Chaining Communists

Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter focuses on the Korean War, which constituted the first instance of multilateral military coalition building in the post-World War II era. The U.S. government served as the pivotal state in this coalition-building effort. The chapter then looks at the deployment decisions of the three largest troop-contributing countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, and Turkey; the Philippines, a deeply embedded state with the United States in 1950; and South Africa, a weakly embedded state with the United States in 1950. The deployment decisions of the U.K. and Canada were the result of intense U.S. prodding involving a mixture of personal appeals, incentives, and threats. In this process, the U.S. government instrumentalized diplomatic networks to the greatest extent possible. Meanwhile, the Philippines was lured into the coalition via U.S. diplomatic embeddedness. Finally, in the case of South Africa, diplomatic embeddedness played no direct role. Rather, South Africa perceived the Korean War as an opportunity to gain from the U.S. long-desired military equipment, in particular military aircraft.

Author(s):  
Crystal Mun-hye Baik

Korean immigration to the United States has been shaped by multiple factors, including militarization, colonialism, and war. While Koreans migrated to the American-occupied islands of Hawai’i in the early 20th century as sugar plantation laborers, Japanese imperial rule (1910–1945) and racially exclusive immigration policy curtailed Korean migration to the United States until the end of World War II. Since then, Korean immigration has been shaped by racialized, gendered, and sexualized conditions related to the Korean War and American military occupation. Although existing social science literature dominantly frames Korean immigration through the paradigm of migration “waves,” these periodizations are arbitrary to the degree that they centralize perceived US policy changes or “breaks” within a linear historical timeline. In contrast, emphasizing the continuing role of peninsular instability and militarized division points to the accumulative effects of the Korean War that continue to impact Korean immigration. With the beginning of the American military occupation of Korea in 1945 and warfare erupting in 1950, Koreans experienced familial separations and displacements. Following the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953, which halted armed fighting without formally ending the war, the American military remained in the southern half of the Peninsula. The presence of the US military in South Korea had immediate repercussions among civilians, as American occupation engendered sexual intimacies between Korean women and US soldiers. Eventually, a multiracial population emerged as children were born to Korean women and American soldiers. Given the racial exclusivity of American immigration policy at the time, the US government established legislative “loopholes” to facilitate the migrations of Korean spouses of US soldiers and multiracial children adopted by American families. Between 1951 and 1964 over 90 percent of the 14,027 Koreans who entered the United States were Korean “war brides” and transnational adoptees. Since 1965, Korean spouses of American servicemen have played key roles in supporting the migration of family members through visa sponsorship. Legal provisions that affected the arrivals of Korean women and children to the United States provided a precedent for US immigration reform after 1950. For instance, the 1952 and 1965 Immigration and Nationality Acts integrated core elements of these emergency orders, including privileging heterosexual relationships within immigration preferences. Simultaneously, while the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act “opened” the doors of American immigration to millions of people, South Korean military dictatorial rule and the imminent threat of rekindled warfare also influenced Korean emigration. As a result, official US immigration categories do not necessarily capture the complex conditions informing Koreans’ decisions to migrate to the United States. Finally, in light of the national surge of anti-immigrant sentiments that have crystallized since the American presidential election of Donald Trump in November 2016, immigration rights advocates have highlighted the need to address the prevalence of undocumented immigrant status among Korean Americans. While definitive statistics do not exist, emergent data suggests that at least 10 percent of the Korean American population is undocumented. Given this significant number, the undocumented status of Korean Americans is a critical site of study that warrants further research.


2021 ◽  
pp. 71-92
Author(s):  
R. Keith Schoppa

In the aftermath of World War II, global realities seemed to have been grouped into binary formats: the United States and the USSR in a policy the United States called “containment” and included the establishment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Berlin Airlift, the Cuban Missile Crisis; and the Korean War. Violent decolonization rose for Great Britain in Malaysia and Kenya and for France in Vietnam and Algeria. Another chapter dichotomy was the general success of the civil rights movement in the United States and the concomitant strengthening of apartheid in South Africa.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 213-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiwei Chen

AbstractChinese allegations that the United States used biological weapons against Chinese troops and Korean civilians is one of the most shocking episodes of the Korean War. While the Chinese government repeatedly reprimanded the U.S. government for its uncivilized combat behavior, the U.S. government vigorously issued denials, treating the charges as an extreme propaganda maneuver applied by China in that moment of military crisis, ideological fervor, and political passion. Since then, a huge amount of scholarship has been produced on the allegation.1 None, however, provided a persuasive conclusion on the incident, mainly due to the lack of reliable sources.


Author(s):  
Craig L. Symonds

At the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy was more than twice as large as all the rest of the navies of the world combined. The inevitable contraction that followed was less draconian than after previous wars because of the almost immediate emergence of the Cold War. ‘Confronting the Soviets: the Cold War navy (1945–1975)’ explains that while deterring a Soviet missile strike remained a primary mission of all of America’s services throughout the Cold War, the United States also confronted a series of smaller wars around the world. These included the Korean War, unrest in the Middle East, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, 1965–74.


2020 ◽  
pp. 19-61
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This chapter traces the history of American presence in Southeast Asia. The American legacy in the region began with traders and missionaries during the first half of the nineteenth century, then progressed to diplomats and official relations during the second half, and then to the arrival of American armed forces at the turn of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, America’s commercial interests and footprint continually broadened and deepened; educational and religious ties also blossomed. Except in the Philippines, America was largely seen as a benevolent partner—but not yet a power. That would change in the wake of World War II and the Cold War. With the advent of communist regimes in China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and the ensuing Korean War, Southeast Asia took on a completely different cast in Washington. It became one of two major global theaters of conflict against communism. Thus began America’s long and draining involvement in Vietnam and Indochina (1958–1975). But with the end of the long and exhausting Indochina conflict, which tore the United States itself apart, American attention naturally began to wane and dissipate. Yet, the United States continued to engage and build its relations with the region from the Carter through the Bush 43 administrations.


