New Departures

Author(s):  
Simon Miles

This chapter covers Ronald Reagan's first meeting with Mikhail Gorbache in Geneva in November 1985, exploring the internal and external roots of the nascent new thinking in Soviet foreign-policy and its impact on East–West relations. It recounts how superpower relations over a five-year period became messy and contradictory as Moscow and Washington exchanged harsh words and engaged in more dialogue than is commonly thought. It also mentions how the process of ending the Cold War had begun as US policymakers regained confidence in their place in the world and their Soviet counterparts took drastic measures to deal with a deteriorating situation. The chapter refers to policymakers in Washington and Moscow who struggled with the dualities of the Cold War. It describes that the policymakers witnessed a strong and rising United States and a Soviet Union that was on a grim downward trajectory.

This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-281
Author(s):  
Robert Siekmann

Especially as a consequence of the termination of the Cold War, the détente in the relations between East en West (Gorbachev's ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy matters) and, finally, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the number of UN peace-keeping operations substantially increased in recent years. One could even speak of a ‘proliferation’. Until 1988 the number of operations was twelve (seven peace-keeping forces: UNEF ‘I’ and ‘II’, ONUC, UNHCYP, UNSF (West New Guinea), UNDOF AND UNIFIL; and five military observer missions: UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM and UNIPOM). Now, three forces and seven observer missions can be added. The forces are MINURSO (West Sahara), UNTAC (Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia); the observer groups: UNGOMAP (Afghanistan/Pakistan), UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq), UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’ (Angola), ONUCA (Central America), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) and ONUSAL (El Salvador). UNTAG (Namibia), which was established in 1978, could not become operational until 1989 as a result of the new political circumstances in the world. So, a total of twenty-three operations have been undertaken, of which almost fifty percent was established in the last five years, whereas the other half was the result of decisions taken by the United Nations in the preceding forty years (UNTSO dates back to 1949). In the meantime, some ‘classic’ operations are being continued (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL), whereas some ‘modern’ operations already have been terminated as planned (UNTAG, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM ‘I’ and ‘II’, and ONUCA). At the moment (July 1992) eleven operations are in action – the greatest number in the UN history ever.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
Amadu Sesay ◽  
Charles Ukeje

The end of the cold war has made democratization, and its barest essential component elections, imperative for all nondemocratic forms of government. This is to be expected, given the dismal failure of the socialist alternative even in the first socialist country, the former Soviet Union. The United States, which is not only the foremost democracy in the world but also the only superpower, has been in the vanguard of democracy salesmanship. Africa, the continent with the least democratic space, has not been left out, as witnessed by President Bill Clinton’s unprecedented tour of the continent in March 1998.Understandably, Nigeria, arguably the most important country in Africa, was left out of the tour, since it was then under the obnoxious, undemocratic, and oppressive military regime of the late General Sani Abacha.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-207
Author(s):  
Étienne Forestier-Peyrat

Abstract This article shows how official discussions of federal arrangements within the USSR affected Soviet foreign policy from the 1940s through the 1960s, especially on questions of decolonization and relations with the United States and other Western countries. Connecting Soviet domestic history and international developments, the article shows how the federal structure of the USSR was used in transnational debates on composite polities, race, and nationality and also how it was debated internally. Attacks on the highly centralized nature of Soviet federal structures in international arenas and the countermeasures adopted as part of the ideological Cold War had long-term as well as short-term effects on Soviet politics and foreign policy. Within the USSR, such attacks raised questions about the ethnofederal structure of the USSR and provided comparison points for both loyalist and dissident proponents of national rights in the country.


Author(s):  
Robert G. Patman

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Africa. It first considers the United States’ historical engagement with Africa, particularly during the Cold War era that saw the intensification of US–Soviet Union superpower rivalry, before discussing the rise of a New World Order in the immediate post–Cold War period that held out the possibility of positive US involvement in Africa. It then explores the United States’ adoption of a more realist approach after Somalia, as well as its renewal of limited engagement between 1996 and 2001. It also analyzes US policy towards Africa after 9/11, with emphasis on President George W. Bush’s efforts to incorporate Africa into Washington’s global strategic network as part of the new war on terror, as compared to the approach of the Obama administration calling for political transformation in Africa.


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

The modern era was the American century, but it was also very much the communist century. Between them, the United States and the Soviet Union held the fate of the world in their hands. If there was to be a just and durable peace after 1945, an understanding between Washington and Moscow would have to be its foundation. Instead, in a conflict quickly dubbed “the Cold War,” the world suffered through four decades of existential tension between the Soviets and the Americans. ‘Superpower’ explains why the Soviets and Americans moved from cooperating in a world war to resisting each other in the Cold War, before exploring the events and ending of the Cold War in the 1980s.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Judas Everett

The Cold War was a confrontation dominated by dogmatic ideology; the rise of Gorbachev and his attempts to inject new thinking into the Soviet Union were critical in ending that standoff. Generally, Gorbachev was successful in the field of foreign policy and many of his ideas and actions created lasting legacies which have shaped the world today. However, one idea which failed to gain much traction was his proposal regarding a Common European Home. The aim of this paper is to examine how this opportunity was missed or why hasn’t it been taken advantage of, before moving on to analyse whether shared aims, freedoms, values and responsibilities exist between Russia and the EU today. Opinion polling shows that Russian values and opinions are complex, but often similar to other post-communist countries that have successfully become European Union member states. The issue of NATO expansion stands out as more problematic than a lack of shared values between the EU and Russian citizens.


1994 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Risse-Kappen

Realist or liberal explanations for the end of the cold war cannot account for the specific content of the change in Soviet foreign policy or for Western responses to it. These theories need to be complemented by approaches that emphasize the interaction between international and domestic factors and that take seriously the proposition that ideas intervene between structural conditions and actors' interests. Some of the strategic prescriptions that informed the reconceptualization of Soviet security interests originated in the Western liberal internationalist community, which formed transnational networks with “new thinkers” in the former Soviet Union. These new ideas became causally consequential for the turnaround in Soviet foreign policy and also had an impact on American and German reactions to it. Even though transnational networks were active in Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, their success varied. Domestic structures like the nature of political institutions, state-society relations, and political culture determine the ability of transnational networks first, to gain access to a country's political system and second, to build “winning coalitions.” These differences in domestic structures can largely explain the variation in impact of the strategic prescriptions among the three countries.


Author(s):  
Tony Smith Jr.

The liberal internationalist tradition is credited with America's greatest triumphs as a world power—and also its biggest failures. Beginning in the 1940s, imbued with the spirit of Woodrow Wilson's efforts at the League of Nations to ‘make the world safe for democracy,’ the United States steered a course in world affairs that would eventually win the Cold War. Yet in the 1990s, Wilsonianism turned imperialist, contributing directly to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the continued failures of American foreign policy. This book explains how the liberal internationalist community can regain a sense of identity and purpose following the betrayal of Wilson's vision by the brash ‘neo-Wilsonianism’ being pursued today. The book traces how Wilson's thinking about America's role in the world evolved in the years leading up to and during his presidency, and how the Wilsonian tradition went on to influence American foreign policy in the decades that followed. It traces the tradition's evolution from its ‘classic’ era with Wilson, to its ‘hegemonic’ stage during the Cold War, to its ‘imperialist’ phase today. The book calls for an end to reckless forms of U.S. foreign intervention, and a return to the prudence and ‘eternal vigilance’ of Wilson's own time. It renews hope that the United States might again become effectively liberal by returning to the sense of realism that Wilson espoused, one where the promotion of democracy around the world is balanced by the understanding that such efforts are not likely to come quickly and without costs.


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