Justification awareness
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Abstract We offer a new semantic approach to formal epistemology that incorporates two principal ideas: (i) justifications are prime objects of the model: knowledge and belief are defined evidence-based concepts; (ii) awareness restrictions are applied to justifications rather than to propositions, which allows for the maintaining of desirable closure properties. The resulting structures, Justification Awareness Models, JAMs, naturally include major justification models, Kripke models and, in addition, represent situations with multiple possibly fallible justifications which, in full generality, were previously off the scope of rigorous epistemic modeling.
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2020 ◽
Vol 29
(2)
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pp. 688-704
2010 ◽
Vol 20
(3)
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pp. 100-105
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2020 ◽
Vol 5
(4)
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pp. 1026-1038