Taking a Step Back. Exercises as Training Opportunities.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Opportunity To Learn ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Personnel Turnover ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Exercise

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.

ICS CONTRIBUTES TO THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
The North ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.

The Oil Spill Response Fund – Four Decades of Success

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Trust Fund ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

Adaptation of the Incident Command System to Oil Spill Response During the American Trader Spill

1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-272
Author(s):  
Robert G. Rolan ◽  
Keith H. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management Plan ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Crisis Management Plan

ABSTRACT While developing its new crisis management plan in 1989, BP America (BPA) modified the incident command system (ICS) for use as the organizational structure of its oil spill response team. This was done to be compatible with the post-Exxon Valdez organization of the Alyeska response team and for certain advantages it would provide for responses in other locations and in other types of crisis situations. The ICS was originally developed for fighting wildfires in California and has since been widely adopted by other fire and emergency services in the U. S. While retaining most of the ICS structure, ?PA developed modifications necessary to fit the unique requirements of oil spill response. The modified ICS was used during a full scale test of ?PA's draft crisis management plan in December 1989, and thus was familiar to ?PA's top executives and other participating response team members. When the American Trader spill occurred in February 1990, BPA's management used the modified ICS organization even though the crisis management plan had not been finalized or widely distributed within the company. Details of the organizational structure evolved as the spill response progressed, in part due to the changing requirements of the response over time and in part because of previously unrecognized issues. This paper describes that evolution and the resulting final structure. Essential differences between the original ICS and BPA's oil spill version of it are highlighted. Despite the unrecognized issues and the unfamiliarity of some team members with the ICS, the organization worked well and can be credited with a share of the success of the American Trader response.

United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability history, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Delivery System ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal State ◽  
United States Coast Guard ◽  
Remote Areas ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
State And Local

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.

Unannounced Drill Program: Testing Spill Management Team Capability through Vessel & Facility Oil Spill Contingency Plans

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017425
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Joe Stewart ◽  
Yvonne Addassi
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Initial Response ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Program Testing ◽  
Continued Education ◽  
Contingency Plans

California has approximately >10,000 vessels calling its ports each year, and 200–300 facilities state wide, many of which are required to have a California Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan) on file with Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR). Spill Management Teams (SMT), either staffed by Contingency Plan holders' employees or contracted out, and the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure must be described in these plans. OSPR introduced an unannounced SMT drill program (Program) in 2012 to ensure that Contingency Plan holders can successfully complete the proper initial notifications, activate their SMT, and use ICS in accordance with their approved Contingency Plan and California Code 820.01, Drills and Exercises. There are multiple goals of this Program, including the enhanced capability of SMTs, OSPR, and other partners. This Program provides continued education and training for Contingency Plan holders and SMTs in an effort to bolster the initial response phase of an actual incident. Through these drills, SMTs must demonstrate that they could make proper notifications and decisions during an actual incident and be staffed with trained personnel in ICS to fill positions before State and Federal representatives respond. Additionally, SMTs should deploy resources listed in their approved Contingency Plans and ensure those resources are up to date, available, and sufficient. Furthermore, drills provide an opportunity for OSPR and SMTs to build relationships through testing these procedures, which should make the initial response more efficient and effective. Lastly, the drills are often conducted with representatives from United States Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have their own drill programs. Working in conjunction with federal partners ensures continuity and fewer required drills of SMTs. Since the beginning of the Program, SMTs continue to improve their response capabilities, validated by more successfully completed unannounced drills. OSPR has conducted 30 unannounced drills, all of which were on SMTs for marine facilities and vessels. With the expanded authority of OSPR to regulate facilities statewide in 2015, this Program will continue to grow. Ultimately, a more comprehensive Program should lead to enhanced SMT capability statewide, and therefore better protection of the State's natural resources overall. The goal of this poster will be to describe: 1) the history and purpose of this Program; 2) the lessons learned and improvements of SMTs and Contingency Plans; and 3) the expansion of the Program from marine to statewide.

ESA Section 7: Time for a Refresh in the Pre-Spill Planning Consultation Process

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley
Keyword(s):  
Endangered Species ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Service Agency ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.

