Under Water, Actual Water

2021 ◽  
pp. 235-251
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Garodnick

This chapter talks about Hurricane Sandy, which charged toward the East Coast in the final days of October 2012. It emphasizes how residents of Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town were encouraged to shelter in place as the area was not officially in an evacuation zone, despite being only one hundred yards from the East River. It also recounts how Hurrican Sandy caused to shut off power and water to Stuy Town and Peter Cooper and about a quarter of New York City's homes and businesses. The chapter describes the traffic into Manhattan after the hurricane cane, which was so severe that the mayor announced restrictions on single-occupancy cars entering Manhattan. It highlights the severe damages residents saw as they slowly returned to the affected buildings, such as destroyed basements and unsightly recycling bins now located right in front of their front doors.

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Callaghan

Severe weather systems can generate large waves and storm surges which can cause many fatalities in coastal areas. In extreme circumstances a single cyclone caused up to 500,000 fatalities in the Bay of Bengal in 1970. Adaption by authorities in that region from evacuations and construction of storm shelters have significantly reduced the number of such fatalities there. The effects of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 in New York City and surrounding areas is examined to show how ocean effects can cause many casualties. Scrutiny of a European storm shows how a slight error in analysis can fail to detect a deadly increase in intensity which caused many fatalities. World record wave height events are examined, and the historical Australian east coast events are investigated. The impacts from long period waves emanating from distant storms are shown to be a forecasting problem.


Data Series ◽  
10.3133/ds888 ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Wayne Wright ◽  
Christine J. Kranenburg ◽  
Emily S. Klipp ◽  
Rodolfo J. Troche ◽  
Xan Fredericks ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin H. Strauss ◽  
Philip M. Orton ◽  
Klaus Bittermann ◽  
Maya K. Buchanan ◽  
Daniel M. Gilford ◽  
...  

AbstractIn 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the East Coast of the United States, creating widespread coastal flooding and over $60 billion in reported economic damage. The potential influence of climate change on the storm itself has been debated, but sea level rise driven by anthropogenic climate change more clearly contributed to damages. To quantify this effect, here we simulate water levels and damage both as they occurred and as they would have occurred across a range of lower sea levels corresponding to different estimates of attributable sea level rise. We find that approximately $8.1B ($4.7B–$14.0B, 5th–95th percentiles) of Sandy’s damages are attributable to climate-mediated anthropogenic sea level rise, as is extension of the flood area to affect 71 (40–131) thousand additional people. The same general approach demonstrated here may be applied to impact assessments for other past and future coastal storms.


Eos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 94 (37) ◽  
pp. 323-323
Author(s):  
Ernie Balcerak
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAURA VALENTINI

In late 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the East Coast of the U.S., causing much suffering and devastation. Those who could have easily helped Sandy's victims had a duty to do so. But was this a rightfully enforceable duty of justice, or a nonenforceable duty of beneficence? The answer to this question is often thought to depend on the kind of help offered: the provision of immediate bodily services is not enforceable; the transfer of material resources is. I argue that this double standard is unjustified, and defend a version of what I call “social samaritanism.” On this view, within political communities, the duty to help the needy—whether via bodily services or resource transfers—is always an enforceable demand of justice, except when the needy are reckless; across independent political communities, it is always a matter of beneficence. I defend this alternative double standard, and consider its implications for the case of Sandy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 139-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Solecki ◽  
Robin Leichenko ◽  
David Eisenhauer

AbstractIt is five years since Hurricane Sandy heavily damaged the New York- New Jersey Metropolitan region, and the fuller character of the long-term response can be better understood. The long-term response to Hurricane Sandy and the flooding risks it illustrated are set in myriad of individual and collective decisions taken during the time following the event. While the physical vulnerability of this region to storm surge flooding and climate change risks including sea level rise has been well-documented within the scholarly literature, Sandy’s impact placed decision-makingpost extreme events into the forefront of public and private discussions about the appropriate response. Some of the most fundamental choices were made by individual homeowners who houses were damaged and in some cases made uninhabitable following the storm. These individuals were forced to make decisions regarding where they would live and whether Sandy’s impact would result in their moving. In the disaster recovery and rebuilding context, these early household struggles about whether to leave or stay are often lost in the wider and longer narrative of recovery. To examine this early phase, this paper presents results of a research study that documented the ephemeral evidence of the initial phase of recovery in coastal communities that were heavily impacted by Hurricane Sandy’s storm surge and flooding. Hurricane Sandy and the immediate response to the storm created conditions for a potential large-scale transformation with respect to settlement of the coastal zone. In the paper, we examine and analyze survey and interview results of sixty-one residents and two dozen local stakeholders and practitioners to understand the stresses and transitions experienced by flooded households and the implications for the longer term resiliency of the communities in which they are located.


Data Series ◽  
10.3133/ds905 ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Fischer ◽  
Patrick J. Phillips ◽  
Timothy J. Reilly ◽  
Michael J. Focazio ◽  
Keith A. Loftin ◽  
...  

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1431-1434
Author(s):  
Dennis E. Connelly ◽  
Dennis J. McCarthy ◽  
John E. Westerlind

ABSTRACT This paper explores the challenges involved with the recovery of oil from a discharge canal with limited access and high relative currents. In March 1999, a sheen was observed in the cooling water discharge canal of Consolidated Edison's 2.5-million kilowatt generating station in Queens (New York City), New York At the time the sheen was discovered, the entire station had been shut down for several months for a maintenance outage. As the tide rose and fell in the East River, into which the discharge canal emptied, the oil sheen moved in and out of a 1,000-foot long tunnel connecting the generating station to the canal. The major challenges to the recovery and removal of the oil sheen were: (1) the low over head of the discharge tunnel and canal support girders, which prevented getting a skimmer into the tunnel and canal; (2) the high discharge rate of the station's cooling water pump; and (3) skimming the sheen in a 3-to 5-knot current. Consolidated Edison is a member of Clean Harbors Cooperative, L.L.C, which was brought in to remove the sheen. This was accomplished utilizing two JBF Scientific DIP Belt Skimmers, which were set up parallel to the current flow, and deflection booming.


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