Insights from Meta-Analysis of Recent Exercises

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1388-1399
Author(s):  
Wade A. Narin van Court ◽  
Mark B. Robinson

ABSTRACT Oil terminals maintain and assess their oil spill response readiness by conducting drills and exercises in general accordance with the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) guidelines; however, they often do not realize the full benefits of the time and effort they invest in their exercise programs. Specifically, the way many terminals conduct and evaluate their drill and exercise programs does not provide an in-depth understanding of the capabilities and competencies of their personnel and their response contractors. URS Corporation (URS) recently performed a meta-analysis of tabletop exercises (TTX), equipment deployment exercises (EDX), and unannounced spill equipment deployment drills (UDD) that we facilitated at terminals around the United States. The meta-analysis was performed as a combined review of the after action reports from the various exercises to identify common lessons learned and areas for improvement. Specifically, the objective of the meta-analysis was to develop recommendations, based on an in-depth understanding of the identified common lessons learned and insights from our exercise facilitators, to enhance or improve terminals' oil spill response performance when implemented in the design of future drills and exercises. Based on our study, URS identified and developed recommendations to address the following areas for improvement: training/exercises did not build on previous efforts; TTX were “walk through” or discussion type of exercises and not conducted in “real time”; UDD were conducted in similar ways each time and did not “stress the system”; exercises and drills did not involve upper level (e.g., regional or corporate) personnel who may have significant roles in the response; terminal personnel did not have relationships with staff of industries, contractors, and/or agencies in their area; terminal personnel were not familiar with the Geographic Response Plans or Area Contingency Plans for their area; and exercise programs and post-exercise reviews and critiques did not effectively assess all 15 response plan components. By implementing the recommendations from our meta-analysis, terminals can expect to obtain significantly greater benefits in terms of competence and confidence to respond to oil spills for a modest investment in additional time, cost, and effort.

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 745-761
Author(s):  
Geeva Varghese ◽  
Thomas Coolbaugh

ABSTRACT A robust preparedness framework is essential to maximize response effectiveness and safeguard success. Exercises are an integral part of oil spill preparedness and emergency management. Exercises enhance the capability of an organization to respond by validating plans and procedures and seeking affirmations on assumptions and stakeholder expectations. Since planning and preparing for exercises can be costly and time consuming, it is important that lessons learned are accurately captured, widely communicated and implemented in a timely manner so that they can lead to measurable improvements in the way we prepare and respond to incidents. On average, international Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSRO) may be involved in thirty to forty oil spill response exercises in a given year, ranging from small scale exercises testing communication between various stakeholders to highly complex, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional scenarios. Participation in multiple exercises in various capacities ranging from planning, designing and facilitation to participation, performance and capability assurance as an Oil Spill Response Organization, presents varied opportunities to view and analyze exercises from both ends of the spectrum, as a planner as well as a participant. A meta-analysis of these exercises offers a unique opportunity to systematically identify recurring areas for improvement and to examine new avenues to explore and test capabilities with operators who have established robust exercise programs. A key outcome of this would be to translate learnings into important enhancements for industry’s collective response and preparedness capability. This paper presents a meta-analysis view of recent OSRO-industry exercises with a focus on a comparative assessment of specific After Action Reviews (AAR). The purpose is to identify common themes in terms of lessons learned and areas for improvement, especially when designing and planning future exercises. It also considers whether exercises have evolved to incorporate changing response capabilities and realistically testing any increased information requirements of the stakeholder community. Finally, it will also examine how successfully companies have sought out emerging technologies that will positively impact preparedness, response and recovery. It is anticipated that the recommendations put forward from this meta-analysis will assist operators in realizing the full benefits of the time and effort invested in exercise programs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1219-1223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Cantin ◽  
Roger Laferriere ◽  
Larry Hewett ◽  
Charlie Henry

