scholarly journals COLONIAL PIPELINE ENOREE RIVER OIL SPILL: A CASE HISTORY1

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-168
Author(s):  
Arthur B. Smith
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Water System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Primary Water ◽  
History Of

ABSTRACT In December 1991, a pipeline ruptured near Fountain Inn, South Carolina, resulting in the release of approximately 13,000 barrels of No. 2 fuel oil to the inland surface water system. Over 18 miles of Durbin Creek and the Enoree River were seriously impacted by the spill, one of the largest inland oil discharges in the United States in 1991. As a result of the spill, primary water supply intakes for the towns of Clinton (population 8,500) and Whitmire (population 2,000) remained closed until the appropriate level of water quality for consumption could be restored. These towns are located about 30 miles and 50 miles respectively, from the site of the pipeline rupture. The Environmental Protection Agency Region IV on-scene coordinator and the U. S. Coast Guard Strike Team responded to the scene and directed the pipeline company's cleanup efforts over a five-day period, which resulted in recovery of more than 95 percent of the spilled product. This paper presents a case history of the spill response, highlighting significant events, findings, and decisions which were instrumental in achieving a rapid and effective cleanup, and giving particular emphasis to the role of the regional response team (RRT), which was activated during this release. The response and lessons learned from this spill were evaluated, and the resulting recommendations are offered for consideration in handling future events of this magnitude.

Taking a Step Back. Exercises as Training Opportunities.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Opportunity To Learn ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Personnel Turnover ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Exercise

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.

Star Evviva Spill: Oiled Waterfowl But no Oil

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-195
Author(s):  
Francis J. Sturm ◽  
Charles Jennings
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Gulf Coast ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Response Effort ◽  
Heavy Fuel Oil ◽  
South Carolina Department ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT In January 1999, over 200 oiled waterfowl were recovered from the coastal beaches of South Carolina and North Carolina. A large, multiagency response effort was mounted to collect and rehabilitate these birds, and to identify the source of the damaging oil spill. This was the first time on record that the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) was used on the East Coast of the Unite States to clean wildlife in the absence of any known spill. A temporary rehabilitation center was established for the bird rescue and recovery operation under the direction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR), while the U.S. Coast Guard spearheaded efforts to determine the cause and source of the damaging spill. Representatives from a number of government agencies located up and down the eastern seaboard and Gulf Coast worked together to respond to this wildlife damage and identify the source of the spill: the Star Evviva, which discharged 24,700 gallons of heavy fuel oil approximately 30 miles off the coast of South Carolina. Responding agencies used a unified response and innovative techniques to deal with the unusual challenges presented by this event. This paper summarizes the “lessons learned” in that response effort and attempts to provide useful advice concerning wildlife contingency planning and oil spill investigation and identification.

scholarly journals RESPONSE TO THE ESSO BAYWAY OIL SPILL

1981 ◽  
Vol 1981 (1) ◽  
pp. 409-412
Author(s):  
Robert J. Meyers
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
State Agencies ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Public Reaction ◽  
Neches River

ABSTRACT The 50,000 dwt tanker Esso Bayway punctured a hole in its bottom on January 28, 1979, spilling 6,500 barrels (bbl) of Light Arabian crude oil into the Neches River near Port Arthur, Texas. Oil impacted 3 miles (mi) of the river, adjacent bayous, and an environmentally sensitive salt marsh. This paper describes the response to the spill by the Exxon Company, U.S.A., Marine Department. Several contractors using a variety of cleanup methods for collection and recovery of the oil were used during the 30-day operation. The preplanned implementation of an emergency response by an Exxon team of managers, supervisors, scientists, public affairs advisors, claims agents, accountants, and communications experts to coordinate the cleanup operation is discussed. In addition to the Exxon response team, scientists from academia were retained to provide guidance in the assessment of any potential environmental impacts. The United States Coast Guard (USCG), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), acting as the Scientific Support Coordinator, and state agencies also participated in the cleanup operation. Cleanup was completed in 4 weeks at a cost of $1.5 million with minimum private claims, insignificant environmental damage, and positive media coverage and public reaction. This paper describes the efforts that obtained these results.

scholarly journals ESA Section 7: Pre-spill Planning Updates and Emergency Consultations

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
LCDR John LaMorte
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
National Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Hazardous Substance ◽  
Response Team ◽  
National Marine Fisheries Service

