Buckets of steam and left-handed hammers. The fool’s errand as a signal of epistemic and coalitional dominance

In various professional groups, experts send rookies on absurd tasks as a prank. The fool’s errand appears in factories and hospitals, in elite schools and scout camps, among soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Why are newcomers deceived and humiliated and why are fool’s errands similar in structure despite various contexts and remarkably persistent over time? Here I propose that the cultural success of this social institution and its recurrent features across history and cultures are based on evolved cognitive mechanisms activated by apprenticeship as social learning and group induction. I will show that evolved mechanisms of epistemic vigilance explain how novices are reliably deceived by experts using opaque statements erroneously perceived as pedagogical. Furthermore, evolved capacities for coalition building explain why insiders use the prank as strategic signaling of hierarchies based on epistemic asymmetry. The intersection of cognitive mechanisms and patterns of professional recruitment create a tradition where insiders coordinate to humiliate newcomers to assert epistemic and coalitional dominance.

The strategic role of corporate online references: building social capital through signaling in business networks

Purpose This paper aims to conceptualize corporate reference management as a strategic signaling activity in business networks. While research has extensively outlined how firms develop and maintain social capital through business-to-business (B2B) relationships, less is known about how they signal their participation in business networks to develop this social capital. Therefore, this paper conceptualizes B2B references, in particular corporate online references (COR), as a tool through which firms “borrow” attractiveness from their business network. Through the lens of structural social capital theory, COR is shown to capture advantages related to interconnectedness between firms. Design/methodology/approach The paper reports on a two-step qualitative and quantitative research design. First, the authors undertook a qualitative study that reports on the COR practices of senior business managers. A quantitative study then uses social network analysis (SNA) to audit a digital business network comprising 1,098 firms in a metropolitan area of the UK, referencing to each other through their corporate websites using COR. Findings The analyses find that COR practices contribute to building structural social capital in networks through strategic signaling. Firms do so by managing B2B references to craft strategic signals, using five steps: requesting, granting, curating, coding and decoding references. While the existing literature on business marketing portrays reference management as a routine and operational management practice, this investigation conceptualizes reference management, in particular COR, as a strategic activity. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to use SNA to represent B2B references in the form of COR as a network, which overlaps with (but is not entirely identical to) the business network. Further, the study re-conceptualizes reference management as a strategic signaling activity that leverages the firm’s participation in business networks to build structural social capital by borrowing attractiveness of prestigious business partners that leverages existing structural social capital. Finally, the paper coins and conceptualizes COR as an exemplar of referencing management and offers propositions for further research.

Strategic Signaling for Selling Information Goods

This paper studies the benefit in using signaling by an information seller holding information that can completely disambiguate some uncertainty concerning the state of the world for the information buyer. We show that a necessary condition for having the information seller benefit from signaling in this model is having some ``seed of truth" in the signaling scheme used. We then introduce two natural signaling mechanisms that adhere to this condition, one where the seller pre-commits to the signaling scheme to be used and the other where she commits to use a signaling scheme that contains a ``seed of truth". Finally, we analyze the equilibrium resulting from each and show that, somehow counter-intuitively, despite the inherent differences between the two mechanisms, they are equivalent in the sense that for any equilibrium associated with the maximum revenue in one there is an equilibrium offering the seller the same revenue in the other.

Choice Manipulation Through Comparability in Markets with Verifiable Multi-Attribute Products

We illustrate how an information sender may use unverifiable signals regarding a set of substitute products located in an alternative market to manipulate the choices made by uninformed but perfectly rational decision makers (DMs) within the verifiable market where the information sender operates. We do so by defining an optimal information gathering structure for rational DMs who acquire information sequentially from a set of multidimensional products. The resulting strategic signaling environment delivers two main results that are illustrated numerically. First, in order for the sender to successfully manipulate the information gathering and choice behavior of DMs, he should release signals on characteristics that differ from their most preferred ones. Second, the capacity of the sender to manipulate the behavior of DMs depends negatively on his reputation regarding the expected value of the unobserved characteristics guaranteed to DMs within the market where he operates. Normative applications to online search environments conditioned by the provision of strategic reviews in social media are presented.