scholarly journals Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition

Author(s):  
Yingyi Qian

This paper develops a simple model to analyze the “dual-track” approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto-improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform. The model highlights the critical roles of enforcement of the plan for achieving Pareto improvement and full liberalization of the market track for achieving efficiency. We examine how the dual-track approach has worked in product and labor market liberalization in China.

Author(s):  
Mark I. Vail

This chapter situates the book in theoretical and empirical contexts. It provides a brief overview of competing theoretical approaches to explaining trajectories of economic reform in continental Europe in the era of austerity and transnational neoliberalism since the early 1990s. Since standard analyses of “neoliberal” reform fail to capture these dynamics of economic reform in continental Europe, as do conventional institutionalist and interest-based accounts, it argues for an approach that emphasizes the political power of ideas and highlights the influence of national liberal traditions—French “statist liberalism,” German “corporate liberalism,” and Italian “clientelist liberalism.” It provides a brief overview of the remainder of the book, which uses a study of national liberal traditions to explain trajectories of reform in fiscal, labor-market, and financial policies in France, Germany, and Italy, three countries that have rejected neoliberal approaches to reform in a neoliberal age.


2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 387-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew F Mitchell ◽  
Andrea Moro

Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer, and redistributing the gains that are left over. We relax the assumption that winners know the losses suffered by the losers and show that the informationally efficient method of compensating losers may involve the use of seemingly inefficient (but informationally efficient) distortionary policies. The risk of overcompensating losers may make distortions informationally efficient, as there are points on the Pareto frontier where distortions are used.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Diogo G. C. Britto

Lump-sum job displacement policies (e.g. severance pay) are often presented as a better alternative to contingent policies (e.g. unemployment insurance) in the context of developing countries, under the rationale that the former are less harmful to formal employment as they do not incentivize substitution from formal to informal jobs. First, this paper provides original evidence on the employment effects of lump-sum income in the context of a developing country with high labor informality. Using Brazilian data, a regression discontinuity (RD) design shows that a transfer equivalent to 15 days of earnings (i) increases the duration out of a formal job by 1.9 weeks, (ii) reduces monthly earnings in the next job by 1.6%, and (iii) reduces total earnings in the formal labor market by 3.6% over a three-year period. Second, the paper studies the impact of a one-month extension in unemployment insurance (UI) on a comparable sample of displaced workers. UI is shown to have a stronger impact on the duration out of a formal job compared with a lump-sum transfer. In addition, a novel exercise matching administrative and survey data shows that 57% of the decrease in formal employment caused by UI is compensated by an increase in the incidence of informal employment. However, workers receiving the UI extension partially recover the initial employment loss over time in such a way that the adverse impact on employment over a three-year period is similar compared with the lump-sum transfer. Moreover, UI is found to be less harmful to re-employment wages, possibly because it improves the worker's bargaining power as it offers insurance against the duration of joblessness. Overall, the UI extension is less detrimental to total earnings in the formal labor market over a three-year period. Hence, although these findings indicate that contingent job insurance policies have a stronger impact on the initial duration out of a formal job and indeed incentivize informal employment, they do not support the notion that lump-sum policies are less harmful to formal employment and earnings in the medium term.


Asian Survey ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 894-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong-Chool Ha ◽  
Wang Hwi Lee

The post-crisis economic reforms in South Korea have been uneven. While financial reform has been thoroughly carried out, corporate restructuring and labor market flexibility have not been successfully implemented to transform the micro-behavior of the chaebol and labor unions. The unevenness of economic reform is attributable to sociopolitical dynamics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-230
Author(s):  
Tilak Sanyal

The article considers the scope of Pareto improvement through an inequality-inducing income transfer in a society where multiple pure public goods are provided by voluntary contribution only from the rich individual. In contrast to the case of single public good, here we show that in presence of only one poor individual in the society such an income transfer can never be Pareto improving. JEL Classification: H41, D63, D31, H23


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document