RESULTS OF A FULL-SCALE SURPRISE TEST OF SUN'S MAJOR SPILL RESPONSE PLAN

1985 ◽  
Vol 1985 (1) ◽  
pp. 623-625
Author(s):  
Leon J. Kazmierczak ◽  
Thomas A. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Voluntary Agreement ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
To Come ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Sun Transport, the Marine division of Sun Refining and Marketing Company, a subsidiary of Sun Company, Inc., has conducted a series of drills to assess the effectiveness of its Oil Spill Response Plan. The latest drill, third in the series, was conducted in September 1982. Papers presented at the 1979, 1981, and 1983 Oil Spill Conference describe the plan, its rationale, and the previous two drills. This paper reviews the training progression of the previous exercises and reports on the findings and experiences of this latest exercise. As in previous drills, the planning committee and a few others were the only people in Sun Company with any prior knowledge of the drill. This simulation was the most extensive. It involved simultaneous and separate call-out scenarios, full-scale use of contractor cleanup crew and equipment, chartering aircraft, and participation by representatives of the Clean Caribbean Cooperative, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), and the U.S. Coast Guard. The realism provided by this exercise allowed each participant to experience firsthand the problems on-scene at a major cleanup operation and to come away with confidence in managing them.

Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs): Developing Response Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2879-2894
Author(s):  
Christopher Klarmann ◽  
LCDR Johna Rossetti
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Response ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
Marine Environmental

ABSTRACT ID: 2017-101 – GIUEs: Developing Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 to conduct Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUE), a cornerstone of the oil spill exercise cycle. These exercises are instrumental for USCG Captains of the Port (COTP) to evaluate industry preparedness for oil spill response by specifically testing a facility or vessel on notification procedures, response time, and deployment of facility-owned or Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) equipment. Facility Response Plan holders and Vessel Response Plan holders are subject to these exercises under federal regulations 33 C.F.R. § 154 and § 155. In 2013, the USCG restructured their GIUE policy to provide better guidance for employees. This updated policy detailed how to properly plan and conduct a GIUE as well as established expectations following both satisfactory and unsatisfactory exercises. In this paper we will examine the changes that the USCG has made regarding its policy on planning and conducting GIUEs, describe how USCG field units are implementing the new policy, including how unsatisfactory GIUEs are addressed, and examine what commonalities, are being seen in GIUE unsatisfactory results. Finally, we will discuss how plan holders, OSROs, and regulatory agencies can work together to better prepare for responding to an environmental emergency when it occurs.

U.S. NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE POLICY1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Lead Agency ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
International Engagement ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.

Developing an International Oil Spill Policy Strategy for the U.S.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 913-917
Author(s):  
Michael Adams
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Integrated Policy ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT As called for under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), “Parties to the OPRC convention are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.” As a signatory to OPRC the U.S. Government (USG) has pledged to assist other countries in the development of their own oil spill response capabilities and while USG has many agreements that meet the guidelines of assisting other countries, there is no formal engagement strategy for developing further agreements, no agency championing this effort, and there are many still requiring assistance. However, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to perform the role of drafting an engagement strategy and working with the global community to assist those countries that have yet to develop an adequate oil spill response system of their own due to the lack of resources, expertise or both. There are many hurdles to enabling USCG to assume the OPRC assistance banner that have been previously addressed (Adams, IOSC 2001), which this paper will not seek to readdress. However, if USG does decide to move forward with an integrated policy there remains the need to develop an adequate engagement strategy. This strategy is necessary to ensure the limited resources available for foreign assistance are expended in the most cost effective, ethical and responsible manner possible. There are three alternative strategies I will analyze in an effort to determine the best suited for implementation of this policy. These three strategies are based primarily on 1) environmental need, 2) geographical proximity, and 3) political/economic interests. The goal of this strategy is to effectively implement the oil spill assistance policy alluded to previously in support of the U.S.'s pledge under OPRC. This paper will analyze the success of each strategy making a recommendation on which one USG should pursue.

ESA Section 7: Time for a Refresh in the Pre-Spill Planning Consultation Process

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley
Keyword(s):  
Endangered Species ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Service Agency ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.

CALIFORNIA OIL SPILL DISPERSANT PLAN-ACHIEVEMENT THROUGH COOPERATION

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 433-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Ellen Faurot-Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Decision Tool ◽  
Operational Window ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
National Significance ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The use of dispersants in marine waters off California requires detailed foresight and planning. In an effort to expedite a decision to use dispersants and reduce first strike response time, the Region IX Regional Response Team tasked Californias Marine Area Committees to recommend dispersant approval zones. Each Area Committee conducted Net Environmental Benefit Analyses for their areas of responsibility, and from those analyses recommended dispersant zone designations to the U.S. Coast Guard and the Regional Response Team (RRT). All zone recommendations were approved by the RRT in July 2002, and development of the remaining elements of the dispersant plan began. Using primarily a model developed in New Zealand, the authors drafted a comprehensive dispersant use plan for the waters off California. The U.S. Coast Guard Captains of the Port in California reviewed the draft plan, and tested it during the April, 2004 Spill of National Significance (SONS) drill in southern California. The streamlined decision flowcharts, imbedded “Decision Boxes” and operational appendices with further instructions, forms and resource contact information, proved the California Dispersant Plan was a very intuitive and workable response decision tool. During the SONS drill, this greatly improved the ability of the Unified Command to make a decision regarding dispersant use, get the resources in place, and begin dispersant sorties within the operational “window” for dispersant use. It is expected that the same expedited and informed response process will serve California well during an actual oil spill response.

scholarly journals UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY “THEN” AND “NOW”

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.

scholarly journals The Marine Salvage Industry: Proven in Preventing Oil Spills

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Policies ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.

VESSEL RESPONSE PLAN REQUIREMENTS: OBSERVATIONS BY INTERTANKO

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-262
Author(s):  
Charles R. Corbett
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Contingency Plans ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
Oil Spill Cleanup ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The U.S. government has elected to proceed unilaterally with respect to oil spill response plans for vessels—despite the fact that it is party to two important treaties which support a globally unified system. While the timetable for implementing the vessel response plans required by U. S. legislation moves forward for tanker owners, the U. S. executive branch has not kept pace by providing badly needed guidelines—demanded by the same legislation. Of particular importance are the failure of revisions to the U. S. National Contingency Plan, area contingency plans, and oil spill cleanup contractor approval procedures and guidelines to appear.

MSRC SHUTTLE BARGE SYSTEM FOR SHALLOW-WATER OIL SPILL CLEANUP

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 844-847
Author(s):  
George W. Dowell ◽  
Tom Coudon
Keyword(s):  
Shallow Water ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Virgin Islands ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Requirement ◽  
Recovery Capacity ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Oil Spill Cleanup ◽  
The U.S ◽  
New System

ABSTRACT When the U.S. Coast Guard stipulated that 20 percent of oil spill response requirement had to be capable of use in shallow water, MSRC began the design of a new system. To meet the recovery capacity requirements, early decisions mandated that the system be operable in two feet of water with a swift current, capable of beaching without damage, road transportable without permits, and comply with all Coast Guard rules for documentation and inspection. The resulting shuttle barge systems are stored, on trailers, at 15 coastal U.S. sites, and in Hawaii and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

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