Prelude to the Korean War

2018 ◽  
pp. 112-150
Author(s):  
Paul J. Heer

This chapter discusses how Kennan attempted to apply his strategic vision along the periphery of East Asia, after having assessed that China and the rest of the mainland were strategically expendable to the United States. He advocated the neutralization of Japan and the Philippines—but did so inconsistently—and the avoidance of any US security commitments on the Korean Peninsula or in Southeast Asia, especially Indochina. The chapter chronicles the roles that Kennan and Davies played in various policy deliberations on these countries under Acheson. It concludes with a benchmark summary of Kennan’s cumulative impact on US policy towards East Asia on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War.

2018 ◽  
pp. 183-198
Author(s):  
Paul J. Heer

This chapter discusses how the impact of the Korean War undermined and ultimately destroyed Kennan’s strategic vision for US policy in East Asia. It led to the US militarization of Japan; US security commitments in Korea, Taiwan, Indochina, and the Philippines; and a hardening of US policy toward Communist China—all of which he had opposed. The net result was the application in East Asia of a version of Kennan’s own containment doctrine that he did not support. The final tragic casualty was Davies himself: the chapter describes how McCarthyism and charges of Communist sympathies led unjustly to Davies’s dismissal from the State Department, and the impact this had on Kennan.


2020 ◽  
pp. 19-61
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This chapter traces the history of American presence in Southeast Asia. The American legacy in the region began with traders and missionaries during the first half of the nineteenth century, then progressed to diplomats and official relations during the second half, and then to the arrival of American armed forces at the turn of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, America’s commercial interests and footprint continually broadened and deepened; educational and religious ties also blossomed. Except in the Philippines, America was largely seen as a benevolent partner—but not yet a power. That would change in the wake of World War II and the Cold War. With the advent of communist regimes in China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and the ensuing Korean War, Southeast Asia took on a completely different cast in Washington. It became one of two major global theaters of conflict against communism. Thus began America’s long and draining involvement in Vietnam and Indochina (1958–1975). But with the end of the long and exhausting Indochina conflict, which tore the United States itself apart, American attention naturally began to wane and dissipate. Yet, the United States continued to engage and build its relations with the region from the Carter through the Bush 43 administrations.


Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter focuses on the Korean War, which constituted the first instance of multilateral military coalition building in the post-World War II era. The U.S. government served as the pivotal state in this coalition-building effort. The chapter then looks at the deployment decisions of the three largest troop-contributing countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, and Turkey; the Philippines, a deeply embedded state with the United States in 1950; and South Africa, a weakly embedded state with the United States in 1950. The deployment decisions of the U.K. and Canada were the result of intense U.S. prodding involving a mixture of personal appeals, incentives, and threats. In this process, the U.S. government instrumentalized diplomatic networks to the greatest extent possible. Meanwhile, the Philippines was lured into the coalition via U.S. diplomatic embeddedness. Finally, in the case of South Africa, diplomatic embeddedness played no direct role. Rather, South Africa perceived the Korean War as an opportunity to gain from the U.S. long-desired military equipment, in particular military aircraft.


Author(s):  
Richard Mason

The Korean War, which broke out very closely upon the heels of the Communist victory in China, immediately assumed global implications beyond the boundaries of the Korean Peninsula. Essentially a Korean civil war, it immediately became a major ‘hot war’ in the Cold War in Asia. This paper discusses the relations between the United States and Indonesia in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea, covering the period from the outbreak of the war in 1950 through to the end of the war in 1954. The paper explores the various ways in which the United States attempted to co-opt and coerce Indonesia into the Western camp in the Cold War, and Indonesia’s responses thereto. The central theme of the paper is the interplay between the United States’ policy of containment and the Indonesian policy of non-alignment in the Cold War. An examination of the United States’ policy toward Indonesia, a non-communist but non-aligned nation, vis-à-vis the Korean War, would serve to illustrate the dynamics and nature of the Cold War in Southeast Asia.  


2021 ◽  
pp. 63-91
Author(s):  
Jacob Darwin Hamblin

Eisenhower’s initiative provided rhetorical tools to others who pursued political or even personal goals in their own countries. The first major efforts to take “Atoms for Peace” seriously were in East Asia, particularly post-occupation Japan and also South Korea, freshly emerging from the Korean War. In both cases the United States would be confronted with its own empty promises, because these countries explicitly asked for American help to build nuclear reactors to power their economic resurgence. Instead, US officials stalled for time and wavered, unsure how—or if—they should genuinely encourage a peaceful nuclear industry outside the United States and Europe.


Author(s):  
Paul J. Heer

This book chronicles and assesses the little-known involvement of US diplomat George F. Kennan—renowned as an expert on the Soviet Union—in US policy toward East Asia, primarily in the early Cold War years. Kennan, with vital assistance from his deputy John Paton Davies, played pivotal roles in effecting the US withdrawal from the Chinese civil war and the redirection of American occupation policy in Japan, and in developing the “defensive perimeter” concept in the western Pacific. His influence, however, faded soon thereafter: he was less successful in warning against US security commitments in Korea and Indochina, and the impact of the Korean War ultimately eclipsed his strategic vision for US policy in East Asia. This was due in large part to Kennan’s inability to reconcile his judgment that the mainland of East Asia was strategically expendable to the United States with his belief that US prestige should not be compromised there. The book examines the subsequent evolution of Kennan’s thinking about East Asian issues—including his role as a prominent critic of US involvement in the Vietnam War—and the legacies of his engagement with the region.


Author(s):  
Gregg A. Brazinsky

This chapter shows how the PRC’s search for greater status brought with it new obligations. China’s desire to stand at the helm of an Eastern revolution compelled the CCP to offer assistance to other Asian revolutionaries. The chapter argues that this mindset was a key factor in Beijing’s decisions to enter the Korean War and provide training and assistance to the Viet Minh. The United States, on the other hand, sought to prevent the PRC from gaining stature through its role in these conflicts. It often cited deflating China’s prestige in Asia as a motive for both fighting on in Korea and aiding the French in Indochina.


Author(s):  
Heike Wieters

Chapter 3 is a case study on CARE’s work in Korea during and after the Korean War. It traces CARE’s response to a presidential aid appeal in the United States, shows how American NGOs competed for donor dollars and media attention. In addition, it depicts the difficulties private humanitarian players encountered in a foreign setting involving a refugee crisis and a tight web of players with different stakes, meaning military players, Korean and United States government agencies, United Nations organizations as well as diverse foreign aid agencies.


2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suhi Choi

Abstract Since its fiftieth anniversary, memorialization of the Korean War has taken place in towns and cities across the United States. As a case study of this belated memory boom, this essay looks at the Utah Korean War Memorial, erected by local veterans in 2003 at Memory Grove Park, Salt Lake City. Situated in both the local and national contexts of remembrance, the memorial resonates largely with three mythical scripts, with themes of resilience, local pride, and the good war, all of which have allowed veterans to negotiate tensions between individual and collective memories. This case study reveals in particular how the official commemoration of the war has shifted local veterans' rhetorical positions from potential witnesses of subversive realities of the war to uncritical negotiators whose legitimization of the very process of mythologizing memories has ultimately alienated them from their own experiences during and after the war.


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