Conclusion

The conclusion seeks to draw out some of the manuscript’s lessons for China, the United States, and less developed countries. It looks briefly at current Sino-American competition in Africa and parts of Asia and draws comparisons with the Cold War period, pointing to both similarities and differences. Although the dimensions of Chinese involvement in these regions have changed, some of the PRC’s motives remain the same.

The Diplomatic Campaign, 1963–1966

During the early 1960s, Beijing launched a new diplomatic effort to raise its visibility and promote its viewpoints in the Third World. Its goal was to assemble a radical coalition (or united front) of Afro-Asian states that opposed imperialism and revisionism. The PRC took advantage of the frustrations with the Great Powers harbored by Indonesia, Cambodia, Pakistan and some of the newly independent African countries to win allies in the Third World. The United States constantly sought to undermine these efforts by advocating more moderate versions of nonalignment and mobilizing public opinion against Chinese officials when they travelled abroad.

The Burdens of Status, 1950–1954

This chapter shows how the PRC’s search for greater status brought with it new obligations. China’s desire to stand at the helm of an Eastern revolution compelled the CCP to offer assistance to other Asian revolutionaries. The chapter argues that this mindset was a key factor in Beijing’s decisions to enter the Korean War and provide training and assistance to the Viet Minh. The United States, on the other hand, sought to prevent the PRC from gaining stature through its role in these conflicts. It often cited deflating China’s prestige in Asia as a motive for both fighting on in Korea and aiding the French in Indochina.

Competition and Cooperation, 1968–1979

This chapter traces the evolution of Sino-American competition in the Third World during the era of détente. Although some forms of competition between Beijing and Washington in the Third World persisted, the changing relationship also made it possible for limited forms of cooperation to occur. By the late 1970s, tentative forms of cooperation that occurred during the Nixon and Ford administrations evolved into more extensive collaboration in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The Cultural Competition, 1955–1964

Alongside Beijing’s diplomatic campaign to win over Afro-Asian countries went an equally vigorous cultural initiative. During the 1950s and early 1960s the PRC carried out a multi-faceted propaganda offensive that highlighted China’s economic and military achievements while criticizing American imperialism. The overarching goal was to reassure the world about China’s intentions while inspiring admiration for the CCP’s revolutionary struggle. This chapter also covers Washington’s efforts to counter the effects of the PRC’s cultural diplomacy.

The Emergence of a Rivalry, 1919–1950

The first chapter explores the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) views of China’s role in what would later come to be known as the Third World. I argue that during these years, despite China’s weak position in international politics, CCP leaders nevertheless believed that their country would ultimately regain its status as a major power by leading a wider revolution of peoples oppressed by colonialism. It also looks at evolving American views of the CCP. It shows how American policies through most of the period served to alienate the CCP leaders from the United States.

The Economic Competition, 1962–1968

The chapter argues that Beijing sought prestige rather than economic benefits through offering aid. Simply having aid programs signified that the PRC was an important power. American officials tried to mitigate the political impact of Chinese aid with their own programs. They often proposed aid projects that were designed to preempt or undermine those launched by the PRC.

China’s Radicalization and the American Response, 1958–1963

This chapter analyzes the radicalization of Chinese foreign policy during the early 1960s and how it influenced Sino-American competition in the Third World. The Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian War forced Beijing to differentiate itself from both Delhi and Moscow in its policies toward Afro-Asian countries. The PRC placed a new emphasis on militant anti-imperialism and promoting revolution. These changes in Chinese foreign policy caused American officials to see the PRC as a greater rather than a lesser threat and led to new measures to prevent Beijing from making political gains in the region. These included promoting India as an alternative model to the PRC.

From Geneva to Bandung

During the aftermath of the Korean War, the PRC continued seeking to strengthen its status in Asia, especially among other post-colonial states, but it hoped to do so in a more peaceful atmosphere that would allow economic recovery and domestic reconstruction. This chapter demonstrates how Beijing used two particularly important conferences—the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference—to demonstrate that it was a peaceful, responsible power. Guided by the skilled statesmanship of Zhou Enlai, the PRC aimed to play a significant role in both conferences while working to assure that the conferences themselves would be important and produce significant results.

Introduction

The purpose of the introduction is to explain my general argument and review the historiography on my topic. The first part of the introduction describes briefly how the book fits into the evolving paradigm of Cold War studies and how looking at Sino-American competition in the Third World broadens our understanding of the field. The second part explores the concept of status, especially as it applies to Chinese and American foreign relations during the Cold War.