scholarly journals Differentiating between integration and non-integration strategies in perceptual decision making

eLife ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel M Stine ◽  
Ariel Zylberberg ◽  
Jochen Ditterich ◽  
Michael N Shadlen

Many tasks used to study decision-making encourage subjects to integrate evidence over time. Such tasks are useful to understand how the brain operates on multiple samples of information over prolonged timescales, but only if subjects actually integrate evidence to form their decisions. We explored the behavioral observations that corroborate evidence-integration in a number of task-designs. Several commonly accepted signs of integration were also predicted by non-integration strategies. Furthermore, an integration model could fit data generated by non-integration models. We identified the features of non-integration models that allowed them to mimic integration and used these insights to design a motion discrimination task that disentangled the models. In human subjects performing the task, we falsified a non-integration strategy in each and confirmed prolonged integration in all but one subject. The findings illustrate the difficulty of identifying a decision-maker’s strategy and support solutions to achieve this goal.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel M Stine ◽  
Ariel Zylberberg ◽  
Jochen Ditterich ◽  
Michael N Shadlen

ABSTRACTMany tasks used to study decision-making encourage subjects to integrate evidence over time. Such tasks are useful to understand how the brain operates on multiple samples of information over prolonged timescales, but only if subjects actually integrate evidence to form their decisions. We explored the behavioral observations that corroborate evidence-integration in a number of task-designs. Several commonly accepted signs of integration were also predicted by non-integration strategies. Furthermore, an integration model could fit data generated by non-integration models. We identified the features of non-integration models that allowed them to mimic integration and used these insights to design a motion discrimination task that disentangled the models. In human subjects performing the task, we falsified a non-integration strategy in each and confirmed prolonged integration in all but one subject. The findings illustrate the difficulty of identifying a decision-maker’s strategy and support solutions to achieve this goal.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lluís Hernández-Navarro ◽  
Ainhoa Hermoso-Mendizabal ◽  
Daniel Duque ◽  
Alexandre Hyafil ◽  
Jaime de la Rocha

It is commonly assumed that, during perceptual decisions, the brain integrates stimulus evidence until reaching a decision, and then performs the response. There are conditions, however (e.g. time pressure), in which the initiation of the response must be prepared in anticipation of the stimulus presentation. It is therefore not clear when the timing and the choice of perceptual responses depend exclusively on evidence accumulation, or when preparatory motor signals may interfere with this process. Here, we find that, in a free reaction time auditory discrimination task in rats, the timing of fast responses does not depend on the stimulus, although the choices do, suggesting a decoupling of the mechanisms of action initiation and choice selection. This behavior is captured by a novel model, the Parallel Sensory Integration and Action Model (PSIAM), in which response execution is triggered whenever one of two processes, Action Initiation or Evidence Accumulation, reaches a bound, while choice category is always set by the latter. Based on this separation, the model accurately predicts the distribution of reaction times when the stimulus is omitted, advanced or delayed. Furthermore, we show that changes in Action Initiation mediates both post-error slowing and a gradual slowing of the responses within each session. Overall, these results extend the standard models of perceptual decision-making, and shed a new light on the interaction between action preparation and evidence accumulation.


Author(s):  
Genís Prat-Ortega ◽  
Klaus Wimmer ◽  
Alex Roxin ◽  
Jaime de la Rocha

AbstractPerceptual decisions require the brain to make categorical choices based on accumulated sensory evidence. The underlying computations have been studied using either phenomenological drift diffusion models or neurobiological network models exhibiting winner-take-all attractor dynamics. Although both classes of models can account for a large body of experimental data, it remains unclear to what extent their dynamics are qualitatively equivalent. Here we show that, unlike the drift diffusion model, the attractor model can operate in different integration regimes: an increase in the stimulus fluctuations or the stimulus duration promotes transitions between decision-states leading to a crossover between weighting mostly early evidence (primacy regime) to weighting late evidence (recency regime). Between these two limiting cases, we found a novel regime, which we name flexible categorization, in which fluctuations are strong enough to reverse initial categorizations, but only if they are incorrect. This asymmetry in the reversing probability results in a non-monotonic psychometric curve, a novel and distinctive feature of the attractor model. Finally, we show psychophysical evidence for the crossover between integration regimes predicted by the attractor model and for the relevance of this new regime. Our findings point to correcting transitions as an important yet overlooked feature of perceptual decision making.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Barretto Garcia ◽  
Marcus Grueschow ◽  
Marius Moisa ◽  
Rafael Polania ◽  
Christian Carl Ruff

