Industry and Government Roles in Addressing Historic Properties in Oil Spill Response: Lessons Learned From A Recent Exercise and Incidents

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 693-697
Author(s):  
Tina M. Toriello ◽  
Jan Thorman ◽  
Pamela Bergmann ◽  
Richard Waldbauer

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on industry and government roles for addressing historic properties during oil spill response. In 1997, the National Response Team (NRT) developed a Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties during Emergency Response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (PA) (National Response Team, 1997). At the 1999 International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC), U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) representatives discussed the development and implementation of the PA, which is intended to ensure that historic properties are appropriately taken into account during the planning for and conducting of emergency response to oil spills and hazardous substance releases. Following the 1999 IOSC, DOI and Chevron representatives began a dialog regarding industry and government roles under the PA. Chevron invited the DOI representatives to participate in an October 1999 large-scale, industry-led spill exercise; a precedent-setting drill that included historic properties protection as a key objective. This 2001 paper focuses on how industry and government have worked together to protect historic properties, government roles in PA implementation, and lessons learned. As an example of what industry can do to support the protection of historic properties during planning and response activities, this paper describes Chevron's Historic Properties Program, a program managed under its emergency spill response environmental functional team (EFT). A discussion of lessons learned focuses on the need for clear definition of industry and government roles, and the benefits of building a foundation of cooperation between industry and government to protect historic properties. Of particular importance is the inclusion of historic properties in all aspects of oil spill preparedness and response, including planning, drills, training, and response organization structure and staffing. Experience from incident response in Alaska has shown that the PA assists Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) and responsible parties, while also protecting historic properties, when the FOSC is prepared to implement the PA promptly and effectively.

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 363-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan C. Thorman ◽  
Pamela Bergmann

ABSTRACT In 1997, the National Response Team completed a Programmatic Agreement on Protection of Historic Properties during Emergency Response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. This agreement, which was drafted by a National Response Team ad hoc committee consisting of representatives of National Response Team member agencies, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers, has important ramifications for federal On-Scene Coordinators and responsible parties conducting spill response in the United States. The purpose of the Programmatic Agreement is to ensure that historic properties are appropriately taken into account in planning for and conducting emergency response to oil spills and hazardous substance releases under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. The agreement provides a uniform, nationwide approach to considering and protecting historic properties before and during an emergency response. Signatories, which include the U.S. Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency, agree to implement this Programmatic Agreement or to develop and then implement regional Programmatic Agreements that are consistent with the nationwide Programmatic Agreement and the National Historic Preservation Act. As of September 1998, implementation of the nationwide Programmatic Agreement and development of regional Programmatic Agreements were just beginning by Regional Response Teams and federal On-Scene Coordinators throughout the United States. The Alaska Regional Response Team, whose development of regional cultural resources guidelines in the early 1990s led to the development of the nationwide Programmatic Agreement, had begun preparing a document on implementation of the nationwide Programmatic Agreement in Alaska. The emergency response provisions of the nationwide Programmatic Agreement were implemented for the first time in the November 1997, M/V Kuroshima spill near Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The major lesson learned from this incident with regard to the nationwide Programmatic Agreement is that its provisions are workable and can contribute to the overall success of the response.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 1015-1016
Author(s):  
Bernard Bennett

ABSTRACT Achieving and maintaining preparedness for oil spill response is similar to other emergency services in that constant training is required to achieve success. Careful consideration of what training is required must be conducted through systematic task and training needs analysis. Only then can the methods and suppliers of such training be selected. Once initiated, the training must be maintained, reinforced, and updated through exercises or other schemes. This paper looks at some lessons learned from conducting oil spill training and concludes that emergency response training for oil spills can be financially justifiable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Song Li ◽  
Manel Grifoll ◽  
Miquel Estrada ◽  
Pengjun Zheng ◽  
Hongxiang Feng

Many governments have been strengthening the construction of hardware facilities and equipment to prevent and control marine oil spills. However, in order to deal with large-scale marine oil spills more efficiently, emergency materials dispatching algorithm still needs further optimization. The present study presents a methodology for emergency materials dispatching optimization based on four steps, combined with the construction of Chinese oil spill response capacity. First, the present emergency response procedure for large-scale marine oil spills should be analyzed. Second, in accordance with different grade accidents, the demands of all kinds of emergency materials are replaced by an equivalent volume that can unify the units. Third, constraint conditions of the emergency materials dispatching optimization model should be presented, and the objective function of the model should be postulated with the purpose of minimizing the largest sailing time of all oil spill emergency disposal vessels, and the difference in sailing time among vessels that belong to the same emergency materials collection and distribution point. Finally, the present study applies a toolbox and optimization solver to optimize the emergency materials dispatching problem. A calculation example is presented, highlighting the sensibility of the results at different grades of oil spills. The present research would be helpful for emergency managers in tackling an efficient materials dispatching scheme, while considering the integrated emergency response procedure.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1219-1223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Cantin ◽  
Roger Laferriere ◽  
Larry Hewett ◽  
Charlie Henry