Author(s):  
James I. Matray

On June 25, 1950, North Korea’s invasion of South Korea ignited a conventional war that had origins dating from at least the end of World War II. In April 1945, President Harry S. Truman abandoned a trusteeship plan for postwar Korea in favor of seeking unilateral U.S. occupation of the peninsula after an atomic attack forced Japan’s prompt surrender. Soviet entry into the Pacific war led to a last minute agreement dividing Korea at the 38th parallel into zones of occupation. Two Koreas emerged after Soviet-American negotiations failed to agree on a plan to end the division. Kim Il Sung in the north and Syngman Rhee in the south both were determined to reunite Korea, instigating major military clashes at the parallel in the summer of 1949. Moscow and Washington opposed their clients’ invasion plans until April 1950 when Kim persuaded Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin that with mass support in South Korea, he would achieve a quick victory. At first, Truman hoped that South Korea could defend itself with more military equipment and U.S. air support. Commitment of U.S. ground forces came after General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. occupation commander in Japan, visited the front and advised that the South Koreans could not halt the advance. Overconfident U.S. soldiers would sustain defeat as well, retreating to the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula. On September 15, MacArthur staged a risky amphibious landing at Inchon behind enemy lines that sent Communist forces fleeing back into North Korea. The People’s Republic of China viewed the U.S. offensive for reunification that followed as a threat to its security and prestige. In late November, Chinese “volunteers” attacked in mass. After a chaotic retreat, U.S. forces counterattacked in February 1951 and moved the line of battle just north of the parallel. After two Chinese offensives failed, negotiations to end the war began in July 1951, but stalemated in May 1952 over the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war. Peace came because of Stalin’s death in March 1953, rather than President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s veiled threat to stage nuclear strikes against China. Scholars have disagreed about many issues surrounding the Korean War, but the most important debate continues to center on whether the conflict had international or domestic origins. Initially, historians relied mainly on U.S. government publications to write accounts that ignored events prior to North Korea’s attack, endorsing an orthodox interpretation assigning blame to the Soviet Union and applauding the U.S. response. Declassification of U.S. government documents and presidential papers during the 1970s led to the publication of studies assigning considerable responsibility to the United States for helping to create a kind of war in Korea before June 1950. Moreover, left revisionist writers labeled the conflict a classic civil war. Release of Chinese and Soviet sources after 1989 established that Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong approved the North Korean invasion, prompting right revisionist scholars to reassert key orthodox arguments. This essay describes how and why recent access to Communist documents has not settled the disagreements among historians about the causes, course, and consequences of the Korean War.


Author(s):  
Ellen D. Wu

This chapter talks about how the ethnic Chinese throughout the United States greeted the news of the People's Republic of China's entry into the Korean War with immense trepidation. Almost overnight, the prevailing images of Chinese in the American public eye had metamorphosed from friendly Pacific allies to formidable, threatening foes. Chinatown's Korean War Red Scare dramatized the ways in which the Cold War structured the reconfiguration of Chinese American citizenship in the post-Exclusion era. The ascendance of anti-Communism as the defining paradigm of US foreign policy after World War II introduced new imperatives to clarify Chinese America's social and political standing. To address these issues, both parties looked to the identification of Chinese in the United States as Overseas Chinese—that is, members of a global Chinese diaspora with ties to each other and China.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul E. Godek

<p><em>Here I review the history of debt monetization by the Federal Reserve, as well as the relationship between debt monetization and inflation. While it is commonly held that inflation follows from debt monetization, that has not been the case in the U.S., at least not since the Korean War. From the early 1950s through 2007 debt monetization has been modest and steady, while inflation has been highly variable. With the recent financial crisis, debt monetization entered a new era. Since 2008 the magnitude and composition of debt monetization has no precedent. Also unprecedented is the Federal Reserve’s ability to suppress inflation despite extensive debt monetization, at least through 2015. Overall, since the creation of the Federal Reserve, the United States has experienced substantial inflation both with and (more commonly) without debt monetization. It remains to be seen if the United States can experience substantial debt monetization without inflation.</em><em></em></p>


2018 ◽  
pp. 112-150
Author(s):  
Paul J. Heer

This chapter discusses how Kennan attempted to apply his strategic vision along the periphery of East Asia, after having assessed that China and the rest of the mainland were strategically expendable to the United States. He advocated the neutralization of Japan and the Philippines—but did so inconsistently—and the avoidance of any US security commitments on the Korean Peninsula or in Southeast Asia, especially Indochina. The chapter chronicles the roles that Kennan and Davies played in various policy deliberations on these countries under Acheson. It concludes with a benchmark summary of Kennan’s cumulative impact on US policy towards East Asia on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War.


1992 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Higgs

Relying on standard measures of macroeconomic performance, historians and economists believe that “war prosperity” prevailed in the United States during World War II. This belief is ill-founded, because it does not recognize that the United States had a command economy during the war. From 1942 to 1946 some macroeconomic performance measures are statistically inaccurate; others are conceptually inappropriate. A better grounded interpretation is that during the war the economy was a huge arsenal in which the well-being of consumers deteriorated. After the war genuine prosperity returned for the first time since 1929.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document