scholarly journals Private shareholding: An analysis of an eclectic group of central banks

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jannie Rossouw
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
European Central ◽  
Dividend Payments ◽  
Implementation Of Monetary Policy ◽  
The Government

Although the title seems to be a contradictio in terminis, this paper identifies a small, eclectic number of central banks with private shareholders about which little has been published. It is shown that only the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States (US) Federal Reserve allow shareholding other than by the government of the respective countries, although not in all instances by the general public. This paper considers private shareholding in this eclectic group of central banks, despite the trend of nationalising central banks that commenced in 1935. Private shareholding is defined as shareholding in a central bank by any party other than the respective government or governments (e.g. the European Central Bank) where the central bank is located.Large differences in the classes of shareholders of these eclectic central banks and differences in their approaches to dividend payments are highlighted in the paper. The conclusions reached are, firstly, that investment only in the shares of the central banks of Belgium and Greece (albeit only for residents in the latter instance) can be regarded as growth investments. Secondly, shareholding in the Italian central bank has been used to recapitalise ailing commercial banks. Thirdly, shareholders play no role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Lastly, the shareholding structure of these banks contributes to improved governance in the case of the central banks of Belgium, Greece, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland and Turkey, but no evidence can be found that central banks with shareholders in any way outperform central banks without shareholders.

scholarly journals Nepriklausomas centrinis bankas

Teisė ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 198-208
Author(s):  
Vytautas Vaškelaitis
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
European Central ◽  
European System ◽  
Independence Dimension ◽  
The Government

Straipsnyje analizuojama centrinio banko nepriklausomumo problema istoriniu, teoriniu ir taikomuoju požiūriais. Iškeliami nepriklausomumo argumentai, atskleidžiama jo esmė, apibrėžiamos nepriklauso­mumo ribos, aptariamas veiklos skaidrumas. Prieinama prie išvados, kad centrinis bankas turėtų būti nepriklausomas nuo vyriausybės, kartu jo veiklą derinant su įstatymų leidžiamuoju ir vykdomuoju vals­tybės institutais. Tyrimo kontekste nagrinėjami pokyčiai, susiję su Europos ekonominės ir pinigų sąjun­gos susikūrimu, nepriklausomumo dimensija Europos centrinių bankų sistemos formate. Nustatoma, kad šiomis sąlygomis kai kuriose srityse nacionaliniai centriniai bankai turi savarankiškumą, kitose – Eu­ropos centrinis bankas naudojasi nacionalinių centrinių bankų paslaugomis, be to, Europos centrinis bankas veikia visiškai savarankiškai. The article analyzes the problem of central bank independence a historical, theoretical, and practice terms. The independence of the arguments raised, disclosed in its essence, defines the limits of inde­pendence, the transparency of the operation in question. Accessible to the conclusion that the central bank should be independent from the government, while its activity in combination with the legislative and executive state institutions. The study examined the context of changes in European economic and monetary union within the independence dimension of the European System of Central Banks in format. Determined that under these conditions in some areas of the national central banks have independence, the other – the European Central Bank uses the services of national central banks, in addition to an­other – the European Central Bank is fully independent.

The ECB as Lender of Last Resort in the Eurozone? An analysis of an optimal institutional design of Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence within the context of the Banking Union

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 628-668
Author(s):  
Sara Elisa Dietz
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
European Central

The latest financial crises in Europe and the United States have reminded us of the importance of the role of central banks as Lender of Last Resort. This article examines the current legal framework in the European Union with regard to the allocation of Lender of Last Resort competence, which until now has been exercised by the national central banks in the Eurozone. The new Emergency Liquidity Assistance Agreement 2017 sustains this institutional design, leaves the Emergency Liquidity Assistance competence with the national central banks and specifies the cooperation between the European Central Bank and the national central banks with regard to the veto-option of the European Central Bank to national Emergency Liquidity Assistance operations. Against this background, the paper discusses whether the current legal competence structure of the European and Monetary Union would also allow for more authority of the European Central Bank with regard to Emergency Liquidity Assistance powers. The paper concludes there is a sufficient legal basis in the monetary policy and financial stability mandate of the European Central Bank to allow it to grant Emergency Liquidity Assistance at least with regard to ‘significant’ banks, as defined under the current European Banking Supervision regime.

Is SDR Creation Inflationary?

Policy Papers ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (7) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
International Reserves ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
European Central ◽  
The World ◽  
The U.S

Giving greater prominence to SDRs in international reserves would entail allocating them more frequently in significant amounts. The question has properly been raised whether such issuance would be inflationary for the world economy. This short paper addresses that question. It explores five different “scenarios” that describe how recipient countries and the leading central banks—most notably the U.S. Federal Reserve (FRB) and the EU’s European Central Bank (ECB)—would respond to those allocations. It concludes that SDR issuance would be inflationary for the world economy under two of the scenarios, but not under the remaining three scenarios, which include the most likely ones.

scholarly journals Unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank: A brief recapitulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Financial Market ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
European Central ◽  
National Bank

<p>The financial and economic crisis that has hit many economies in recent years has significantly increased the activity of central banks. After using the standard instruments of conducting monetary policy, in view of the obstruction of monetary impulse transmission channels, they reached for non-standard instruments. Among them, asset purchase programs played a signifciant role. The European Central Bank (ECB) launched the largest asset purchase programme (APP) of this type in 2014 and expired in December 2018. The aim of the undertaken activities was to improve the situation on the financial market and stimulate economic growth. The article reviews the literature and results of research on the effects of the program and indicates the possibility of using the ECB’s experience in conducting monetary policy by the National Bank of Poland.</p>

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