ABSTRACT Every nation faces the possibility of a major natural disaster and few plans are in place to deal with the massive consequences that follow. When Hurricane Katrina reached landfall, the human toll and extent of damage made it the worst natural disaster in American history. The news headlines were filled with the images of desperation and the efforts of the thousands of heroes across the spectrum of government who worked tirelessly to help the citizens of the Gulf Coast of the United States recover. Less visible to the American public was the vast environmental impact caused by millions of gallons of oil released by hundreds of individual oil spills. The total oil volume lost to the environment is estimated at over 8.2 million gallons, making it the second largest oil spill in United States history. Moreover, this spill was the first major environmental disaster managed under the newly published National Response Plan, a plan developed following the tragic events of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This paper will describe how response managers overcame the incredible challenges of managing multiple oil spills in an enormous area devoid of the support infrastructure, human resources and the logistics network normally present in major spills within the United States. The authors will offer a first hand account of the strategies employed by the response management system assembled to combat the spills. They will describe key lessons learned in overcoming competition for critical resources; the importance of combining scientific, legal and other support in determining response options such as burning and debris removal; and the methodology employed in creating a Unified Area Command that included multiple responsible parties. Finally, this paper will provide insights to processes within the Joint Field Office, an element of the National Response Plan, and how well it performed in supporting response efforts.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-91
Author(s):  
Ken Matsumoto

ABSTRACT There are many ways to evaluate the overall performance of an oil spill response operation. There is, or there should be, however, a common standpoint for looking at such operations, irrespective of the size of the spill. Lessons learned through an incident, however trivial, can provide valuable clues to the future improvement of the operation in refineries and oil terminals. But the number of incidents at one location is too few to stand the test of analysis. Evaluation by a variety of methods is now possible based on information and data available through the worldwide news and reporting networks. This paper presents a guideline, which is widely accepted by the Japanese oil industry, for evaluating responses to oil spills, and introduces a concise equation based on the rating of many response elements.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry A. Romberg ◽  
Dennis M. Maguire ◽  
Richard L. Ranger ◽  
Rod Hoffman

ABSTRACT This paper examines explosion hazards while recovering spilled oil utilizing oil spill recovery barges. The risk of static accumulation and discharge is well understood after thorough investigations of several incidents in the 1970s and 1980s involving explosions on tank barges and vessels during petroleum cargo loading and unloading operations. However, those lessons learned only partially apply to oil spill recovery operations due to the differences in liquid properties, crew training, and additional tasks required during an oil spill response. While regulatory standards have been enacted for petroleum tankers and barges involved in commercial transportation of oil and other hazardous materials, the utility of these standards for oil spill response vessels has not been fully considered. Inverviews were conducted with marine transporters and response organizations to understand the wide range of operational risks and mitigation proceedures currently in use. This paper outlines the four basic conditions that must be present to create a static discharge-induced explosion during liquid cargo operations. A review of explosion casualty history was completed for cargo operations and compared to operations that create similar hazards during oil spill recovery operations. Specific processes that create additional risk of static-induced explosions during response operations were studied to review mitigation actions. Finally, recommendations for continued training are provided to help guide the spill response community when preparing for and responding to oil spills.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 903-908
Author(s):  
James E. Elliott

ABSTRACT The United States National Park System contains over two million acres of submerged lands, and the nation's thirteen marine sanctuaries have over 18,000 square miles of ocean waters and habitats. From the public's perspective, national parks and marine sanctuaries are public goods that should be protected for future generations. Historically, however, response operations within these protected waters have not consistently preserved the environmental integrity of the nation's valuable resources. Vessels are often abandoned and remain aground, thereby emitting residual oil and physically damaging coral reefs and seagrass beds after the responders have removed the accessible oil. Additionally, responders often fail to consult with natural resource trustees and, as a result, physically damage the environment during response operations. This paper presents case studies and lessons learned from vessel groundings and oil spill response operations in national parks, marine sanctuaries, and other protected areas, from the Point Reyes National Seashore to the Florida Keys Marine Sanctuary. The topics of Natural Resource Trustee consultations, application of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, effective use of the Unified Command System, response cost internalization methods, and ecological sustainability are logically presented to argue for a more proactive and consistent national response posture in protected waters.“Surely our people do not understand even yet the rich heritage that is theirs … Our people should see to it that they are preserved for their children and their children's children forever, with their majestic beauty all unmarred.”—President Theodore Roosevelt (Shullery, 1979)


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 801-805
Author(s):  
Jonathan K. Waldron

