Judicial Annulment of National Preparatory Acts and the Effects on Final Union Administrative Decisions: Comments on the Judgment of 29 January 2020, Case C-785/18 Jeanningros, EU:C:2020:46

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-117
Author(s):  
Filipe Brito Bastos

The European Court of Justice's classic Borelli doctrine concerned administrative procedures where national authorities adopt preparatory acts which are binding upon the Union administration. In such cases, preparatory acts cannot be reviewed by Union courts as part of the review of the final Union decision and must instead be reviewed by national courts. Jeanningros provided the Court of Justice with an opportunity to clarify one of Borelli's remaining loose ends – the question of whether national courts should review the national preparatory acts even if the Union administration has already adopted the final decision. The Court answered in the affirmative, but nevertheless left new open questions for legal practice and scholarship to confront.

2019 ◽  

The final decision on the interpretation of Union law rests with the European Court of Justice. Such a ruling oftentimes affects national legal systems. Within the framework of a preliminary ruling procedure, the ECJ often has to decide on the interpretation of directives that are relevant for national private law. The consequence of such a decision is usually a change in the legal situation in the member states. This change in national private law can take place in many different ways. The possible consequences range from changes in the rulings of national courts to changes in member states' laws. This volume illustrates, by way of example, that and how the case law of the European Court of Justice has affected various areas of Spanish and German private law (e.g. sales law, general terms and conditions law and competition law). With contributions by Tatiana Arroyo Vendrell (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Markus Artz (Universität Bielefeld), Beate Gsell (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), Carmen Jerez Delgado (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid), Johann Kindl (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster), Julia Ludwigkeit (Universität Bielefeld), Natalia Mato Pacín (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), David Ramos Munoz (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), Reiner Schulze (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster)


Author(s):  
Nico van Eijk

The point of departure for this chapter is the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case, which annulled the European Data Retention Directive, in part because the use of retained data was not made subject to independent oversight. Next, it examines judgments from the national courts of the Netherlands and the UK, also focusing on the independent oversight issue, declaring invalid the data retention laws of those two countries. From the Digital Rights Ireland case and others, seven standards for oversight of intelligence services can be drawn: the oversight should be complete; it should encompass all stages of the intelligence cycle; it should be independent; it should take place prior to the imposition of a measure; it should be able to declare a measure unlawful and to provide redress; it should incorporate the adversary principle; and it should have sufficient resources.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, which was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on its conception of the ‘new legal order’. The ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be undermined if EU law could be made subordinate to national law of the various states. The validity of EU law can therefore, according to the ECJ, never be assessed by reference to national law. National courts are required to give immediate effect to EU law, of whatever rank, in cases that arise before them, and to ignore or to set aside any national law, of whatever rank, which could impede the application of EU law. Thus, according to the ECJ, any norm of EU law takes precedence over any provision of national law, including the national constitutions. This broad assertion of the supremacy of EU law has not however been accepted without qualification by national courts, and the chapter examines the nature of the qualifications that have been imposed by some national courts.


Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou

This chapter aims to discuss the possibilities and limitations of the EU to provide for an effective and comprehensive data protection regime. In this respect, it presents an analysis of the data protection rules in EU law by examining the relevant constitutional and secondary law framework. It analyzes the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on data protection issues, and argues that the European Court of Justice has interpreted an internal market measure (the Data Protection Directive) in such a way so as to foster the protection of fundamental rights. However, when it comes to the balancing between fundamental rights the Court leaves the question to be resolved by national courts. Finally, the contribution assesses the transborder data flows regime established by the Data Protection Directive and attempts to draw some conclusions on whether the ‘adequate protection’ test ensures a high protection in such flows.


2021 ◽  
pp. 409-450
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter discusses the ‘decentralized’ powers of the European Court of Justice. It looks at two specific constitutional principles that the Court has derived from the general duty of sincere cooperation: the principle of equivalence and the principle of effectiveness. Both principles have led to a significant judicial harmonization of national procedural laws. The chapter then turns to a third incursion into the procedural autonomy of national courts: the liability principle. While the previous two principles relied on the existence of national remedies for the enforcement of European law, this principle establishes a European remedy for proceedings in national courts. An individual can here, under certain conditions, claim compensatory damages resulting from a breach of European law. Importantly, the remedial competence of national courts is confined to national wrongs. They cannot give judgments on ‘European’ wrongs, as jurisdiction over the latter is—like the power to annul Union law—an exclusive power of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Finally, the chapter explores what happens in areas in which the Union has harmonized the remedial or jurisdictional competences of national courts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 357-408
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter highlights the ‘centralized’ powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It begins with an analysis of the Court's annulment power. The power of judicial review is the founding pillar of a Union ‘based on the rule of law’. The chapter then moves to the remedial power of the European Court, and the question of when the Union legislative or executive branches will be liable to pay damages for an illegal action. It also investigates the Court's power to adjudicate disputes between parties. In addition to a number of direct actions (direct actions start directly in the European Court), the EU Treaties also envisage an indirect action starting in the national courts: the preliminary reference procedure. This procedure is the central pillar of the Union's cooperative federalism for it combines the central interpretation of Union law by the Court of Justice with the decentralized application of European law by the national courts.


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