Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs): Developing Response Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2879-2894
Author(s):  
Christopher Klarmann ◽  
LCDR Johna Rossetti
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Response ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
Marine Environmental

ABSTRACT ID: 2017-101 – GIUEs: Developing Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 to conduct Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUE), a cornerstone of the oil spill exercise cycle. These exercises are instrumental for USCG Captains of the Port (COTP) to evaluate industry preparedness for oil spill response by specifically testing a facility or vessel on notification procedures, response time, and deployment of facility-owned or Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) equipment. Facility Response Plan holders and Vessel Response Plan holders are subject to these exercises under federal regulations 33 C.F.R. § 154 and § 155. In 2013, the USCG restructured their GIUE policy to provide better guidance for employees. This updated policy detailed how to properly plan and conduct a GIUE as well as established expectations following both satisfactory and unsatisfactory exercises. In this paper we will examine the changes that the USCG has made regarding its policy on planning and conducting GIUEs, describe how USCG field units are implementing the new policy, including how unsatisfactory GIUEs are addressed, and examine what commonalities, are being seen in GIUE unsatisfactory results. Finally, we will discuss how plan holders, OSROs, and regulatory agencies can work together to better prepare for responding to an environmental emergency when it occurs.

Oil Spill Risks from Nontank Vessels1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Emergency Plan ◽  
Heavy Fuel Oil ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT An issue of increasing concern worldwide is that of oil spills from nontank vessels that carry large quantities of petroleum product as fuel or lubricants. The New Carissa incident in Oregon in 1999 is only one of several that have impacted the U.S. West Coast in the last few years. Others include the M/V Kuroshima, which grounded in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 1997, and the M/V Kure, which spilled oil in Humbolt Bay also in 1997. The Tenyo Maru was cut in half in a collision and sank with the loss of one life and a spill of at least 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil and diesel in Washington State in 1991. Additional examples of both spills and threats of spills are sited, both in the United States and worldwide. This paper examines a number of actions that have been taken in response to this threat. One such model is the Canadian requirement that vessel owner/operators demonstrate a formal agreement with an approved response contractor, and list that contractor in their Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). A more comprehensive approach would be to establish approved “umbrella” contingency plans for major port areas, supported by contracts with oil spill removal organizations (OSROs). This preferred model has been adopted by the U.S. West Coast states, and affords the opportunity for the contracted responders to drill with emergency response officials, thus improving the likelihood of an efficient, coordinated spill response. This paper also proposes spill prevention design elements for nontank vessels.

scholarly journals The Marine Salvage Industry: Proven in Preventing Oil Spills

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Policies ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.

scholarly journals Meaningful Engagement: Improving and Expanding Tribal Engagement in Federal Emergency Response in the Pacific Northwest

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chrystin McLelland ◽  
Haley Kennard
Keyword(s):  
Pacific Northwest ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Petroleum Products ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Tribal Member ◽  
Response Planning

Abstract: The Northwest Region (the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho) of the United States is home to 43 federally recognized treaty Tribes, who are resource co-managers within their traditional territories and have both decision-making power and sovereign legal rights. There is also a significant refinement and transportation of petroleum products (by rail, pipeline, and vessel) within this area and in our transboundary waters. In Washington alone, more than 20 billion gallons are moved through and across the state on an annual basis. The Northwest Area Committee (NWAC) and Region 10 Regional Response Team (RRT10), the federally mandated bodies which conduct oil pollution and hazardous materials spill response planning, are therefore robust and very active. Within the last decade, tribal engagement in the NWAC and RRT10 has expanded significantly; the RRT10 now has three official tribal members, and the NWAC has supported a Tribal Engagement Task Force for the past four years and is currently looking at transitioning it to a longer-term and more permanent sub-committee strategy. This presentation will discuss the following pieces of the efforts towards tribal engagement in the NWAC/RRT10: 1) The evolution of tribal engagement in the RRT10/NWAC and lessons learned from this process 2) A case study of the unique experience of the Makah Tribe's engagement with the greater response community including both becoming the first tribal member of the NWAC/RRT10 and the development of their memorandum of agreement with the US Coast Guard, and 3) Results from the 2019 Tribal Engagement Task Force's tribal feedback survey (sent out to all Tribes in the region) to identify barriers and strategies for improved meaningful tribal engagement. This reflects the commitment of the NWAC/RRT10 to improving tribal engagement by understanding; the results can not only inform partners in other regions but will inform the next phase of the NWAC/RRT10's approach to tribal engagement. The Northwest Area model for tribal engagement in oil spill planning, preparedness, and response is an important precedent for national and international engagement with Indigenous peoples in this arena.

