between the unequal distribution and the alternative. In this set-up, apes maximized their rewards by taking their partners' potential actions into account. In conclusion, children and apes showed clear instances of strategic decision-making to maximize their own rewards while maintaining successful coordination.

scholarly journals Empowering strategic decision-making for wildfire management: avoiding the fear trap and creating a resilient landscape

Fire Ecology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Castellnou ◽  
Núria Prat-Guitart ◽  
Etel Arilla ◽  
Asier Larrañaga ◽  
Edgar Nebot ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Strategic Decision Making ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Wildfire Management ◽  
Defensive Strategies ◽  
Response Systems ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Emergency Response Systems

AbstractIn recent years, fire services in Mediterranean Europe have been overwhelmed by extreme wildfire behavior. As a consequence, fire management has moved to defensive strategies with a focus only on the known risks (the fear trap). In this region, wildfires can change rapidly, increasing the uncertainty and causing complex operational scenarios that impact society right from the initial hours. To address this challenge, proactive approaches are an alternative to defensive and reactive strategies.We propose a methodology that integrates the uncertainty of decisions and the cost of each opportunity into the strategic decision-making process. The methodology takes into account values such as fire-fighting safety, organizational resilience, landscape resilience, and social values.Details of the methods and principles used to develop and implement a creative decision-making process that empower the fireline are provided. A tool that segregates the landscape into polygons of fire potential and defines the connectivity between those polygons is used. Two examples of operational implementation of this methodology are presented (2014 Tivissa Fire and 2015 Odena Fire).These methods facilitate the analysis of possible scenarios of resolution and the costs of the opportunities that help build resilient emergency response systems and prevent their collapse. Moreover, they help explain the risk to society and involve citizens in the decision-making process. These methods are based on the experience and lessons learned by European incident commanders, managers, and researchers collected during the last decade.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN INTERACTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mykola Somych ◽  
◽  
Yuiiia Vakulenko ◽  
Liudmyla Horbatiuk ◽  
Yurii Kovryzko ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Alternative Methods ◽  
Personal Interest ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Legitimate Interests ◽  
System Of Parameters ◽  
Political Economic

The article summarizes the theoretical principles of defining the concept of «mechanism», «conflict management mechanism». The main types of conflicts according to the Law of Ukraine «On Civil Service» are clarified: official disputes and conflicts of interest – a situation in which the personal interest of a civil servant affects or may affect the objective performance of his duties and in which there is or may occur contradictions between the personal interest of the employee and the legitimate interests of citizens, organizations, society. The main types of conflict management mechanisms are identified: organizational, legal and socio-psychological, taking into account objective and subjective factors, which covers a system of parameters, sequential actions, a set of methods and measures of socio- psychological nature. The causes of conflict situations in the interaction of public authorities and the public are substantiated: objective (social, political, economic, ideological factors) and subjective (derived from objective). Conflict fields of contradictions that arise in the process of interaction are depicted: legislative principles, political sphere, personnel policy, undemocratic worldview of managers, economic competence. The analysis of the main conflict fields of contradictions of local governments of Poltava region is carried out. New, alternative methods of conflict resolution have been formed: competition, adaptation, compromise, avoidance, cooperation, their general characteristics have been determined. Officials were invited to use the open conversation technique in order to reach a compromise.

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