Not the Wars You’re Looking For

2021 ◽  
pp. 29-80
Author(s):  
Jacqueline L. Hazelton

This chapter examines support for the compellence theory in three cases: the Malayan Emergency, the Greek Civil War, and the Philippines' campaign against the Huk insurgency. In the British campaign in Malaya, 1948–1957, the colonial government defeated a small, isolated Communist insurgency that failed to gain political traction even within the population of impoverished ethnic Chinese rubber plantation workers that it targeted as its often-unwilling base of support. In Greece in 1947–1949, the United States backed the repressive, fragile post-World War II Greek government and built its military capacity sufficiently to defeat the Communist and nationalist insurgents. In the Philippines in 1946–1954, the United States backed the Philippine government as a bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia, pressing for major governance reforms while building Philippine security forces. In all three cases, elite accommodation played a significant role in the counterinsurgent's ability to defeat the insurgency militarily, with the type of elite involved varying by case; uses of force included forcefully controlling civilians; and uses of force broke the insurgency before reforms were implemented, if they were implemented at all, as the compellence theory predicts.

Jazz in China ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 67-78
Author(s):  
Eugene Marlow

During World War II, the Japanese constructed prisoner of war camps in fifteen countries, including China. These camps numbered approximately 240. The Japanese—whose attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 brought the United States into World War II— saw their global role as manifest destiny, particularly with respect to China. Militarist Japan's attempt to conquer China began by seizing Manchuria in 1931 and became a full-fledged invasion from 1937 [when they attacked Shanghai] to 1945. This chapters shows that American jazz musicians—all of whom were playing in Shanghai—were not immune to the Japanese invasion and occupation. Some landed in internment camps in China and the Philippines.


Author(s):  
Patricio N. Abinales

An enduring resilience characterizes Philippine–American relationship for several reasons. For one, there is an unusual colonial relationship wherein the United States took control of the Philippines from the Spanish and then shared power with an emergent Filipino elite, introduced suffrage, implemented public education, and promised eventual national independence. A shared experience fighting the Japanese in World War II and defeating a postwar communist rebellion further cemented the “special relationship” between the two countries. The United States took advantage of this partnership to compel the Philippines to sign an economic and military treaty that favored American businesses and the military, respectively. Filipino leaders not only accepted the realities of this strategic game and exploited every opening to assert national interests but also benefitted from American largesse. Under the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos, this mutual cadging was at its most brazen. As a result, the military alliance suffered when the Philippines terminated the agreement, and the United States considerably reduced its support to the country. But the estrangement did not last long, and both countries rekindled the “special relationship” in response to the U.S. “Global War on Terror” and, of late, Chinese military aggression in the West Philippine Sea.


Significance US policymakers feel there is sufficient support for the United States elsewhere in the Philippine government and population to erode Duterte's threats to unravel the alliance. Nonetheless, Washington is considering alternative South-east Asian partners. Impacts Japan's role as an interlocutor between Manila and Washington on security issues could grow. Duterte might meet outgoing President Barack Obama in Peru at the November 19-20 APEC meeting. However, should this occur, it is unlikely to improve Philippine-US ties much if at all. Rumours of human rights abuses in the Philippines will anger US members of Congress, further deteriorating ties.


1961 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicente R. Pilapil

At the closing years of the nineteenth century the Philippine Islands became a territorial part of the United States. For this “imperialist” domination of another people, the latter government, being based on the principle of popular sovereignty, had to find a justification. It found reason in the contention that it was helping the Filipino people achieve their independence from the despotism of Spanish rule; after that, the United States Government felt obliged to provide a stable government in the islands in place of the former colonial government. For the benefit of the American people, most of whom had only then heard of the Philippines, scores of articles were written on this Far Eastern country. In line with the government's position—that of posing as the “ savior ” of an oppressed people—and influenced by the revolutionary propaganda which had characterized the period of struggle for independence, these writers tended to paint a more or less dark picture of the Philippine Archipelago as it stood in the last century of Spanish colonization. What really was the state of the Philippines in the nineteenth century has remained a question of great interest and undiminished historical importance. Another Philippine affair was met with equal interest in this country: the friar-problem.