THE STATES/BC OIL SPILL TASK FORCEAN—INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOR FORMULATING AND INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
British Columbia ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Response ◽  
Regional Coordination

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.

RESULTS OF A FULL-SCALE SURPRISE TEST OF SUN'S MAJOR SPILL RESPONSE PLAN

1985 ◽  
Vol 1985 (1) ◽  
pp. 623-625
Author(s):  
Leon J. Kazmierczak ◽  
Thomas A. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Voluntary Agreement ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
To Come ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Sun Transport, the Marine division of Sun Refining and Marketing Company, a subsidiary of Sun Company, Inc., has conducted a series of drills to assess the effectiveness of its Oil Spill Response Plan. The latest drill, third in the series, was conducted in September 1982. Papers presented at the 1979, 1981, and 1983 Oil Spill Conference describe the plan, its rationale, and the previous two drills. This paper reviews the training progression of the previous exercises and reports on the findings and experiences of this latest exercise. As in previous drills, the planning committee and a few others were the only people in Sun Company with any prior knowledge of the drill. This simulation was the most extensive. It involved simultaneous and separate call-out scenarios, full-scale use of contractor cleanup crew and equipment, chartering aircraft, and participation by representatives of the Clean Caribbean Cooperative, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), and the U.S. Coast Guard. The realism provided by this exercise allowed each participant to experience firsthand the problems on-scene at a major cleanup operation and to come away with confidence in managing them.

U.S. NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE POLICY1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Lead Agency ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
International Engagement ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.

Developing an International Oil Spill Policy Strategy for the U.S.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 913-917
Author(s):  
Michael Adams
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Integrated Policy ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT As called for under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), “Parties to the OPRC convention are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.” As a signatory to OPRC the U.S. Government (USG) has pledged to assist other countries in the development of their own oil spill response capabilities and while USG has many agreements that meet the guidelines of assisting other countries, there is no formal engagement strategy for developing further agreements, no agency championing this effort, and there are many still requiring assistance. However, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to perform the role of drafting an engagement strategy and working with the global community to assist those countries that have yet to develop an adequate oil spill response system of their own due to the lack of resources, expertise or both. There are many hurdles to enabling USCG to assume the OPRC assistance banner that have been previously addressed (Adams, IOSC 2001), which this paper will not seek to readdress. However, if USG does decide to move forward with an integrated policy there remains the need to develop an adequate engagement strategy. This strategy is necessary to ensure the limited resources available for foreign assistance are expended in the most cost effective, ethical and responsible manner possible. There are three alternative strategies I will analyze in an effort to determine the best suited for implementation of this policy. These three strategies are based primarily on 1) environmental need, 2) geographical proximity, and 3) political/economic interests. The goal of this strategy is to effectively implement the oil spill assistance policy alluded to previously in support of the U.S.'s pledge under OPRC. This paper will analyze the success of each strategy making a recommendation on which one USG should pursue.

Implications of OPA 90 in General and Its Effect on the T-AO 187 Class Oilers in Particular

1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Maritime Organization ◽  
The Status ◽  
Oil Tankers ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Hull Construction

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.

TO BOLDLY GO WHERE NO STATE HAS GONE BEFORE1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Marine Safety

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.

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