Material Phenomenology to the Test of Deconstruction: Michel Henry and Derrida

When we go back-by means of the epoché of the world, following Michel Henry-towards the originary “how” of all manifestation (videor), we stumble once and again upon the phenomenological situation of the body. The body is, then that originary hinge by means of which I manifest world in a continuous resistance. It will be, as well, within my own body where I am always aware of oneself, according to my own affection (self-affection, not previously constituted). Thus, the material condition of the body will be that of my internal body, or subjective body-as Henry initially read in Maine de Biran-or that of my flesh, as Henry himself would later say. Bearing all this in mind, the intermediate situation of one’s own affection, of this body of mine, with regard to the world and the videor, turns out to be an appropriate medium to attempt a preliminary study of the problematic situation of the internal time of affection. For this purpose, we shall revise the analysis offered by Michel Henry in Material Phenomenology and in Incarnation, indicating possible aporias, as well as alternatives to these last ones.Cuando, siguiendo a Michel Henry, retrocedemos en una epoché hacia el “cómo” originario de toda manifestación (videor), tropezamos una y otra vez con la situación fenomenológica del cuerpo. El cuerpo es, pues, esta bisagra originaria a través de la cual yo manifiesto el mundo en continua resistencia. También será dentro del propio cuerpo donde uno será siempre autoconsciente, de acuerdo con la propia afección (autoafección, no constituida previamente). Por eso, la condición material del cuerpo será la de mi cuerpo interior o cuerpo subjetivo, de acuerdo con la lectura inicial que Henry hace de Maine de Biran; o de mi carne, como dirá el mismo Henry más tarde. Teniendo en cuenta todo ello, la situación intermedia, situación de la afección propia y la de mi cuerpo en relación con el mundo y el videor, resulta ser un medio apropiado para emprender un estudio preliminar de la problemática situación del tiempo interno de la afección. Para ello, revisaremos el análisis que Michel Henry ofrece en Material Phenomenology y en Incarnation, indicando las posibles aporías, así como posibles alternativas.

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We-Synthesis

Research in Phenomenology ◽

10.1163/15691640-12341418 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 49 (2) ◽

pp. 183-206

Author(s):

Joseph Rivera

Keyword(s):

Edmund Husserl ◽

Transcendental Subjectivity ◽

Second Person ◽

Person Perspective ◽

Radical Critique ◽

Michel Henry ◽

Meaningful Engagement ◽

Second Person Perspective ◽

Phenomenological Conception ◽

Material Phenomenology

Abstract The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) To show the basic contours of transcendental subjectivity in the later work of Edmund Husserl, especially the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis, and in the strictly phenomenological work of Michel Henry, especially Material Phenomenology; (2) to highlight Henry’s radical critique of Husserlian intersubjectivity and show that such critique, while valuable in its intention, is ultimately misguided because it neglects the important contribution Husserl’s complicated vocabulary of lifeworld makes to the study of intersubjectivity; and (3) to point toward a phenomenological conception of intersubjective practice we may call the realm of we-synthesis that prioritizes the first-person perspective rooted in empathy, which enables meaningful engagement with the second-person perspective. Working in conjunction with Husserl and Henry on the phenomenological conception of shared life enables the recuperation of the fragile line between subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

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JUSLIŠKUMO SAMPRATOS TRANSFORMACIJOS ŠIUOLAIKINĖJE FENOMENOLOGIJOJE

Problemos ◽

10.15388/problemos.2012.0.724 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 82 ◽

pp. 18-26 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Dalius Jonkus

Keyword(s):

