V. Federal Reserve Relations with the Government in the Thirties

1965 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Federal Reserve ◽  
The Government

scholarly journals SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2007–2008: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (PART I)

Ekonomika ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaidotas Pajarskas ◽  
Aldona Jočienė
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mortgage Market ◽  
Subprime Mortgage ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Mortgage Crisis ◽  
Subprime Mortgage Crisis ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

The main purpose of this article is to determine which factors and how contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007–2008, what their causal links and effects on the markets and the whole economy were, and to assess what actions could have been taken by the Federal Reserve and the Government in order to mitigate or prevent the consequences of subprime mortgage crisis and housing bubble. In order to obtain the research results, the authors performed a qualitative analysis of the scientific literature on the course of events and their development that led to the subprime mortgage crisis, and focused on the insufficiently regulated home mortgage market expansion, the impact on the subprime mortgage crisis of financial innovations and financial engineering, poorly evaluated systemic risks and policy undertaken by both the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve before and after the crisis. The quantitative research focused on two main parts: firstly, analysis of the dependence between the causes of subprime mortgage crisis and the consequences, using a statistical and regression analysis, and secondly, an alternative path the Government and the Federal Reserve could have taken in their policy actions and the results they could have produced. The authors believe that the results of the research could give useful guidelines to the central bankers and government officials on how to make long-term decisions that can help in preparing for the financial distress, mitigating the consequences when the crisis strikes, accelerating the recovery and even preventing the crisis it in the future. The second part of the qualitative research will appear in the next issue of the journal.

scholarly journals Private shareholding: An analysis of an eclectic group of central banks

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jannie Rossouw
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
Dividend Payments ◽  
Implementation Of Monetary Policy ◽  
The Government

Although the title seems to be a contradictio in terminis, this paper identifies a small, eclectic number of central banks with private shareholders about which little has been published. It is shown that only the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States (US) Federal Reserve allow shareholding other than by the government of the respective countries, although not in all instances by the general public. This paper considers private shareholding in this eclectic group of central banks, despite the trend of nationalising central banks that commenced in 1935. Private shareholding is defined as shareholding in a central bank by any party other than the respective government or governments (e.g. the European Central Bank) where the central bank is located.Large differences in the classes of shareholders of these eclectic central banks and differences in their approaches to dividend payments are highlighted in the paper. The conclusions reached are, firstly, that investment only in the shares of the central banks of Belgium and Greece (albeit only for residents in the latter instance) can be regarded as growth investments. Secondly, shareholding in the Italian central bank has been used to recapitalise ailing commercial banks. Thirdly, shareholders play no role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Lastly, the shareholding structure of these banks contributes to improved governance in the case of the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey, but no evidence can be found that central banks with shareholders in any way outperform central banks without shareholders.

scholarly journals PIERWSZY BANK STANÓW ZJEDNOCZONYCH JAKO PIERWOWZÓR SYSTEMU REZERWY FEDERALNEJ

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 171
Author(s):  
Wojciech Kwiatkowski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Banking Institution ◽  
The Right

First Bank of the United States as a Prototype for the Federal Reserve SystemSummaryThe article describes the history of the First Bank of the United Statesfirst banking- institution, that was charted in XVII-th century North America as an effect of a cooperation of two federal bodies – Congress and the President. Although, the federal government possessed only 20 %, of the shares with federal licences it could conduct its activity on territory of the whole country. Moreover – the Bank is now referred to as the first central bank in the United States because of its national scope and services rendered to the federal government. The Bank helped the government to obtain emergency loans, facilitated the payment of taxes, and served as the receiver and disburser of the public funds. In addition, it issued bank notes and made them fully redeemable in coin. During a 20-years period the Bank achieved a commercial success and maintained a financial stability. However, in 1811 Congress did not renew the charter because the Bank’s constitutionality was questioned.Alexander Hamilton (the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury), who was [the followerof creation of the bank, already in 1790 assumed that the federal government had the power to charter banks because the Constitution granted the government the right to establish institutions necessary for its operations. Addifferent viewpoint was presented by Thomas Jefferson who favored a more decentralized government and believed that only the states could charter banks under the Constitution. Furthermore – because the Constitution did not expressly grant the power to Congress, he reasoned that federally chartered banks were unconstitutional. Finally in 1819, as a far-reaching decision, the Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall followed Hamilton’s reasoning and ruled in case McCulloch vs Maryland that the Second Bank of the United States was constitutional. For U.S. federal government this decision of the Supreme Court was very important about 200 years later – in 1913, when president Wilson, many politicians’ and main U.S. bankers decided to create the Federal Reserve System.

High US government debt does not itself raise risks

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Government Debt ◽  
Business Investment ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Us Government ◽  
Deficit Spending ◽  
The Government

Significance Some economists are suggesting that, over the longer term, this could cause financial markets to stop buying US debt and charge prohibitively high rates, and cause the dollar to crash. Other economists argue that more deficit spending could fuel output and so keep relative debt levels in check. Impacts The government retirement trust funds will continue to be major buyers of government debt. In the recovery and beyond, financing the debt could raise private borrowing costs, reduce business investment and slow economic growth. High and rising debt might constrain policymakers in their ability to respond to unforeseen events. A higher debt path that boosts interest rates would give the Federal Reserve more flexibility in implementing monetary policy.

scholarly journals Central Banking in Rawls’s Property-Owning Democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 674-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens van ’t Klooster
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
The Us ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

The dramatic events of the crisis have reignited debates on the independence of central banks and the scope of their mandates. In this article, I contribute to the normative understanding of these developments by discussing John Rawls’s position in debates of the 1950s and 1960s on the independence of the US Federal Reserve. Rawls’s account of the central bank in his property-owning democracy, Democratic Central Banking (DCB), assigns authority over monetary policy directly to the government and prioritizes low unemployment over price stability. I contrast DCB with Central Bank Independence (CBI), which requires that the central bank is independent of the government and pursues low inflation. I evaluate DCB by asking whether justice as fairness requires democratic control of the central bank and argue that it does not. Instead, so I argue, the choice between DCB and CBI should be justified in terms of the difference principle. By reflecting on central banking in a property-owning democracy, I cast new light on the Rawlsian realistic utopia of a just capitalist society, while also investigating democratic objections to today’s independent central banks.

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