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) promoted a coordinated industry and government enhancement of response resources to combat oil spills effectively in the United States. However, the United States remains vulnerable to oil spills near the borders it shares with Canada, Mexico, and various nations in the Caribbean due to legal and administrative impediments associated with cross-boundary spill response activities. This paper explores cross-boundary related issues that could hinder a response and the relationship and roles of industry and government with regard to such issues, and provides recommendations to enhance improved cooperation between government and industry to facilitate response activities. The international structure that currently exists—globally, regionally, and bilaterally—provides a basic framework that promotes cooperation between nations to respond harmoniously to spills threatening the shores of neighboring countries. However, the existing agreements and understandings only provide a basic umbrella. They require planning and implementation of details and commitment to take the specific actions required to implement these agreements and understandings fully. As a result, the enhanced private response capability that now exists in the United States may not be available in a spill involving cross-boundary operations. Neighboring nations must take action to facilitate cross-boundary activities by responders by providing responder-immunity protection similar to that provided under OPA 90 and by removing potential impediments to response activities: laws and other requirements relating to matters such as customs, immigration, and safety training.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 625-629
Author(s):  
Charlie Henry ◽  
Charles E. Sasser ◽  
Guerry O. Holm ◽  
Kevin Lynn ◽  
John Brolin ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Freshwater marshes cover 4000 square kilometers of the Louisiana coastal zone and are the most abundant marsh habitat type. Many of these marshes actually float as organic mats on underlying water. Some estimates suggest as much as 70% of Louisiana's coastal freshwater marsh are of the floating variety. The slow flow of water characteristic of these environments generally transports very little sediment. As a result, the marsh substrate is composed of primarily live and dead organic matter (peat formation) rather than mineral sediments. Since floating marshes are structurally different than intertidal marsh habitats, many traditional oil spill response options are ineffective or inappropriate. Access to the marsh is often limited since there is no open water ingress and the marsh structure cannot support the weight of equipment. Oil spill response options are further complicated when the source of the oil is a pipeline leak located below the floating marsh mat; spilled oil is free to travel at the interface of the underlying water and mat. Protection booming is impossible. Oil impacts often result in the death of all the living plants that are integral to the formation and sustainability of the habitat. This paper reports on two oil spills in a floating marsh near Paradis, Louisiana that occurred eight years apart. Both spills were spatially close to each other, which provided an excellent comparison for assessing potential long-term impact from oil spills in floating marshes. During both oil spill responses, unique response techniques were developed to recover spilled oil and enhance marsh recovery. An effective technique was to rake away and remove the dead oil-contaminated surface plant debris from the site and employ sorbent recovery. Lessons learned from these responses were used to develop mitigation guidance for future responses.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 693-697
Author(s):  
Tina M. Toriello ◽  
Jan Thorman ◽  
Pamela Bergmann ◽  
Richard Waldbauer

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on industry and government roles for addressing historic properties during oil spill response. In 1997, the National Response Team (NRT) developed a Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties during Emergency Response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (PA) (National Response Team, 1997). At the 1999 International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC), U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) representatives discussed the development and implementation of the PA, which is intended to ensure that historic properties are appropriately taken into account during the planning for and conducting of emergency response to oil spills and hazardous substance releases. Following the 1999 IOSC, DOI and Chevron representatives began a dialog regarding industry and government roles under the PA. Chevron invited the DOI representatives to participate in an October 1999 large-scale, industry-led spill exercise; a precedent-setting drill that included historic properties protection as a key objective. This 2001 paper focuses on how industry and government have worked together to protect historic properties, government roles in PA implementation, and lessons learned. As an example of what industry can do to support the protection of historic properties during planning and response activities, this paper describes Chevron's Historic Properties Program, a program managed under its emergency spill response environmental functional team (EFT). A discussion of lessons learned focuses on the need for clear definition of industry and government roles, and the benefits of building a foundation of cooperation between industry and government to protect historic properties. Of particular importance is the inclusion of historic properties in all aspects of oil spill preparedness and response, including planning, drills, training, and response organization structure and staffing. Experience from incident response in Alaska has shown that the PA assists Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) and responsible parties, while also protecting historic properties, when the FOSC is prepared to implement the PA promptly and effectively.


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