Descriptive Analysis ◽

Phenomenological Description ◽

The Other ◽

Direct Experience ◽

Michel Henry ◽

New Form ◽

Aron Gurwitsch ◽

Hyletic Data ◽

Striking Contrast ◽

Material Phenomenology

Klausimas apie transcendenciją šiuolaikinės fenomenologijos diskusijose susiejamas su klausimu apie jusliškumą. Jutimai tradiciškai suvokiami kaip išorybės ir vidujybės tarpininkai. Nagrinėdamas objekto duotį patirtyje Edmundas Husserlis įsteigia materijos ir formos perskyrą. Grynieji įspūdžiai pateikiami kaip tokia pirminė patyrimo medžiaga, kuri tampa prasminga tiktai per intencionalų formavimą. Michelis Henry supriešina materialią ir intencionalią fenomenologiją. Jis siekia parodyti, jog be grynųjų įspūdžių analizės nebūtų galima ir intencionali fenomenologija. Henry mano, kad Husserlis aiškiai neatsako į klausimą apie juslinės materijos ir intencionalios formos santykį. Be to, jis teigia, jog Husserlis šį santykį interpretuoja pripažindamas intencionalios formos pirmenybę. Taigi Henry siekia reabilituoti materialinę fenomenologiją, nes būtent joje t. y. juslinėje materijoje, kaip tik ir glūdi, jo manymu, bet kokios pirminės duoties paslaptis. Šis posūkis į materialiąją fenomenologiją reabilituoja „gyvenimo imanencijos“ filosofiją. Tačiau Wilhelmo Schapo, Martino Heideggerio ir Maurice’o Merleau-Ponty pateikti fenomenologiniai aprašymai parodo, kad jusliškumas yra ne imanencijos ir transcendencijos tarpininkas, bet tokia transcendentali empirijos plotmė, kurią įmanoma aprašyti tik atmetant grynųjų įspūdžių sampratą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: hiletiniai duomenys, intencionali forma, jusliškumas, fenomenologija.Transformation of the Notion of Sensibility in Contemporary PhenomenologyDalius JonkusSummaryThe question about transcendence in the contemporary phenomenology is related to the conception of sensibility. Michel Henry and Emanuel Levinas from one side and Aron Gurwitsch and Maurice Merleau-Ponty from the other side have totaly different understandings of sensibility. Analysing sensibility, Husserl elaborates a distinction between hyletic data and animating noesis. He claims that, from one side, hyle itself means nothing without intentional morfe, and, from the other side, the intuitive presentation of an object arises only on the basis of experienced complex of sensations. Michel Henry finds striking contrast between material and intentional phenomenology. He states that without pure impressions intentional phenomenology is impossible. According to him, Husserl gives preference to the intentional morfe and leaves behind the pure impression of sensuous hyletic data. Michel Henry’s task is to rehabilitate material phenomenology, he stresses that sensuous data keeps the secret of primal experience. This turn to material phenomenology rehabilitates „immanence of life“ and creates new form of empiricism. Aron Gurwitsch criticizes construction of hyle-morfe distinction. He claims that descriptive analysis of direct experience fails to ascertain such an intermediary stratum. Also phenomenological description demonstrates that sensibility is not a mediator between immanence and transcendence, but the domain of interaction between senses which create consciousness of meaning. My purpose is to show that this refutation of the hyle in general has important consequences. Phenomenology gives not only a redefinition of the concepts of noesis and intentionality, but also reforms the concept of time.Keywords: hyletic data, intentional morfe, sensibility, phenomenology.

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Provocations and Improvisations Concerning Reality: The Encounters of Jacques Derrida and Jean Luc-Nancy

Derrida Today ◽

10.3366/drt.2014.0078 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 79-101

Author(s):

Joanna Hodge

Keyword(s):

Jacques Derrida ◽

The Real ◽

Michel Henry

This essay responds to the Nancean account of presentation, evoked in the opening citation, in order to trace out in Nancy's enquiries a disruption of Husserlian presentation, and a re-thinking of materiality on the edge of classical phenomenology. It stages a non-encounter between the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy and of Jacques Derrida in relation to a third term, the Lacanian conception of the ‘real’. Thereby it can be shown how these writings touch on each other, in response to phenomenology and to psychoanalytical theory, but do not engage. All the same, the claim to be made is that the writings of Nancy and Derrida converge in forming a third option, alongside the secularised phenomenologies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and the Christian phenomenologies of Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry, by marking up the event of Lacan's reformulation of Freud's psychoanalytical theorising.

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pathos of the invisible life －Kandinsky on Michel Henry－

CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas ◽

10.15750/chss..28.200805.011 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol null (28) ◽

pp. 347-377

Author(s):

김재희

Keyword(s):

Michel Henry ◽

The Invisible

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,Vitalismus‘ und reine Potenzialität bei Michel Henry

Phänomenologische Forschungen ◽

10.28937/1000108305 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2019 (1) ◽

pp. 53-70

Author(s):

Rolf Kühn

Keyword(s):

Michel Henry ◽

Life Itself ◽

Recent Interpretation

The recent interpretation of Michel Henry’s thought as a ‘phenomenological vitalism’ raises fundamental questions regarding the reception of his phenomenology. The issue raised, however, is not primarily about radical phenomenology being inspired (or not) by more or less vitalistic philosophies like those of Maine de Biran, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and even Freud, rather it concerns the ‘how’ of purely immanent appearing in affect and force understood as immediate corporeality. Does the latter, being original affectivity, require temporality in order to free the affect from its passivity (Passibilit%t) and, thus, in order to enable action? This, however, would lead to an impossible intentional gap or difference within the original phenomenality of life itself. As an alternative, flesh can be seen as a potentiality, inwhich the concrete transcendental possibility and the phenomenological power of appearing as ‘I can’ are already united prior to any formal exercise of freedom. Such inquiry into the reception of the phenomenology of life provides at the same time a framework for the contemporary phenomenological debate

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