Humans and animals can flexibly choose their actions based on different information, ranging from objective states of the environment (e.g., apples are bigger than cherries) to subjective preferences (e.g., cherries are tastier than apples). Whether the brain instantiates these different choices by recruiting either specialized or shared neural circuitry remains debated. Specifically, domain-general theories of prefrontal cortex (PFC) function propose that prefrontal areas flexibly process either perceptual or value-based evidence depending on what is required for the present choice, whereas domain-specific theories posit that PFC sub- areas, such as the left superior frontal sulcus (SFS), selectively integrate evidence relevant for perceptual decisions. Here we comprehensively test the functional role of the left SFS for choices based on perceptual and value-based evidence, by combining fMRI with a behavioural paradigm, computational modelling, and transcranial magnetic stimulation. Confirming predictions by a sequential sampling model, we show that TMS-induced excitability reduction of the left SFS selectively changes the processing of decision-relevant perceptual information and associated neural processes. In contrast, value-based decision making and associated neural processes remain unaffected. This specificity of SFS function is evident at all levels of analysis (behavioural, computational, and neural, including functional connectivity), demonstrating that the left SFS causally contributes to evidence integration for  perceptual but not value-based decisions.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. Lange ◽  
Ankani Chattoraj ◽  
Jeffrey M. Beck ◽  
Jacob L. Yates ◽  
Ralf M. Haefner

AbstractHuman decisions are known to be systematically biased. A prominent example of such a bias occurs when integrating a sequence of sensory evidence over time. Previous empirical studies differ in the nature of the bias they observe, ranging from favoring early evidence (primacy), to favoring late evidence (recency). Here, we present a unifying framework that explains these biases and makes novel psychophysical and neurophysiological predictions. By explicitly modeling both the approximate and the hierarchical nature of inference in the brain, we show that temporal biases depend on the balance between “sensory information” and “category information” in the stimulus. Finally, we present new data from a human psychophysics task that confirms a critical prediction of our framework showing that effective temporal integration strategies can be robustly changed within each subject, and that allows us to exclude alternate explanations through quantitative model comparison.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyra Schapiro ◽  
Kresimir Josic ◽  
Zachary Kilpatrick ◽  
Joshua I Gold

Deliberative decisions based on an accumulation of evidence over time depend on working memory, and working memory has limitations, but how these limitations affect deliberative decision-making is not understood. We used human psychophysics to assess the impact of working-memory limitations on the fidelity of a continuous decision variable. Participants decided the average location of multiple visual targets. This computed, continuous decision variable degraded with time and capacity in a manner that depended critically on the strategy used to form the decision variable. This dependence reflected whether the decision variable was computed either: 1) immediately upon observing the evidence, and thus stored as a single value in memory; or 2) at the time of the report, and thus stored as multiple values in memory. These results provide important constraints on how the brain computes and maintains temporally dynamic decision variables.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Gwilliams ◽  
Jean-Rémi King

AbstractModels of perceptual decision making have historically been designed to maximally explain behaviour and brain activity independently of their ability to actually perform tasks. More recently, performance-optimized models have been shown to correlate with brain responses to images and thus present a complementary approach to understand perceptual processes. In the present study, we compare how these approaches comparatively account for the spatio-temporal organization of neural responses elicited by ambiguous visual stimuli. Forty-six healthy human subjects performed perceptual decisions on briefly flashed stimuli constructed from ambiguous characters. The stimuli were designed to have 7 orthogonal properties, ranging from low-sensory levels (e.g. spatial location of the stimulus) to conceptual (whether stimulus is a letter or a digit) and task levels (i.e. required hand movement). Magneto-encephalography source and decoding analyses revealed that these 7 levels of representations are sequentially encoded by the cortical hierarchy, and actively maintained until the subject responds. This hierarchy appeared poorly correlated to normative, drift-diffusion, and 5-layer convolutional neural networks (CNN) optimized to accurately categorize alpha-numeric characters, but partially matched the sequence of activations of 3/6 state-of-the-art CNNs trained for natural image labeling (VGG-16, VGG-19, MobileNet). Additionally, we identify several systematic discrepancies between these CNNs and brain activity, revealing the importance of single-trial learning and recurrent processing. Overall, our results strengthen the notion that performance-optimized algorithms can converge towards the computational solution implemented by the human visual system, and open possible avenues to improve artificial perceptual decision making.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Deverett ◽  
Sue Ann Koay ◽  
Marlies Oostland ◽  
Samuel S.-H. Wang

To make successful evidence-based decisions, the brain must rapidly and accurately transform sensory inputs into specific goal-directed behaviors. Most experimental work on this subject has focused on forebrain mechanisms. Here we show that during perceptual decision-making over a period of seconds, decision-, sensory-, and error-related information converge on the lateral posterior cerebellum in crus I, a structure that communicates bidirectionally with numerous forebrain regions. We trained mice on a novel evidence-accumulation task and demonstrated that cerebellar inactivation reduces behavioral accuracy without impairing motor parameters of action. Using two-photon calcium imaging, we found that Purkinje cell somatic activity encoded choice- and evidence-related variables. Decision errors were represented by dendritic calcium spikes, which are known to drive plasticity. We propose that cerebellar circuitry may contribute to the set of distributed computations in the brain that support accurate perceptual decision-making.


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