ABSTRACT In 2001 the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (collectively referred to as Action Agencies) along with the Department of the Interior's (DOI) United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and the Department of Commerce (DOC) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively referred to as the Services) signed the 2001 Inter-agency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)1. The purpose of this 2001 MOA was to “identify and incorporate plans and procedures to protect listed species and designated critical habitat during spill planning and response activities” (USCG, EPA, USFWS, and NMFS, 2001). The procedures outlined in the 2001 MOA are based on the need to meet legal requirements set forth in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (Title 40 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 300 [40 CFR § 300]), the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 [16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.]. The 2001 MOA established procedures to improve the conservation of listed species and the oil spill planning and response procedures delineated in the NCP. Streamlining this process is required by section 7(a)(1) of the ESA. (USCG, 2018). The MOA also coordinates the consultation requirements specified in the ESA regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 402, with pollution response responsibilities outlined in the NCP. It addresses three areas of oil spill response: 1) pre-spill planning activities; 2) spill response event activities; and 3) post-spill activities. (USCG, 2018). Though this document outlined procedures for how the Action Agencies and the Services were to comply with ESA Section 7, there still existed ambiguities and lack of national level guidance on how agencies were to comply with ESA Section 7. More specifically, these concerns pertained to pre-spill, emergency, and post-response operations. To alleviate the demand in the field for further ESA Section 7 guidance the National Response Team (NRT)2 established the NEC Subcommittee which quickly began developing guidance for federal agencies in order to assist these agencies maintain environmental compliance for oil and hazardous substance incident response operations. This paper will provide an update from the 2017 IOSC ESA presentation, discuss what products the NEC is currently developing and how previous NEC products have since been implemented.

scholarly journals Assessing clarity of message communication for mandated USEPA drinking water quality reports

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Phetxumphou ◽  
Siddhartha Roy ◽  
Brenda M. Davy ◽  
Paul A. Estabrooks ◽  
Wen You ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Water Quality ◽  
Drinking Water ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Water System ◽  
System Size ◽  
The United States ◽  
National Sample ◽  
Evaluation Tool ◽  
Index Index ◽  
State Of The Science

The United States Environmental Protection Agency mandates that community water systems (CWSs), or drinking water utilities, provide annual consumer confidence reports (CCRs) reporting on water quality, compliance with regulations, source water, and consumer education. While certain report formats are prescribed, there are no criteria ensuring that consumers understand messages in these reports. To assess clarity of message, trained raters evaluated a national sample of 30 CCRs using the Centers for Disease Control Clear Communication Index (Index) indices: (1) Main Message/Call to Action; (2) Language; (3) Information Design; (4) State of the Science; (5) Behavioral Recommendations; (6) Numbers; and (7) Risk. Communication materials are considered qualifying if they achieve a 90% Index score. Overall mean score across CCRs was 50 ± 14% and none scored 90% or higher. CCRs did not differ significantly by water system size. State of the Science (3 ± 15%) and Behavioral Recommendations (77 ± 36%) indices were the lowest and highest, respectively. Only 63% of CCRs explicitly stated if the water was safe to drink according to federal and state standards and regulations. None of the CCRs had passing Index scores, signaling that CWSs are not effectively communicating with their consumers; thus, the Index can serve as an evaluation tool for CCR effectiveness and a guide to improve water quality communications.

scholarly journals An approach for developing a national estimate of waterborne disease due to drinking water and a national estimate model application

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (S2) ◽  
pp. 201-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Messner ◽  
Susan Shaw ◽  
Stig Regli ◽  
Ken Rotert ◽  
Valerie Blank ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Drinking Water ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Water System ◽  
Credible Interval ◽  
The United States ◽  
Water Systems ◽  
Epidemiologic Studies ◽  
Incidence Rates ◽  
Waterborne Disease ◽  
Public Water Systems

In this paper, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) presents an approach and a national estimate of drinking water related endemic acute gastrointestinal illness (AGI) that uses information from epidemiologic studies. There have been a limited number of epidemiologic studies that have measured waterborne disease occurrence in the United States. For this analysis, we assume that certain unknown incidence of AGI in each public drinking water system is due to drinking water and that a statistical distribution of the different incidence rates for the population served by each system can be estimated to inform a mean national estimate of AGI illness due to drinking water. Data from public water systems suggest that the incidence rate of AGI due to drinking water may vary by several orders of magnitude. In addition, data from epidemiologic studies show AGI incidence due to drinking water ranging from essentially none (or less than the study detection level) to a rate of 0.26 cases per person-year. Considering these two perspectives collectively, and associated uncertainties, EPA has developed an analytical approach and model for generating a national estimate of annual AGI illness due to drinking water. EPA developed a national estimate of waterborne disease to address, in part, the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments. The national estimate uses best available science, but also recognizes gaps in the data to support some of the model assumptions and uncertainties in the estimate. Based on the model presented, EPA estimates a mean incidence of AGI attributable to drinking water of 0.06 cases per year (with a 95% credible interval of 0.02–0.12). The mean estimate represents approximately 8.5% of cases of AGI illness due to all causes among the population served by community water systems. The estimated incidence translates to 16.4 million cases/year among the same population. The estimate illustrates the potential usefulness and challenges of the approach, and provides a focus for discussions of data needs and future study designs. Areas of major uncertainty that currently limit the usefulness of the approach are discussed in the context of the estimate analysis.