Crisis Response and Management Following Hurricane Sandy

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 299895
Author(s):  
Annjea M. Cormier
Keyword(s):  
Local Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
Crisis Response ◽  
Hurricane Sandy ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Pollution Mitigation ◽  
National Response ◽  
The Right

The United States Coast Guard responded to the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey under the National Response Framework's Emergency Support Function 10 Oil and Hazardous Material Response. Based on countless lessons learned; decisive response leadership is required in the initial response to build operational momentum, and establish interagency coordination. The Hurricane Sandy Pollution Response is a stellar example of how the initial actions shaped the direction and effectiveness of the rest of the response. This poster will emphasize how the leadership asked the right questions, referred to the right plans, set the right priorities and included the right partners. Additionally, it will identify the protocols that were established to execute Pollution Mitigation. The regional and area contingency plans provided supporting mechanisms and structure for multi-agency cooperation. Due to the extent of the wide spread damage pollution reporting to the National Response Center was disrupted and remained ineffective at a local level until the impacted shoreline communities were reconstituted. The Unified Command conducted wide-area assessments by aerial observers, boat operations and field personnel to quantify and assess the pollution threats from thousands of sources. The Operations Section of the Incident Command utilized Emergency Response Management System Application (ERMA) to develop the common operating picture and prioritize threats based on environmentally sensitive areas. During Hurricane Sandy, critical decision making allowed the response organization to oversee 1,500 contracted personnel, over 1,245 miles of shoreline, and mitigated 439 potential/active pollution threats. The poster will include the Response Time-line, Response Doctrine, ICS Implementation, Key Decisions, Pollution Mitigation protocols and National Strike Force Boat Operations.

ON COURSE: THE CALIFORNIA UNIFIED OIL SPILL CONTROL TRAINING PARTNERSHIP

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-515
Author(s):  
John H. Giesen ◽  
Jon D. MacArthur
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Approach ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Response Training ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
Spill Control

ABSTRACT Faced with training and travel dollar constraints, California's Department of Fish and Game and the 11th U.S. Coast Guard District worked to form a multiorganizational partnership designed to leverage required resources to conduct a premier operational-level oil spill response training program in the state. The partnership included no less than six major organizations from both the public and private sectors, each playing critical roles in planning and conducting the training. Major hurdles overcome were curriculum development and operational support. Both of these challenges were resolved through a unified management approach in which the ultimate objective became success of the course. The lessons learned from the program provide guidance and rationale for future such efforts.

Incorporating Well Control Support Functions into a Broader Oil Spill Response Organization

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2098-2111
Author(s):  
Kelly Lynn Schnapp ◽  
Joseph Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Bryan Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Outer Continental Shelf ◽  
Support Functions ◽  
Well Drilling ◽  
Well Control ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
And Control

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to better prepare the oil spill response community for incorporating well control into a response organization, based on conditional considerations rather than long and firmly held assumptions. Techniques used to control a well, after a blowout, are more closely related to technical well drilling and control activities rather than to operations intended to address oil in the environment. When oil is released from a well in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), response organizers need to consider various factors influencing the organization that may exist at the time. These include a working knowledge of well control by response leadership; strength of responder relationships; and response complexity (to include authority, stakeholder and public expectations). This is particularly true when incorporating the well control support function in the oil spill response operational planning processes, usually facilitated by the Incident Command System (ICS). Within the last three years, complex well control operations were uniquely incorporated into response organizations during two Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs) and during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident. Three options will be presented. Considerations for incorporating well control into a response organization will be presented using the case studies noted previously and by comparing similar lessons learned from the salvage industry in the late 1990's. Options presented help demonstrate that response organization flexibility is key to a successful response. This paper seeks to illuminate options surrounding placement of well control within an incident command structure based upon unique incident situational realities.

scholarly journals Current and Proposed Efforts to Resolve HSPD-5 and NCP Authorities (NIC and PFO)

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
LCDR John LaMorte ◽  
LT Rebecca Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Gulf Of Mexico ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
National Guard ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Oil Well ◽  
Environmental Disasters ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Oil Rig ◽  
Exercise And Training

ABSTRACT During the evening of 20 April, 2010 U.S. Coast Guard District Eight Command Center watch standers received a report of an explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon (DWH), an oil rig working on the Macondo oil well approximately 42 miles Southeast of Venice, LA (OSC Report, 2011). The explosion on board the DWH and resulting fires eventually destroyed the oil rig and caused it to sink into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven crewmembers lost their lives in the tragic events that unfolded that night, and one of the nation's largest environmental disasters would soon follow. Estimates of the oil discharged from the Macondo oil well were between 12,000 and 25,000 barrels per day, and the response involved approximately 47,000 oil spill response personnel, 6,870 vessels, approximately 4.12 million feet of boom, and 17,500 National Guard personnel, five states (OSC Report, 2011). The massive oil spill lasted 87 days and estimates suggest that more than 200 million gallons of oil was discharged into the Gulf of Mexico, which stands as the largest oil spill event in U.S. history. From these massive response operations came important lessons learned for SONS event planning, preparedness, and response, as it became apparent during DWH response operations that oil spill response governance and doctrine was not well understood across the whole-of-government. This issue was well documented in the National Incident Commander's report and several recommendations were identified to address this issue. This paper will explore the steps taken within the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) SONS Exercise and Training Program to promote a better understanding of oil spill response governance and doctrine among Cabinet-level senior leadership and the interagency representatives that will ultimately be involved when the next SONS event happens.

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