2020 ◽  
pp. 19-61
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This chapter traces the history of American presence in Southeast Asia. The American legacy in the region began with traders and missionaries during the first half of the nineteenth century, then progressed to diplomats and official relations during the second half, and then to the arrival of American armed forces at the turn of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, America’s commercial interests and footprint continually broadened and deepened; educational and religious ties also blossomed. Except in the Philippines, America was largely seen as a benevolent partner—but not yet a power. That would change in the wake of World War II and the Cold War. With the advent of communist regimes in China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and the ensuing Korean War, Southeast Asia took on a completely different cast in Washington. It became one of two major global theaters of conflict against communism. Thus began America’s long and draining involvement in Vietnam and Indochina (1958–1975). But with the end of the long and exhausting Indochina conflict, which tore the United States itself apart, American attention naturally began to wane and dissipate. Yet, the United States continued to engage and build its relations with the region from the Carter through the Bush 43 administrations.


1968 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240
Author(s):  
Grant K. Goodman

During the 1930's the pace of contact between the Philippines and Japan quickened noticeably. This was, of course, the result of the concurrence of the promise of the United States to grant independence to the Philippines, embodied firmly in the Tydings- McDuffie Act of 1934, and of the intensified interest in Southeast Asia at all levels in Japan. One manifestation of this phenomenon was the development of mutual Philippine-Japanese undertakings in what might broadly be called the cultural realm. I have already described elsewhere the establishment and operation of such organizations at the Philippine Society of Japan1 and of Philippine-Japanese student exchanges. However, in the paragraphs which follow I will turn my attention to the inception and subsequent scope of the exchange of university professors between Japan and the Philippines. In so doing, I hope to suggest that these exchanges, though limited in nature, were meaningful cultural interchanges for both countries and that their termination was precipitated not by any lack of enthusiasm on the part of either Japan or the Philippines but rather by the impasse in American-Japanese relations which immediately preceded the outbreak of World War II.


Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter focuses on the Korean War, which constituted the first instance of multilateral military coalition building in the post-World War II era. The U.S. government served as the pivotal state in this coalition-building effort. The chapter then looks at the deployment decisions of the three largest troop-contributing countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, and Turkey; the Philippines, a deeply embedded state with the United States in 1950; and South Africa, a weakly embedded state with the United States in 1950. The deployment decisions of the U.K. and Canada were the result of intense U.S. prodding involving a mixture of personal appeals, incentives, and threats. In this process, the U.S. government instrumentalized diplomatic networks to the greatest extent possible. Meanwhile, the Philippines was lured into the coalition via U.S. diplomatic embeddedness. Finally, in the case of South Africa, diplomatic embeddedness played no direct role. Rather, South Africa perceived the Korean War as an opportunity to gain from the U.S. long-desired military equipment, in particular military aircraft.


Author(s):  
Ellen D. Wu

This chapter talks about how the ethnic Chinese throughout the United States greeted the news of the People's Republic of China's entry into the Korean War with immense trepidation. Almost overnight, the prevailing images of Chinese in the American public eye had metamorphosed from friendly Pacific allies to formidable, threatening foes. Chinatown's Korean War Red Scare dramatized the ways in which the Cold War structured the reconfiguration of Chinese American citizenship in the post-Exclusion era. The ascendance of anti-Communism as the defining paradigm of US foreign policy after World War II introduced new imperatives to clarify Chinese America's social and political standing. To address these issues, both parties looked to the identification of Chinese in the United States as Overseas Chinese—that is, members of a global Chinese diaspora with ties to each other and China.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 811-815
Author(s):  
MOLLY GEIDEL

Daniel Immerwahr's How to Hide an Empire, recently published to much fanfare, takes as its starting point what Immerwahr calls a “conceptual filing error.” Born from his surprise at visiting the Philippines and encountering streets “named after US colleges” and university students speaking “virtually unaccented English,” the book contends that while most people have heard of the “big wars” the United States has waged, “the actual territory” of US empire “often slips from view.” In response to this alleged invisibility, Immerwahr has produced a new popular history of US empire, one focussed on officially annexed US colonies and military bases, as well as the states that lie beyond the “logo map” whose outlines are the continental United States (14–15). The book's first section quickly sketches the story of US westward expansion, mostly through the story of Daniel Boone, then moves on to more satisfying chapters detailing the annexation of the uninhabited Guano Islands, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, as well as the resistance to annexation in the latter two cases; the section ends by recounting World War II battles over Pacific islands. The second half of the book examines the postwar period, contending that the United States “gave up territory” in this period because it “honed an extraordinary suite of technologies,” from screw threads to synthetic rubber, that allowed it to construct a “pointillist empire” of communication and infrastructural networks (17).


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