RESPONSE TO THE GROUNDING OF THE F/V El JYU MARU NO. 211

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 225-229
Author(s):  
Vance Bennett ◽  
Don Noviello
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Northern Region ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Nesting Sites ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Spill Site ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Republic Of Palau ◽  
Marine Safety

ABSTRACT On December 2, 1991, the Japanese fishing vessel Ei Jyu Maru No. 21 ran hard aground near a remote, sparsely populated island in the northern region of the Republic of Palau, a Trust Territory of the United States. The grounding caused fractures in the hull, through which bilge oil, diesel fuel, and lubricating oils leaked out. The spilled oil, and the fuel remaining in the vessel, threatened environmentally sensitive reefs and bird nesting sites on nearby islands. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Guam and the Coast Guard Pacific Strike Team sent personnel to Palau to mitigate the effects of this spill. The response team, after six weeks of effort under less than ideal conditions, removed the fuel remaining on the vessel and prevented any further pollution. The remote location of Palau, about 7,000 miles from the west coast of the United States, and the undeveloped character of this region of Palau made this response a complex, costly, and time-consuming endeavor. These factors contributed to the problems that hindered this response—for example, long distances between the spill site and support areas, lack of infrastructure at the spill site, unreliable communications systems, and misunderstandings over the role of the Coast Guard.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency/U.S. Coast Guard Peer Exchange Program1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 1137-1139
Author(s):  
Jeffrey C. Babb ◽  
Glenn Cekus
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Leadership Roles ◽  
Environmental Response ◽  
Protection Agency ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Response Team ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Nationwide, the U.S. Coast Guard (CG) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are both tasked with the implementation of several environmental and safety statutes (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabilities Act [CERCLA], Oil Pollution Act of 1990 [OPA 90], Clean Water Act [CWA], international Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships [MARPOL], etc.). They share important leadership roles on the National Response Team (NRT), Regional Response Team (RRT) and several other response planning bodies. Often EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) and CG OSC representatives work together in oil and chemical response operations and on various planning and exercise committees. However, the joint efforts of both organizations are often impacted by a mutual lack of understanding of each other's authorities, policies, procedures, internal structures, and leadership roles. Even the response zones for CG and EPA are often based on factors other than geography and often may not be well understood. USCG Marine Safety Office (MSO) Chicago and EPA Region V are bridging this gap in understanding by sponsoring a Peer Exchange Program. Representatives from each agency are spending up to a week with the other agency for hands-on training and education. The program was initiated in April 1996 and has produced excellent results. As a result, joint CGIEPA responses run more smoothly, mutual understanding and accessibility are enhanced, and overall public health and welfare and the environment are better protected.

Unannounced Drill Program: Testing Spill Management Team Capability through Vessel & Facility Oil Spill Contingency Plans

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017425
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Joe Stewart ◽  
Yvonne Addassi
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Initial Response ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Program Testing ◽  
Continued Education ◽  
Contingency Plans

California has approximately >10,000 vessels calling its ports each year, and 200–300 facilities state wide, many of which are required to have a California Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan) on file with Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR). Spill Management Teams (SMT), either staffed by Contingency Plan holders' employees or contracted out, and the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure must be described in these plans. OSPR introduced an unannounced SMT drill program (Program) in 2012 to ensure that Contingency Plan holders can successfully complete the proper initial notifications, activate their SMT, and use ICS in accordance with their approved Contingency Plan and California Code 820.01, Drills and Exercises. There are multiple goals of this Program, including the enhanced capability of SMTs, OSPR, and other partners. This Program provides continued education and training for Contingency Plan holders and SMTs in an effort to bolster the initial response phase of an actual incident. Through these drills, SMTs must demonstrate that they could make proper notifications and decisions during an actual incident and be staffed with trained personnel in ICS to fill positions before State and Federal representatives respond. Additionally, SMTs should deploy resources listed in their approved Contingency Plans and ensure those resources are up to date, available, and sufficient. Furthermore, drills provide an opportunity for OSPR and SMTs to build relationships through testing these procedures, which should make the initial response more efficient and effective. Lastly, the drills are often conducted with representatives from United States Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have their own drill programs. Working in conjunction with federal partners ensures continuity and fewer required drills of SMTs. Since the beginning of the Program, SMTs continue to improve their response capabilities, validated by more successfully completed unannounced drills. OSPR has conducted 30 unannounced drills, all of which were on SMTs for marine facilities and vessels. With the expanded authority of OSPR to regulate facilities statewide in 2015, this Program will continue to grow. Ultimately, a more comprehensive Program should lead to enhanced SMT capability statewide, and therefore better protection of the State's natural resources overall. The goal of this poster will be to describe: 1) the history and purpose of this Program; 2) the lessons learned and improvements of SMTs and Contingency Plans; and 3) the expansion of the Program from marine to statewide.

ESA Section 7: Time for a Refresh in the Pre-Spill Planning Consultation Process

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley
Keyword(s):  
Endangered Species ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Service Agency ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.

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