ABSTRACT Every nation faces the possibility of a major natural disaster and few plans are in place to deal with the massive consequences that follow. When Hurricane Katrina reached landfall, the human toll and extent of damage made it the worst natural disaster in American history. The news headlines were filled with the images of desperation and the efforts of the thousands of heroes across the spectrum of government who worked tirelessly to help the citizens of the Gulf Coast of the United States recover. Less visible to the American public was the vast environmental impact caused by millions of gallons of oil released by hundreds of individual oil spills. The total oil volume lost to the environment is estimated at over 8.2 million gallons, making it the second largest oil spill in United States history. Moreover, this spill was the first major environmental disaster managed under the newly published National Response Plan, a plan developed following the tragic events of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This paper will describe how response managers overcame the incredible challenges of managing multiple oil spills in an enormous area devoid of the support infrastructure, human resources and the logistics network normally present in major spills within the United States. The authors will offer a first hand account of the strategies employed by the response management system assembled to combat the spills. They will describe key lessons learned in overcoming competition for critical resources; the importance of combining scientific, legal and other support in determining response options such as burning and debris removal; and the methodology employed in creating a Unified Area Command that included multiple responsible parties. Finally, this paper will provide insights to processes within the Joint Field Office, an element of the National Response Plan, and how well it performed in supporting response efforts.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 926-926
Author(s):  
Duane Michael Smith

ABSTRACT With the implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 came the requirement for vessels to develop plans for responding to oil spills from their vessels. While some companies had such plans in the past, the National Response System did not formally recognize their existence. Individual vessel response plans must now be viewed as an integral part of the National Response System. All of the parties that could be involved in an oil spill response must begin to view themselves as one tile of many that make up the mosaic known as the National Response System.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-91
Author(s):  
Ken Matsumoto

ABSTRACT There are many ways to evaluate the overall performance of an oil spill response operation. There is, or there should be, however, a common standpoint for looking at such operations, irrespective of the size of the spill. Lessons learned through an incident, however trivial, can provide valuable clues to the future improvement of the operation in refineries and oil terminals. But the number of incidents at one location is too few to stand the test of analysis. Evaluation by a variety of methods is now possible based on information and data available through the worldwide news and reporting networks. This paper presents a guideline, which is widely accepted by the Japanese oil industry, for evaluating responses to oil spills, and introduces a concise equation based on the rating of many response elements.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 439-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Henry

ABSTRACT Since the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), dispersants have been used as part of a combined response to mitigate seven oil spills in United States Gulf of Mexico (GOM) waters. Of the dispersant operations reported, four utilized the Regional Response Team VI pre-approval authority to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) that requires a monitoring plan. The successful integration of dispersant pre-authorization along with a fully funded ready response delivery system maintained by industry contributed to the successful use of dispersants to aid in mitigating spilled oil. A key element to gaining the original pre-approval authority was a functional operational monitoring plan. While each response was considered a successful dispersant operation, each incident provided valuable lessons learned that have been integrated into subsequent contingency planning and modifications to existing pre-authorization requirements in the GOM. This paper provides a chronological review of oil spill responses where dispersants were applied in the GOM since OPA 90.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry A. Romberg ◽  
Dennis M. Maguire ◽  
Richard L. Ranger ◽  
Rod Hoffman

ABSTRACT This paper examines explosion hazards while recovering spilled oil utilizing oil spill recovery barges. The risk of static accumulation and discharge is well understood after thorough investigations of several incidents in the 1970s and 1980s involving explosions on tank barges and vessels during petroleum cargo loading and unloading operations. However, those lessons learned only partially apply to oil spill recovery operations due to the differences in liquid properties, crew training, and additional tasks required during an oil spill response. While regulatory standards have been enacted for petroleum tankers and barges involved in commercial transportation of oil and other hazardous materials, the utility of these standards for oil spill response vessels has not been fully considered. Inverviews were conducted with marine transporters and response organizations to understand the wide range of operational risks and mitigation proceedures currently in use. This paper outlines the four basic conditions that must be present to create a static discharge-induced explosion during liquid cargo operations. A review of explosion casualty history was completed for cargo operations and compared to operations that create similar hazards during oil spill recovery operations. Specific processes that create additional risk of static-induced explosions during response operations were studied to review mitigation actions. Finally, recommendations for continued training are provided to help guide the spill response community when preparing for and responding to oil spills.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 587-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Yew Weng

ABSTRACT There are always lessons to be learnt from every oil spill response. Similarly, critics are always quick to point out how a response was too slow, the inadequacy of equipment / manpower resources and, inevitably, how the response lacks proper coordination. Yet many of these common criticisms can be resolved if artificial ‘roadblocks and red tape’ are removed so that Responders can go about doing their jobs, providing prompt responses in mitigating damages caused by oil spills. This paper will discuss the challenges of mounting an international oil spill response in the Asia Pacific with specific references to political roadblocks and red tape put up by ‘recipient’ countries. Tier 3 Oil Spill Response organizations, namely Oil Spill Response and East Asia Response Limited (OSRL/EARL), regularly practices activations and resource deployments through exercises with different scenarios. These exercises can take the form of tabletop exercises or full scale deployment of equipment, recall of Members’ regional and worldwide teams. The larger scale exercises involve trans-boundary movement of people and equipment, including boats and aircrafts. OSRL/EARL has conducted large scale exercises successfully. Unfortunately, there are also times when red tape prevented the company from responding in the swift and efficient manner that it endeavors. Various reasons given are ‘national security’ and the need for very ‘high level approvals’ as the recipient country will be deemed to be calling outside assistance for a national incident. The paper will discuss some of OSRL/EARL'S experiences like:Response organizations refusing to participate in exercises due to ‘national security’ reasonsNational agencies refusing import of equipment due to taxation lawsProtracted approval processes, and sometimes outright refusal, for materials like dispersantRefusing entry of international aircraftsClearance and complicated permit requirements for Responders entering a country to assist in the response The challenge to remove these road blocks is an uphill task. OSRL/EARL has an on-going Advocacy program to engage and cooperate on these issues with Government Agencies and relevant bodies. The Author believes that the removal of ‘road blocks’ will expedite responses to oil spills.


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